

No. 25-

IN THE
Supreme Court of the United States

NATIONAL ASSOCIATION FOR GUN RIGHTS AND
TONI THERESA SPERA FLANIGAN,

Petitioners,

v.

NED LAMONT, IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS THE
GOVERNOR OF THE STATE OF CONNECTICUT, *et al.*,

Respondents.

ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES
COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

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QUESTION PRESENTED

This Court has held that arms typically possessed by law-abiding citizens for lawful purposes are protected by the Second Amendment. *District of Columbia v. Heller*, 554 U.S. 570, 625 (2008). The Second Circuit disagrees. It wrote: “Even assuming *arguendo* that the desired firearms and magazines are ‘typically possessed’ and ‘in common use’ for lawful purposes, *we disagree* [that they are necessarily protected by the Second Amendment.]” Pet.App. 30a (emphasis added).

The question presented is:

Whether a ban on the possession of AR-15-style rifles and firearm magazines with a capacity in excess of ten rounds—both of which are possessed by millions of law-abiding Americans for lawful purposes—violates the Second Amendment.

PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING

Petitioners National Association for Gun Rights and Toni Theresa Spera Flanigan were the plaintiffs in the district court and plaintiffs-appellants in the court of appeals.

Respondents Ned Lamont, in his official capacity as the Governor of the State of Connecticut, Patrick J. Griffin, in his official capacity as the Chief State's Attorney of the State of Connecticut, and Sharmese L. Walcott, in her official capacity as the State's Attorney, Hartford Judicial District, were the defendants in the district court and the defendant-appellees in the court of appeals.

CORPORATE DISCLOSURE STATEMENT

National Association for Gun Rights has no parent corporation, and there is no publicly held corporation that owns 10% or more of its stock.

STATEMENT OF RELATED PROCEEDINGS

The following proceedings are related to this case within the meaning of Supreme Court Rule 14.1(b)(iii).

- *National Association for Gun Rights v. Lamont*, No. 23-1162 (2nd Cir. Aug. 22, 2025)
- *National Association for Gun Rights v. Lamont*, No. 22-cv-1118 (D. Conn. Aug. 3, 2023)

The following case was consolidated with Petitioners' case in *National Association for Gun Rights v. Lamont*, No. 23-1162 (2nd Cir. 2025):

- *Grant v. Lamont*, No. 22-cv-1223 (D. Conn. Aug. 28, 2023)

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PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

In *District of Columbia v. Heller*, 554 U.S. 570 (2008), this Court held that under the text, history, and tradition of the Second Amendment, the government may not categorically ban arms typically possessed by law-abiding citizens for lawful purposes. *Id.* at 625, 628-29. Unfortunately, in the years that followed, the circuit courts ignored *Heller*’s “text, history, and tradition” test, opting instead to review Second Amendment challenges under a judge-empowering “balancing test.” See *New York State Rifle & Pistol Association, Inc. v. Bruen*, 597 U.S. 1, 17-19, 24, 26 (2022). *Bruen* abrogated those cases, reiterated *Heller*’s text, history, and tradition standard, and admonished the lower courts to review Second Amendment challenges under that standard. *Id.* at 24, 26. Unfortunately, when it comes to reviewing firearms bans, the lower federal courts have ignored *Bruen*’s admonition, and this case is perhaps the most egregious example yet.

Plaintiffs challenge Connecticut’s categorical ban on AR-15s and firearm magazines with a capacity greater than ten rounds. Under the *Heller* test, it should have been easy for the lower courts to find that those arms bans violate the Second Amendment. Rifles and magazines are “bearable arms” and are therefore manifestly “Arms” covered by the plain text of the Constitution. See *Heller*, 554 U.S. at 582. As for history and tradition, *Heller* has already told us that there is no historical tradition that supports banning weapons in common use for lawful purposes by law-abiding citizens. *Id.* at 625-27.

Plaintiffs submitted evidence that Americans own over 20 million AR-15s or similar rifles and at least 150 million magazines with a capacity greater than ten

rounds. Pet.App. 128a-129a.¹ There was never any doubt about the common use issue. Indeed, the Second Circuit previously conceded that the rifles and magazines banned by the State “are in common use as that term was used in *Heller*.” *New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n, Inc. v. Cuomo*, 804 F.3d 242, 255 (2d Cir. 2015) (internal quotation marks omitted), and the court below never expressed any disagreement with this holding.

Plaintiffs then argued that Connecticut’s arms bans violate the Second Amendment “because they constitute a categorical ban on widely popular weapons in common use today for lawful purposes,” and this, standing alone, “is sufficient for finding that possessing the regulated weapons is protected by the Second Amendment.” Pet. App. 29a (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). The circuit court rejected Plaintiffs’ argument. It stated that “[e]ven assuming *arguendo* that the desired firearms and magazines are ‘typically possessed’ and ‘in common use’ for lawful purposes, *we disagree* [that they are necessarily protected by the Second Amendment].” Pet. App. 30a (internal citations and quotation marks omitted; emphasis added).

According to the circuit court, even if the banned weapons are in common use, it may nevertheless uphold the State’s ban because *Heller* did not really mean what it seemed to unambiguously say—i.e., that the Second Amendment protects weapons in common use by law-abiding Americans. Instead, according to the circuit court, this Court’s precedents do “not shield popular weapons from review of their potentially *unusually dangerous*

1. The State admitted that 3.8 million such magazines are lawfully owned in Connecticut alone. Pet.App. 132a, n.27.

character.” Pet.App. 30a (emphasis added). Then, under the guise of performing a search for historical analogues to the challenged statutes, the circuit court engaged in an interest-balancing analysis that was practically indistinguishable from the intermediate scrutiny analysis it performed before *Bruen* in *Cuomo*. See Pet. App. 46a-49a. The result of that interest-balancing inquiry was not surprising. The court held that the challenged statutes are likely constitutional because the arms they ban are “usually dangerous.” Pet.App. 60a. In other words, the circuit court did the very thing *Bruen* specifically prohibited. *Id.*, 597 U.S. at 29, n.7 (courts may not “engage in independent means-end scrutiny under the guise of an analogical inquiry.”). And the panel’s assertion that it may uphold an arms ban *even if* the banned arm is in common use for lawful purposes by millions of law-abiding Americans is probably the most flagrant violation yet of this Court’s Second Amendment precedents.

The Court should grant the petition because the question presented is of critical importance to tens of millions of law-abiding AR-15 and magazine owners throughout the country. See *Snope v. Brown*, 145 S. Ct. 1534, 1538 (2025) (Thomas, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari). Justice Kavanaugh noted that the *Snope* plaintiffs had a “strong argument” that AR-15s are in common use and therefore protected by the Second Amendment. *Id.*, 145 S. Ct. 1534 (Kavanaugh, J., statement respecting denial of certiorari). Thus, the Second Circuit’s holding that a ban on the “most popular civilian rifle in America”² is consistent with the Second Amendment is, to say the least, questionable. *Id.*

2. *Id.* at 1535 (Thomas, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari).

Justice Thomas has observed that “further percolation” in this area of law “is of little value when lower courts in the jurisdictions that ban AR–15s appear bent on distorting this Court’s Second Amendment precedents.” *Id.*, 145 S. Ct. at 1538 (Thomas, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari). This observation is even more true today. Indeed, it is difficult to imagine how a circuit court could distort *Heller*’s plain holding to a greater extent than the Second Circuit did in this case.

The interlocutory nature of this case should not be an impediment to granting review, because under the circuit court’s ruling, further development of the record would be pointless. Suppose for the sake of argument that Plaintiffs were to prove that Americans possess a billion “large capacity”³ magazines and 100 million AR-15 rifles. Under the circuit court’s reasoning, that evidence would be irrelevant. The circuit court has evaluated the empirical data provided by the government’s expert witnesses, and in its judgment these arms may be banned because of their “unusually dangerous character” even if they are “in common use for lawful purposes.” Pet.App. 30a (internal quotation marks omitted). The circuit court’s ruling provides additional confirmation of one of *Bruen*’s key insights: Second Amendment litigation after *Heller* has taught us that the lower “federal courts tasked with making [] difficult empirical judgments” about “the costs and benefits of firearms restrictions” will always find a

3. The statute challenged in this case characterizes the banned magazines as “large capacity magazines.” This is a politically charged misnomer meant to stir the passions of the public against the law-abiding citizens who possess these magazines, which are the standard capacity magazine for many lawfully owned firearms.

way to “defer to the determinations of legislatures.” See *Bruen*, 597 U.S. at 25, 26 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). This is true even if doing so means distorting this Court’s precedents beyond recognition. *Snope*, 145 S. Ct. at 1538 (Thomas, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari).

Justice Kavanaugh recently stated that this Court should address the AR-15 issue “in the next Term or two.” *Id.* at 1534. This case presents an ideal opportunity to address that issue and also to resolve the circuit court splits that have developed regarding *Bruen*’s methodology, and otherwise provide guidance to the lower courts.

OPINIONS BELOW

The opinion of the court of appeals is not yet published but is available at 2025 WL 2423599 (2d Cir. Aug. 22, 2025), and is reproduced at Pet.App. 1a-73a.

The district court’s Decision on Plaintiffs’ Motion for Preliminary Injunction is published at *Nat’l Ass’n for Gun Rts. v. Lamont*, 685 F. Supp. 3d 63 (D. Conn. 2023), and is reproduced at Pet.App. 74a-169a.

JURISDICTION

The court of appeals issued its opinion on August 22, 2025. This Court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1254(1).

CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED

The relevant constitutional provisions and portions of the General Statutes of Connecticut are reproduced in the Appendix at Pet.App. 170a-203a.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

A. Factual and Legal Background

1. The Challenged Laws

Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53-202a (a)(1)⁴ defines the term “assault weapon” to include commonly possessed semiautomatic rifles such as AR-15s.⁵ Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53-202b prohibits the distribution and sale of assault weapons. Sections §§ 53-202c and 53-202d prohibit the possession of an assault weapon unless the owner obtained the firearm before applicable regulations went into effect and obtained a certificate of possession.

4. In 2023, after this case was filed, the State’s legislature expanded the definition of what constitutes an assault weapon by adding several new subsections. The district court correctly held that the sections of the statutes challenged by Plaintiffs were not substantively changed. Pet.App. 81a, n.2.

5. The term “assault weapon” is not a technical term used in the firearms industry or community for firearms commonly available to civilians. Instead, the term is a rhetorically charged political term meant to stir the emotions of the public against those persons who choose to exercise their constitutional right to possess certain semi-automatic firearms that are commonly owned by millions of law-abiding American citizens for lawful purposes. See *Stenberg v. Carhart*, 530 U.S. 914, 1001 n.16 (2000) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted).

Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53-202w(b) states that any person who distributes, imports into the State, offers for sale, or purchases a “large capacity magazine” shall be guilty of a class D felony. With certain exceptions not relevant here, section 53-202w(a)(1) defines a “large capacity magazine” as “any firearm magazine, belt, drum, feed strip or similar device that has the capacity of, or can be readily restored or converted to accept, more than ten rounds of ammunition.

2. The Plaintiffs

The National Association for Gun Rights is a Second Amendment advocacy organization. Pet.App. 17a. Plaintiff Toni Theresa Spera Flanigan is a Connecticut resident legally qualified to possess firearms. Ibid. She desires to own an AR-15 or a similar rifle and magazines that hold more than 10 rounds. Ibid.

The challenged statutes ban many weapons other than AR-15s and large capacity magazines. However, the circuit court focused its review on Plaintiffs’ specific challenge to the statutes as applied to the weapons they seek to possess, i.e. AR-15-style rifles and magazines that hold more than 10 rounds. Pet.App. 22a.

3. The Banned Arms Are in Common Use

In *Cuomo*, the Second Circuit noted that Americans own millions of the firearms and magazines prohibited by the Connecticut statutes.⁶ *Id.*, 804 F.3d at 255. The Court then made the following key holding:

6. *Cuomo* concerned challenges to both the New York and the Connecticut statutes banning AR-15s and large capacity magazines. Pet.App. 17a.

Even accepting the most conservative estimates cited by the parties and by amici, the assault weapons and large-capacity magazines at issue are ‘in common use’ as that term was used in *Heller*.

Ibid.

The panel acknowledged that *Cuomo* remains the law of the circuit on this issue. Pet.App. 30a, citing *Cuomo*, 804 F.3d at 255-257. As *Cuomo* acknowledged, the facts concerning the common use of AR-15s and large capacity magazines are not reasonably subject to dispute. It has been known for a long time that millions of Americans own AR-15s, and the overwhelming majority of them do so for lawful purposes, including self-defense and target shooting. *Friedman v. Highland Park*, 577 U.S. 1039, 1042 (2015) (Thomas, J., joined by Scalia, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari); accord *Snope*, 145 S. Ct. 1534 (Kavanaugh, J., statement respecting denial of certiorari) (“Americans today possess an estimated 20 to 30 million AR-15s. And AR-15s are legal in 41 of the 50 States”).

In a 2022 national survey commissioned by the Washington Post, the researchers found that 6% of American adults (approximately 16 million citizens) own an AR-15-style rifle. Emily Guskin, Aadit Tambe, and Jon Gerberg, The Washington Post, *Why do Americans own AR-15s?* (November 2, 2023) (available at bit.ly/3G0vbG9). The National Shooting Sports Foundation estimates that 30,711,000 rifles such as AR-15/AK-47-type rifles have been produced for the American market. *NSSF Releases Most Recent Firearm Production Figures*, NSSF (Jan. 15, 2025), <https://perma.cc/HJQ9-MHLV>. This Court has described semi-automatic rifles such as AR-15s as “widely

accepted as lawful possessions.” *Staples v. United States*, 511 U.S. 600, 603, 612 (1994). This makes sense because, as noted, tens of millions of Americans own AR-15s or similar rifles. See William English, *2021 National Firearms Survey: Updated Analysis Including Types of Firearms Owned* (May 13, 2022) (available at bit.ly/3K6rL7s), p. 2 (estimating over 24 million AR-15s and similar rifles owned). A Congressional Research Service study shows that in 2020 alone, “2.8 million ... AR- or AK-type rifles” “were introduced into the U.S. civilian gun stock.” See Cong. Rsch. Svc., *House-Passed Assault Weapons Ban of 2022* (H.R. 1808), at 2 (Aug. 4, 2022), bit.ly/3ZsvpwY. In 2022, the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives acknowledged that “the AR-15-type rifle” is “one of the most popular firearms in the United States,” including “for civilian use.” 87 Fed. Reg. 24652, 24655 (Apr. 26, 2022).

The banned magazines are even more common than the banned firearms. The National Shooting Sports Association estimates Americans possess several hundred million magazines with a capacity in excess of ten rounds. See Nat’l Shooting Sports Found., *Detachable Magazine Report, 1990-2021* (2024), perma.cc/4VXU-DJWA. This is unsurprising because “[i]t is indisputable in the modern United States that magazines of up to thirty rounds for rifles and up to twenty rounds for handguns are standard equipment for many popular firearms.” David B. Kopel, *The History of Firearm Magazines and Magazine Prohibitions*, 78 Alb. L. Rev. 849, 874 (2015). In summary, “[t]here may well be some capacity above which magazines are not in common use,” but “that capacity surely is not ten.” *Heller v. District of Columbia*, 670 F.3d 1244, 1261 (D.C. Cir. 2011).

B. Procedural Background

Plaintiffs brought a Second Amendment challenge to the Connecticut laws described above. The district court had jurisdiction over Plaintiffs' claims under 28 U.S.C. § 1331. On November 3, 2022, Plaintiffs filed a motion seeking a preliminary injunction enjoining enforcement of the challenged statutes. The district court denied Plaintiffs' motion for preliminary injunction in an order dated August 3, 2023. Pet.App. 169a. Plaintiffs appealed the district court's order to the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. The circuit court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1). The circuit court affirmed the district court's order on August 22, 2025. Pet.App. 2, 66.

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION

A. The Court Should Resolve Multiple Circuit Splits and Otherwise Provide Additional Guidance Concerning *Bruen's* Methodology

In the seventeen years since *Heller*, there has never been a split among the circuit courts regarding whether the government may ban AR-15s and so-called large capacity magazines. This was true before *Bruen* and it remains true after *Bruen*.⁷ Never mind that these rifles and magazines are possessed by millions of law-abiding Americans for lawful purposes. Never mind that they are perfectly legal in the overwhelming number of states,

7. See Brief of Amicus National Association for Gun Rights in Support of Petitioners, *Duncan v. Bonta*, __ U.S. __, No. 25-198 (collecting pre-*Bruen* cases at 4-5 and post-*Bruen* cases at 6-9).

rendering such bans clear outliers.⁸ While the circuit courts in the jurisdictions that have banned these arms are certain that *Bruen* permits the bans, as demonstrated below, they are all over the map regarding why that should be the case.

1. It should go without saying that a *firearm* is an “arm” covered by the plain text. See *Heller*, 554 U.S. at 581 (citing a Founding-era lexicological source for the proposition that all firearms constitute arms) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted). Nevertheless, the circuit courts are split regarding whether certain firearms and essential firearm components even count as “arms” under the plain text. In *Bianchi v. Brown*, 111 F.4th 438 (4th Cir. 2024), cert. denied sub nom. *Snope v. Brown* (2025), the Fourth Circuit held that while it might “appear” that firearms like the AR-15 “fit comfortably within the term ‘arms’ as used in the Second Amendment,” they actually do not. *Id.* at 447-48. The Seventh Circuit agrees. *Bevis v. City of Naperville, Illinois*, 85 F.4th 1175, 1195 (7th Cir. 2023), cert. denied sub nom. *Harrel v. Raoul* (2024) (AR-15s and large capacity magazines not arms). In *Duncan v. Bonta*, 133 F.4th 852, 867 (9th Cir. 2025) (cert. petition pending), the Ninth Circuit held that magazines with a capacity over ten rounds are not covered by the plain text, even though magazines are an essential component of a semiautomatic firearm.⁹

8. See *Snope*, 145 S. Ct. 1534 (Kavanaugh, J., statement respecting denial of certiorari) (AR-15 ban is “something of an outlier”).

9. See also *State v. Gator’s Custom Guns, Inc.*, 568 P.3d 278 (Wash. 2025) (magazines are not arms).

In contrast, the Sixth Circuit recently reached the commonsense conclusion that all firearms are arms as that term is used in the plain text. *United States v. Bridges*, 150 F.4th 517, 524 (6th Cir. 2025) (Machine guns are presumptively protected under step one and the government rebutted that presumption under step two.). And the D.C. and Third Circuits have held that magazines, as essential firearm components, are covered by the plain text. *Hanson v. D.C.*, 120 F.4th 223, 232 (D.C. Cir. 2024), cert. denied, 145 S. Ct. 2778 (2025); *Ass’n of New Jersey Rifle & Pistol Clubs, Inc. v. Att’y Gen. New Jersey*, 910 F.3d 106, 116 (3d Cir. 2018), abrogated on other grounds by *Bruen*. See also *Ocean State Tactical, LLC v. Rhode Island*, 95 F.4th 38, 43 (1st Cir. 2024), cert. denied, 145 S. Ct. 2771 (2025) (assuming magazines are covered), and the Second Circuit below, Pet.App. 35a (same).

2. A straightforward reading of *Heller* situates the common use issue in the history and tradition analysis (i.e., *Bruen*’s step two). Indeed, *Heller*’s entire discussion of the common use issue occurred in its discussion of the nation’s historical tradition. See e.g., *id.*, 554 U.S. at 624 (militia members were expected to supply themselves with weapons in common use at the time); and *id.* at 627 (common use limitation is supported by “historical tradition”). Despite that straightforward conclusion, the lower courts are divided regarding whether “common use” is a step one or a step two inquiry.

The Seventh Circuit held that for plaintiffs to carry their plain text burden under *Bruen*’s step one, they must establish the empirical (as opposed to textual) predicate that an arm is in common use. *Bevis*, 85 F.4th at 1192. Judge Brennan disagreed, arguing that as a matter of

plain text, “Arms” means “Arms,” not “arms in common use.” *Id.* at 1209 (Brennan, J. dissenting). According to Judge Brennan, finding that an arm is in common use is sufficient for determining that the arm is protected at *Bruen*’s step two,¹⁰ not a condition for determining that it is an arm in the first place. *Ibid.* The Tenth, Second, and Fourth Circuits have also held that common use must be addressed at the plain text step. See *United States v. Morgan*, 2025 WL 2502968, at *4 (10th Cir. Sept. 2, 2025); *Antonyuk v. James*, 120 F.4th 941, 981 (2d Cir. 2024), cert. denied, 145 S. Ct. 1900 (2025); and *United States v. Price*, 111 F.4th 392, 400 (4th Cir. 2024), cert. denied, 145 S. Ct. 1891 (2025). In contrast, in *Bridges*, 150 F.4th at 526, the Sixth Circuit held that the plain text inquiry is just that, i.e., a textual inquiry, and the common use issue must be addressed at the second step (i.e., history and tradition).

3. The circuits are split on whether “common use” turns in whole or in part on the number of Americans who have chosen the banned arm. The Sixth Circuit inquired into “ownership data” and whether the arm in question is typically possessed by law-abiding citizens. *Bridges*, 150 F.4th at 526-527. The Tenth Circuit also conducted a statistical inquiry, and, quoting Justice Kavanaugh’s statement in *Snope*, implied that AR-15s are protected because they are legal in 41 of 50 states and owned by millions of Americans. *Morgan*, at *5, n.3, quoting 145 S. Ct. 1534 (Kavanaugh, J., statement respecting denial of

10. It is sufficient for determining the arm is protected because if it is in common use, it cannot be banned under the historical tradition of banning “dangerous and unusual” arms. See *Duncan v. Bonta*, 133 F.4th 852, 903 (9th Cir. 2025) (Bumatay, J., dissenting) (“whether a weapon is ‘dangerous and unusual’ or ‘in common use’ are different sides of the same coin”).

certiorari). However, the First, Fourth, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits have held that the total number of Americans who have chosen an arm is irrelevant in determining whether the arm is in “common use.” See *Ocean State*, 95 F.4th at 50 (rejecting “popularity test”); *Bianchi*, 111 F.4th at 460 (deriding ownership statistics as an “ill-conceived popularity test”); *Bevis*, 85 F.4th at 1190 (using ownership statistics is “circular”); and *Duncan*, 133 F.4th at 882-83 (rejecting “Ownership-Statistics Argument”).

4. *Heller*, *McDonald*,¹¹ and *Bruen* all used the word “use” in the phrase “common use” to mean possession of an arm for the purpose of using it. *Heller*, for example, held that the mere fact that a firearm is the “most popular weapon *chosen* by Americans for self-defense” was sufficient for that firearm to be protected. *Id.* at 629 (emphasis added). None of these cases required empirical studies of how Americans used a weapon in actual self-defense encounters.¹² In other words, as noted above, these cases contemplated that a weapon would be considered in common use for self-defense if the American people chose it for that purpose. They did not require statistical studies into actual usage.

Despite the clarity of these precedents, the circuit courts are split on this issue. The First and Ninth Circuits required evidence that an arm had been commonly used in specific actual self-defense encounters. See *Ocean State*, 95 F.4th 45, and *Duncan*, 133 F.4th at 880, n.11. Whereas, the D.C. Circuit did not. See *Hanson v. D.C.*, 120 F.4th 233.

11. *McDonald v. City of Chicago, Ill.*, 561 U.S. 742 (2010).

12. The records in those cases could not have contained such studies because all three cases were decided on a motion to dismiss record.

5. *Heller* recognized that militia members traditionally reported for duty carrying the sorts of lawful weapons that they possessed at home, and that the Second Amendment therefore protects such weapons as a class, regardless of any particular weapon’s suitability for military use. *Caetano v. Massachusetts*, 577 U.S. 411, 419 (2016) (Alito, J., concurring) (internal quotation marks omitted). This is not to say that all weapons used by the military are protected. Sophisticated military arms like bombers, tanks, and M16 machineguns that are “highly unusual in society at large” are not in common use and are therefore not protected. *Id.*, 554 U.S. at 627. But a weapon in common use is protected even if the military uses that or a similar weapon. Inexplicably, given *Heller*’s clear guidance on this issue, the First, Second, and Fourth Circuits have held that AR-15s and so-called large capacity magazines are unprotected merely because they are *similar* to arms used by the military. See *Ocean State*, 95 F.4th at 48; *Bevis*, 85 F.4th 1199; and *Bianchi*, 111 F.4th at 451.

6. None of this Court’s precedents required Second Amendment challengers to present evidence that a particular arm is “suitable” for self-defense as part of their plain-text burden. Indeed, far from a textual matter, whether a weapon is suitable for a particular purpose is plainly an “empirical judgment” that *Bruen* prohibited judges from making. See *id.*, 597 U.S. at 25. Nevertheless, the Fourth Circuit rejected a challenge in part because plaintiffs “failed to demonstrate that the [banned] weapon is suitable for self-defense.” *Bianchi*, 111 F.4th 458.

Not only is this an appropriate case in which to resolve the basic question of whether these arms are protected, but it also provides an opportunity to clarify a host of

issues concerning *Bruen*'s methodology about which the circuit courts are split.

B. The Post-*Bruen* Consensus Among the Circuit Courts: Interest Balancing by Another Name

Nothing in *Heller* nor *Bruen* even hints that the Second Amendment does not protect a weapon merely because in a reviewing court's view it is "particularly dangerous." The reason for this should be obvious. All weapons are dangerous, and if the Second Amendment does not protect a weapon merely because a reviewing court finds a way to hang the adverb "particularly" onto the adjective "dangerous," the Second Amendment protects nothing at all. This is why Justice Alito wrote that the "dangerous and unusual" test is "a conjunctive test: A weapon may not be banned unless it is *both* dangerous and unusual." *Caetano v. Massachusetts*, 577 U.S. 411, 418 (2016) (emphasis in the original). Thus, "the relative dangerousness of a weapon is irrelevant" if the weapon is commonly used for lawful purposes. *Id.*

Even though Justice Alito's observations predated *Bruen*, they are certainly consistent with it. One of *Bruen*'s key insights was that Second Amendment litigation after *Heller* taught us that the lower "federal courts tasked with making [] difficult empirical judgments" about "the costs and benefits of firearms restrictions" will always find a way to "defer to the determinations of legislatures." See *Bruen*, 597 U.S. at 25, 26 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). This is true even if doing so means distorting this Court's precedents beyond recognition. *Snope*, 145 S. Ct. at 1538 (Thomas, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari).

Unfortunately, the lower courts in the jurisdictions that ban AR-15s and “large capacity” magazines have continued to distort this Court’s Second Amendment precedents and have upheld bans of arms in common use. See *id.* And to rub salt in that wound, they have done so in a way that *Bruen* both anticipated and specifically prohibited in the following passage:

[C]ourts may [not] engage in independent means-end scrutiny *under the guise of an analogical inquiry*. Again, the Second Amendment is the “product of an interest balancing by the people,” not the evolving product of federal judges. *Heller*, 554 U.S. at 635, 128 S.Ct. 2783 (emphasis altered). Analogical reasoning requires judges to apply faithfully the balance struck by the founding generation to modern circumstances, and contrary to the dissent’s assertion, there is nothing “[i]roni[c]” about that undertaking. *Post*, at 2179. It is not an invitation to revise that balance through means-end scrutiny.

Id. at 29, n.7 (emphasis added).

After *Bruen*, the circuit courts reviewing AR-15 and magazine bans have coalesced around a strategy in which they purport to identify a “historical tradition” of banning weapons that are “particularly dangerous” (or some synonym of that phrase) and then engaging in an empirical analysis of whether the banned weapon fits that description. See *Bianchi v. Brown*, 111 F.4th at 446 (under historical tradition, “excessively dangerous” weapons may be banned); *Hanson v. D.C.*, 120 F.4th 235 (under historical tradition, “particularly dangerous” weapons may be

banned); *Bevis*, 85 F.4th at 1201 (discussing historical tradition of restricting access to “especially dangerous” weapons); *Ocean State*, 95 F.4th at 48 (a weapon may be banned if it is “more dangerous” than “normal”); *Duncan*, 133 F.4th at 880 (ban is justified by historical tradition of limiting “particularly dangerous” use of weapon); and the case at bar, Pet.App. 30a (under historical tradition, weapon with “unusually dangerous character” may be banned).

The problem, of course, is that the empirical analysis these circuit courts conducted always amounted to pure interest balancing of the type *Bruen* prohibited. Indeed, as demonstrated in more detail below, a circuit’s post-*Bruen* “historical” analysis may be practically indistinguishable from its pre-*Bruen* “intermediate scrutiny” interest-balancing analysis. Compare *Cuomo*, 804 F.3d at 261-64 to Pet.App. 46a-49a.

Justice Thomas may have understated the matter in *Snope*.¹³ Some would argue that the strategy around which the lower courts coalesced after *Bruen* is not merely distortion of but defiance of this Court’s precedents. Plaintiffs direct the Court’s attention to an amicus brief filed by a solid majority (i.e., 27) of the States seeking review of the Washington Supreme Court’s decision upholding a magazine ban in *State v. Gator’s Custom Guns, Inc.*, 568 P.3d 278 (Wash. 2025). The State *amici* wrote:

13. See *id.*, 145 S. Ct. at 1538 (Thomas, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari) (noting lower courts appear to be “bent on distorting” precedents).

[I]t is time for this Court to address the *repeated defiance* of this Court’s holdings, particularly in jurisdictions that have repeatedly infringed on citizens’ Second Amendment rights. The evident errors below and in similar cases manifest a *deep hostility* to both the Second Amendment itself and this Court’s precedents. . . . Several courts have already upheld outright bans on America’s most common civilian rifle, the AR-15. Plus-ten magazines have faced similar bans, which have been upheld by the Washington Supreme Court below and other courts. *Judicial defiance*, not a careful application of the *Bruen* framework, seems to have driven these outcomes. . . . This combination of legislative and *judicial defiance* of this Court’s precedents is a compounded blow to the constitutional rights of law-abiding Americans. It is again time for the Court to step in.

Brief of Amici State of Montana, *et al* in Support of Petitioners, *Gator’s Custom Guns, Inc. v. Washington*, __ U.S. __, No. 25-153, at 3, 4, 12 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted; emphasis added).

C. The Question Presented is of Critical Importance

The question presented in this case is of critical importance to tens of millions of law-abiding AR-15 and magazine owners throughout the country. See *Snope*, 145 S. Ct. at 1538 (Thomas, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari). As Justice Thomas noted, the AR-15-platform rifle is the most popular rifle in the country. *Heller* held that handguns are protected. The issue in this case is

whether the most popular long gun in the country is protected. And if the Second Amendment does not protect the most popular long gun, it is difficult to imagine how any long gun could be protected. Moreover, the evidence in the court below was that 150 million “large capacity magazines” (which, as noted above, are actually standard capacity magazines) are in circulation. If, as the court below held, the government may lawfully ban an arm that ubiquitous, the Second Amendment is a dead letter beyond *Heller*’s specific holding, because the lower courts will have succeeded in cabining *Heller* to its facts.

D. The Second Circuit’s Decision Cannot be Reconciled With This Court’s Second Amendment Precedents

In *Heller*, this Court held that under the text, history, and tradition of the Second Amendment, the government may not categorically ban arms typically possessed by law-abiding citizens for lawful purposes. *Id.*, 554 U.S. at 625, 628-29 (2008).¹⁴ *Heller*’s text, history, and tradition test and its rejection of judge-empowering interest balancing were obvious. See *Bruen*, 597 U.S. at 19-20; and *Heller v. D.C.*, 670 F.3d 1244 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting) (“*Heller* and *McDonald* leave little doubt that courts are to assess gun bans and regulations based on text, history, and tradition, not by a balancing test such as strict or intermediate scrutiny.”).

14. See also *Snope*, where Justice Kavanaugh observed that neither *Bruen* nor *United States v. Rahimi*, 602 U.S. 680 (2024), disturbed *Heller*’s “common use” test. *Id.*, 145 S. Ct. at 1534 (Kavanaugh, J., statement respecting denial of certiorari), citing *Bruen*, 597 U.S. at 47 and *Rahimi*, 602 U.S. at 735-36 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring).

Unfortunately, in the years that followed, the circuit courts ignored *Heller*'s "text, history, and tradition" test and opted instead to review Second Amendment challenges under the judge-empowering "balancing test" *Heller* had eschewed. See *Bruen*, 17-19, 24, 26. In *Bruen*, this Court abrogated these cases, reiterated *Heller*'s text, history, and tradition standard, and admonished the lower courts to review Second Amendment challenges under that standard. *Id.* at 24, 26. At least as far as arms bans are concerned, the lower federal courts have ignored *Bruen*'s admonition. This case is perhaps the most egregious example yet.

Plaintiffs challenged the State's categorical ban of AR-15s and firearms magazines with a capacity greater than ten rounds. Under the *Heller* test (as reiterated in *Bruen*), it should have been easy for the lower courts to find that those arms bans violate the Second Amendment. Under *Bruen*'s step one (plain text), the banned rifles and magazines are "bearable arms." As such, they are manifestly "Arms" covered by the plain text. See *Heller*, 554 U.S. at 582 ("the Second Amendment extends, prima facie, to all instruments that constitute bearable arms"). Therefore, they are presumptively protected by the Second Amendment. *Bruen*, 597 U.S. at 17 ("[W]hen the Second Amendment's plain text covers an individual's conduct, the Constitution presumptively protects that conduct."). The court below got this step right. Pet.App. 35a (court assumes the firearms and magazines are bearable arms covered by the plain text and thus presumptively entitled to constitutional protection).

Turning to *Bruen*'s step two ("history and tradition"), a government defendant may attempt to justify an arms

ban by invoking the “historical tradition of prohibiting the carrying of ‘dangerous and unusual weapons.’” *Heller*, 554 U.S., at 627. However, in a case involving weapons in common use by millions of Americans for lawful purposes, that tradition is plainly not applicable. *Snope v. Brown*, 145 S. Ct. 1534, 1536 (2025) (Thomas, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari). Plaintiffs submitted evidence that over 24 million Americans own AR-15s and at least 150 million magazines with a capacity greater than ten rounds are owned by law-abiding citizens. Pet.App. 128a-129a. Neither the district court nor the circuit court questioned this evidence. How could they? In *Cuomo*, the Second Circuit acknowledged that Americans own millions of the banned firearms and magazines. 804 F.3d at 255. Consequently, the court held that “[e]ven accepting the most conservative estimates cited by the parties and by amici, *the assault weapons and large-capacity magazines at issue are ‘in common use’ as that term was used in Heller.*” Ibid (emphasis added).

In *Cuomo*, the Second Circuit had no problem holding that the banned weapons are in common use, because it knew it could concede that issue and still uphold the challenged statutes under the pre-*Bruen* interest-balancing regime. And that is what it did. Applying “intermediate scrutiny,” the court upheld the challenged firearm and magazine bans because, in the court’s view, they were “substantially related to the achievement of an important governmental interest.” *Id.*, 804 F.3d at 261-64 (internal citation and quotation marks omitted).

In this case, a straightforward application of *Bruen* and the doctrine of stare decisis seemed to require the Second Circuit to hold that Connecticut’s arms ban violates the Second Amendment. If, as the circuit court

had previously ruled in *Cuomo*, the banned arms are in common use by millions of Americans, what else could it do? Astoundingly, it did exactly what it did in *Cuomo*. It conceded the common use issue upfront but nevertheless upheld the statutes under an interest-balancing approach that was practically identical to the one it employed in *Cuomo*. Specifically, the circuit court stated:

Plaintiffs insist that the challenged restrictions on the desired firearms and magazines violate the Second Amendment because they constitute a categorical ban on widely popular weapons in common use today for lawful purposes. This, Plaintiffs contend, is sufficient for finding that possessing the regulated weapons is protected by the Second Amendment. *Even assuming arguendo that the desired firearms and magazines are “typically possessed” and “in common use” for lawful purposes, we disagree.*

Pet.App. 29a-30a (internal citations and quotation marks omitted; emphasis added).

According to the court below, it can concede common use and still uphold the challenged statutes because *Heller* and *Bruen* do not really mean what they seem to unambiguously say, i.e., that weapons in common use are protected. Instead, those cases “do not shield popular weapons from review of their potentially *unusually dangerous character*.” Pet.App. 30a. (emphasis added). Unsurprisingly, the circuit court went on to hold that the challenged statutes are likely constitutional because, in its judgment, the banned AR-15s and large capacity magazines are, in fact, “usually dangerous.” Pet.App. 60a.

This leads to an obvious question: How did the circuit court know that the most popular rifle in America¹⁵ is “unusually dangerous”? Interest balancing, of course. To be sure, the circuit court did not say that it was engaging in interest balancing, but its “historical analysis” is practically identical to the “intermedial scrutiny” analysis *Cuomo* engaged in ten years ago. Indeed, the two analyses start off with a variation of the same sentence. See *Cuomo*, 804 F.3d at 262 (“[T]he legislation ... address[es] these particularly hazardous weapons.”); and App.Pet. 46a (“The challenged statutes focus on unusually dangerous firearms.”). Moreover, both *Cuomo* and the panel below held that the banned weapons are unusually dangerous for the same reasons. These reasons include their “military-style features,” “lethality,” lack of utility for self-defense, and their use in mass shootings. Compare *Cuomo*, 804 F.3d at 261-64 to Pet.App. 46a-49a. Both *Cuomo* and the panel below also balanced the perceived danger of the banned weapons with the fact that citizens continue to have access to alternative arms more favored by the government. Compare *Cuomo*, 804 F.3d at 260 to Pet. App. 50a. It seemed not to matter to the circuit court that *Heller* prohibited this very tradeoff. *Id.*, 554 U.S. at 629 (“It is no answer to say ... that it is permissible to ban the possession of [one kind of firearm] so long as the possession of other [kinds of] firearms[] is allowed.”).

In summary, the “historical analogical inquiry” in which the panel below engaged was not substantively different from *Cuomo*’s interest-balancing inquiry. Just as in *Cuomo*, the panel made “difficult empirical

15. *Snope*, 145 S. Ct. at 1536 (Thomas, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari).

judgments”¹⁶ about “the costs and benefits of firearms restrictions,”¹⁷ even though judges “lack expertise in the field.”¹⁸ In other words, the panel did the very thing this Court specifically prohibited when it stated in *Bruen* that courts may not “engage in independent means-end scrutiny under the guise of an analogical inquiry.” *Id.*, 597 U.S. at 29, n.7. And the circuit court’s conclusion that an arm may be banned if federal judges agree that it has an “unusually dangerous character,” Pet.App. 30a—no matter how many millions of law-abiding Americans use it for lawful purposes—cannot be reconciled with this Court’s Second Amendment precedents.

Moreover, the circuit court’s historical analysis in which it concluded that this Nation’s history and tradition of firearms regulation supports banning an arm merely because it has an unusually dangerous character was not sound in the first place. Like the Fourth Circuit in *Bianchi*, the court below supported the existence of this tradition by identifying several 19th-century laws regulating certain easily concealable weapons like pistols, dirks, sword canes, and Bowie knives.¹⁹ See, Pet.App. 37a.

16. *Bruen*, 597 U.S. at 25 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).

17. *Ibid.*

18. *Ibid.*

19. Plaintiffs will not address the circuit court’s twentieth century evidence because that evidence is plainly irrelevant under *Bruen*. 597 U.S. at 66, n.28 (“We will not address any of the 20th-century evidence” because it does “not provide insight into the meaning of the Second Amendment when it contradicts earlier evidence.”).

Justice Thomas explained why this evidence failed to establish such a tradition:

[T]he court nowhere attempted to explain why these laws were not simply instances of States prohibiting dangerous and unusual weapons not in common use for self-defense. As the dissent noted, when these laws were challenged, 19th-century courts evaluated them based on “whether the regulated weapon was in common use for lawful purposes.”

Snope, 145 S. Ct. 1538, fn. (2025) (Thomas, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari) (internal citations omitted).

Judge Richardson’s masterful dissenting opinion to which Justice Thomas alluded cashes this out in detail. See, *Bianchi*, 111 F.4th at 483-536 (Richardson, J., joined by Niemeyer, Agee, Quattlebaum, and Rushing, dissenting). Judge Richardson noted that between 1800 and 1860, at least six jurisdictions outlawed the possession, sale, or exchange of weapons like pistols, Bowie knives, or slung-shots. *Id.* at 508. At least four jurisdictions taxed the ownership or sale of such weapons. *Id.* And at least seven jurisdictions prohibited the concealed carry of dangerous weapons, while about four jurisdictions prohibited all carry—concealed or open—of dangerous weapons. *Id.* at 508-09. From Reconstruction through the end of the nineteenth century, at least nine jurisdictions passed statutes outlawing the possession, sale, or exchange of dangerous weapons; six jurisdictions taxed their ownership or sale; at least twenty-three jurisdictions prohibited the concealed carry of dangerous weapons; and at least ten jurisdictions prohibited all carry of such weapons. *Id.* at 509.

It is important to remember that historic regulations are relevant only insofar as they evince constitutional principles that undergird the right. *Id.* at 510, citing *Rahimi*, 602 U.S. at 692. In determining such principles, courts should consider how contemporary courts passed on the constitutionality of those laws. *Id.*, citing *Bruen*, 597 U.S. at 27. Both *Heller* and *Bruen* relied extensively on such state court decisions. *Id.*, citing *Heller*, 554 U.S. at 629 and *Bruen*, 597 U.S. at 52–55, 64–66, 68 and n.30.

Throughout the nineteenth century, state courts often entertained challenges to the statutes cited by Defendants. *Id.* Many of these decisions upheld various statutes because they merely regulated the *manner of carrying these weapons*, without considering whether *their possession or carry* could be completely prohibited. *Id.* (emphasis added). Other decisions considered the kinds of arms citizens could be prohibited from keeping or carrying, and when drawing that line, the courts generally distinguished between “dangerous and unusual” weapons and common weapons. *Id.*

For example, in *Aymette v. State*, 21 Tenn. 154 (1840), the Tennessee Supreme Court explained that the right to keep and bear arms protects those arms “usually employed in civilized warfare[] and that constitute the ordinary military equipment.” 21 Tenn. at 157–58. The court concluded that the legislature may “regulat[e] the manner in which [such] arms may be employed,” but it may not totally prohibit their use. *Id.* at 159. However, the right does not protect “those weapons which are usually employed in private broils, and which are efficient only in the hands of the robber and the assassin.” *Id.* at 158. Applying these principles, the court upheld the conviction in that case since the statute prohibited concealed carry

of a Bowie knife—a weapon the court deemed uncommon for lawful purposes and closely associated with criminal activity. See *id.* at 161–62.

In *Andrews v. State*, 50 Tenn. 165 (1871), the court recognized that the right to keep and bear arms only protects “the usual arms of the citizen of the country, and the use of which will properly train and render him efficient in defense of his own liberties as well as of the State.” *Id.* at 179 (including “the rifle of all descriptions, the shot gun, the musket, and [the] repeater”). The uses of common arms could be regulated “to subserve the general good” (such as to prevent crime), but their possession and carry could not be completely prohibited, for “[t]he power to regulate does not fairly mean the power to prohibit; on the contrary, to regulate, necessarily involves the existence of the thing or act to be regulated.” *Id.* at 179–81. The court then applied these principles to the statute before it. The court upheld the prohibition on carrying dirks, sword canes, Spanish stiletos, and pistols, since, under *Aymette*, these were uncommon for lawful purposes and closely associated with criminal activity. *Id.* at 186. But the court found that the statute potentially included military revolvers—i.e., weapons commonly owned for public defense—within its reach. *Id.* If so, then “the prohibition of the statute is too broad to be allowed to stand,” since it would completely prohibit the bearing of a protected arm. *Id.* at 187–88.

State v. Duke, 42 Tex. 455 (1875), involved a constitutional challenge to a Texas statute prohibiting the carry of “deadly” weapons, including pistols, unless the person had reasonable grounds to fear an immediate and pressing attack on his person. The court explained

that the right protects “such arms as are commonly kept, according to the customs of the people, and are appropriate for open and manly use in self-defense, as well as such as are proper for the defense of the State.” 42 Tex. at 458. The court’s definition thus encompassed arms common for public and private defense.

Finally, in *Fife v. State*, 31 Ark. 455 (1876), the court upheld a man’s conviction for openly carrying a pocket pistol. Relying on *Aymette*, the court found that “the arms which [the Second Amendment] guarantees American citizens the right to keep and to bear, are such as are needful to, and ordinarily used by a well regulated militia, and such as are necessary and suitable to a free people, to enable them to resist oppression, prevent usurpation, [and] repel invasion.” 31 Ark. at 458. But the pistol in question was “not such as is in ordinary use, and effective as a weapon of war, and useful and necessary for ‘the common defense.’” *Id.* at 461. Instead, it was “such as is usually carried in the pocket, or of a size to be concealed about the person, and used in private quarrels and brawls.” *Id.* The court concluded that the legislature could completely prohibit the carry of such firearms “without any infringement of the constitutional right of the citizens of the State to keep and bear arms for their common defense.” *Id.* at 462.

All four of these courts assessed the challenged statutes according to the same principle – whether the regulated weapon was in common use for lawful purposes. *Bianchi*, 111 F.4th at 513 (Richardson, J. dissenting). If it was, the government could regulate the possession or carry of that weapon, but it could not completely ban it. *Id.* Yet if that weapon was not in common use for lawful

purposes, and if the weapon was particularly useful for criminal activity, then the government could outlaw it. *Id.* With possibly two outlying exceptions, every court that considered the types of arms that could be prohibited coalesced around this basic principle. *Id.* The courts widely concurred that the government can prohibit particular weapons only if they are *both* (1) particularly useful for criminal activity, and (2) not common for lawful purposes. *Id.* at 514 (citation omitted). The courts broadly concluded that the government can regulate, but cannot prohibit, the keeping or bearing of arms commonly used for lawful purposes. *Id.*

Judge Richardson's analysis is supported by a common-sense reading of *Bruen*, where the dissent pointed to the same Bowie knife/dirk/pocket pistol laws cited by Defendants and argued that those laws established a historical tradition of barring public carrying of weapons. See *Id.*, 597 U.S. at 124 (Breyer, J., dissenting). The *Bruen* majority obviously did not agree. If those laws did not even establish a tradition of prohibiting *carrying* weapons, *a fortiori* they did not establish a tradition of categorically prohibiting *possessing* those same weapons.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court should grant the petition for writ of certiorari.

Respectfully submitted this 3rd day of October 2025.

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APPENDIX

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**APPENDIX A — OPINION OF THE UNITED
STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE
SECOND CIRCUIT, FILED AUGUST 22, 2025**

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

Nos. 23-1162, 23-1344

NATIONAL ASSOCIATION FOR GUN RIGHTS,
TONI THERESA SPERA FLANIGAN,

Plaintiffs-Appellants,

PATRICIA BROUGHT,

Plaintiff,

v.

NED LAMONT, IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY
AS THE GOVERNOR OF THE STATE OF
CONNECTICUT, PATRICK J. GRIFFIN, IN HIS
OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS THE CHIEF STATES
ATTORNEY OF THE STATE OF CONNECTICUT,
SHARMESE L. WALCOTT, IN HER OFFICIAL
CAPACITY AS THE STATE'S ATTORNEY,
HARTFORD JUDICIAL DISTRICT,

Defendants-Appellees,

DAVID R. SHANNON, IN HIS OFFICIAL
CAPACITY AS THE STATE'S ATTORNEY,
LITCHFIELD JUDICIAL DISTRICT,

Defendant.

2a

Appendix A

EDDIE GRANT, JR., JENNIFER HAMILTON,
MICHAEL STIEFEL, CONNECTICUT
CITIZENS DEFENSE LEAGUE, INC., SECOND
AMENDMENT FOUNDATION, INC.,

Plaintiffs-Appellants,

v.

JAMES ROVELLA, JOHN P. DOYLE, JR.,
SHARMESE L. WALCOTT, PAUL J. NARDUCCI,
IN THEIR OFFICIAL CAPACITIES,

Defendants-Appellees,

EDWARD LAMONT, JR., PATRICK GRIFFIN,
MARGARET E. KELLY, DAVID R. APPELEGATE,
JOSEPH T. CORRADINO, DAVID R. SHANNON,
MICHAEL A. GAILOR, CHRISTIAN WATSON,
PAUL J. FERENCEK, MATTHEW C. GEDANSKY,
MAUREEN PLATT, ANNE F. MAHONEY, IN
THEIR OFFICIAL CAPACITIES,

*Defendants.**

Argued: October 16, 2024

Decided: August 22, 2025

On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Connecticut

Before: LIVINGSTON, *Chief Judge*, WALKER, and NATHAN,
Circuit Judges.

* The Clerk of Court is respectfully directed to amend the caption as set forth above.

*Appendix A***OPINION**

Before the Court are two related appeals principally challenging certain gun-control legislation enacted by the Connecticut legislature in the wake of the 2012 mass homicide at Sandy Hook Elementary School in Newtown, Connecticut. The Connecticut laws at issue restrict the acquisition and possession of “assault weapons” and “large capacity magazines.” Plaintiffs in both underlying cases are individuals and organizations opposed to those restrictions who would seek to acquire and possess weapons restricted by the legislation, including AR-platform firearms and magazines capable of holding more than ten rounds. Plaintiffs sought to preliminarily enjoin the legislation on the basis that it violated their right to keep and bear arms under the Second Amendment of the United States Constitution. The district court (Arterton, *J.*), after concluding that Plaintiffs in both cases had failed to demonstrate a sufficient likelihood of success on the merits of their Second Amendment challenges, denied the respective motions for a preliminary injunction. Plaintiffs now appeal from those rulings.

The Second Amendment protects an individual right to “keep and bear Arms,” but that right is not unlimited. Using the tools of history and tradition required by the analytical framework set forth by the Supreme Court in *District of Columbia v. Heller*, 554 U.S. 570 (2008), and *New York State Rifle & Pistol Association v. Bruen*, 597 U.S. 1 (2022), we conclude that Plaintiffs have not shown a sufficient likelihood of success on the merits of their Second Amendment claims. The challenged Connecticut

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laws, which impose targeted restrictions on unusually dangerous weapons while preserving numerous legal alternatives for self-defense and other lawful purposes, are consistent with our Nation's historical tradition of regulation of such weapons. We additionally conclude that Plaintiffs have not demonstrated that the balance of equities and public interest tip in their favor.

Accordingly, we **AFFIRM** the district court's denial of the preliminary injunction in both cases.

Nathan, *Circuit Judge*, joined by Livingston, *Chief Judge*, and Walker, *Circuit Judge*, concurs in a separate opinion.

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JOHN M. WALKER, JR., *Circuit Judge*.

On December 14, 2012, twenty-year-old Adam Lanza walked into Sandy Hook Elementary School in Newtown, Connecticut carrying a lawfully-purchased Bushmaster XM15-E2S, an AR-15-style semiautomatic rifle, with 30-round magazines in taped reloads to reduce reload time. An amateur shooter trained by first-person shooter video games, Lanza unleashed 154 5.56-millimeter rounds in under five minutes. He killed twenty first-grade students and six educators, then himself.

The Sandy Hook shooting prompted a rapid response from Connecticut legislators. Within four months, the State had enacted new legislation restricting access to certain military-style firearms and large capacity magazines. And, a decade later, Connecticut passed additional restrictions on access to certain assault weapons.

Before the Court are two related appeals principally challenging this gun-control legislation. Plaintiffs in both underlying cases are individuals and organizations opposed to those restrictions who would seek to acquire and possess weapons restricted by the legislation, including AR-platform firearms and magazines capable of holding more than ten rounds. Plaintiffs sought to preliminarily enjoin the legislation on the basis that it violated their right to keep and bear arms under the Second Amendment of the United States Constitution. The district court (Arterton, *J.*), after concluding that Plaintiffs in both cases had failed to demonstrate a sufficient likelihood of success

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on the merits of their Second Amendment challenges, denied the respective motions for a preliminary injunction. Plaintiffs now appeal from those rulings.

The Second Amendment protects an individual right to “keep and bear Arms,” but that right is not unlimited. Using the tools of history and tradition required by the analytical framework set forth by the Supreme Court in *District of Columbia v. Heller*, 554 U.S. 570 (2008), and *New York State Rifle & Pistol Association v. Bruen*, 597 U.S. 1 (2022), we conclude that Plaintiffs have not shown a sufficient likelihood of success on the merits of their Second Amendment claims. Assuming that Plaintiffs’ proposed possession of the firearms and magazines at issue is presumptively entitled to constitutional protection, we nonetheless find that the Government has satisfied its burden of showing that the challenged laws are consistent with our Nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation. The challenged Connecticut laws impose targeted restrictions on unusually dangerous weapons while preserving numerous legal alternatives for self-defense and other lawful purposes. Such restrictions impose a burden comparable to historical antecedents that regulated other unusually dangerous weapons unsuitable for and disproportionate to the objective of individual self-defense. These historical antecedents are analogous to the restrictions at issue in this case.

We additionally conclude that Plaintiffs have not demonstrated that the balance of equities and public interest tip in their favor.

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Accordingly, we **AFFIRM** the district court’s denial of the preliminary injunction in both cases.

BACKGROUND¹

Before we discuss the merits of the constitutional claims in the two appeals, we describe the statutes they challenge and the procedural history of the two appeals.

I. The Challenged Statutes

After the Sandy Hook Elementary School shooting, Connecticut lawmakers declared that “the tragedy in Newtown demand[ed] a powerful response.” Senate Tr., 2013 Sess. (Conn. April 3, 2013) (statement of Sen. Donald E. Williams), *NAGR* App’x 645.² Four months later, Connecticut’s duly-elected legislators enacted the law at the heart of these appeals: An Act Concerning Gun Violence

1. References within citations to “*NAGR*” refer to filings in *National Association for Gun Rights v. Lamont*, No. 23-1162-cv (“*NAGR*”). For example, citations to “Br. of *NAGR* Appellants,” refer to the briefs on appeal of Plaintiffs-Appellants National Association for Gun Rights *et al.* in the *NAGR* matter. References within citations to “*Grant*” refer to filings in *Grant v. Rovella*, No. 23-1344-cv (“*Grant*”). For example, citations to “Br. of *Grant* Appellants” refer to the briefs on appeal of Plaintiffs-Appellants Eddie Grant, Jr., *et al.* in the *Grant* matter. “App’x” refers to the joint appendix, “Sp. App’x” refers to the special appendix, and “Suppl. App’x” refers to the supplemental appendix in the designated matter.

2. Decl. of John J. Donohue ¶ 98, *NAGR* App’x 239; Br. of Amici Mark Barden *et al.* at 7-10.

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Prevention and Children’s Safety, 2013 Conn. Pub. Acts 13-3. This legislation amended and expanded Connecticut’s existing limits on the acquisition and possession of certain military-style firearms (“assault weapons”), initially enacted in 1993, and imposed restrictions for the first time on magazines capable of holding more than ten rounds (“large capacity magazines”).³ *See N.Y. State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. Cuomo*, 804 F.3d 242, 248, 250-51 (2d Cir. 2015) (describing Connecticut’s prior “assault weapon” legislation). Ten years later, Connecticut again expanded the types of restricted assault weapons to include additional firearms (“2023 assault weapons”) in An Act Addressing Gun Violence, 2023 Conn. Pub. Acts 23-53.

The cumulative effect of the challenged firearms restrictions is that Connecticut now prohibits most people in the state from acquiring or possessing “assault weapons,” “2023 assault weapons,” and “large capacity magazines,” as defined below. *See* Conn. Gen. Stat. §§ 53-202b, 53-202c, 53-202d, 53-202w(b).⁴ At the same time,

3. Plaintiffs argue the terms “assault weapons” and “large capacity magazines” are “rhetorically charged political term[s].” Br. of *NAGR* Appellants at 2-4. We use the terms “assault weapons” and “large capacity magazines” because the challenged statutes use those terms, and because we used those terms in addressing an earlier challenge that included the same Connecticut regulatory scheme. *See Cuomo*, 804 F.3d at 247.

4. Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53-202b (restricting the giving, distributing, transporting or importing into the state, exposing or keeping for sale, or selling of an “assault weapon”); *id.* §§ 53-202c, 53-202d (restricting the possession of an “assault weapon,” unless the owner lawfully owned the firearm before the applicable

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Connecticut allows firearms that, while dangerous, as all firearms are to varying degrees, are not so uniquely designed to create mayhem.

To appreciate the reach of the carefully calibrated restrictions, we describe the covered weapons in greater detail than we might otherwise find necessary.

A. Assault Weapons

Broadly, Connecticut defines “assault weapon” to include many, but not all, types of fully automatic and semiautomatic firearms. Its prohibitions apply to selective-fire firearms; types of semiautomatic rifles, pistols, and shotguns with military-style features; and various examples of semiautomatic firearms specified by name with military-style features (and their commercially-available or do-it-yourself copies and duplicates).⁵ *See Cuomo*, 804 F.3d at 260 (observing that the challenged regulatory scheme restricts only a “limited subset” of

regulations went into effect and the individual obtained a certificate of possession from the designated state agency); *id.* § 53-202w(b) (restricting the keeping, offering, or exposing for sale of large capacity magazines; transferring large capacity magazines; or buying, distributing, or bringing them into Connecticut).

5. Under Connecticut law, a “rifle” is a firearm “designed . . . to be fired from the shoulder” using a “cartridge to fire only a single projectile through a rifled bore for each single pull of the trigger.” Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-3(16). A “pistol” or “revolver” is any firearm with a barrel that is less than twelve inches long. *Id.* § 53a-3(18). A “shotgun” is a firearm “designed . . . to be fired from the shoulder” using a “shotgun shell to fire through a smooth bore either a number of ball shot or a single projectile for each single pull of the trigger.” *Id.* § 53a-3(17).

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firearms). Our non-exhaustive summary focuses on the aspects of the restrictions applicable to, or helpful to understanding their application to, the firearms and ammunition that Plaintiffs would purchase but for the challenged statutes. A general description of the types of weapons that are restricted “assault weapons” follows.

First, an “assault weapon” includes any selective-fire firearm capable of both fully automatic and semiautomatic fire.⁶ *See* Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53-202a(1)(A)(i). The longtime standard-issue rifle for the United States military, the M-16, and its successor, the M4 carbine, are representative selective-fire firearms qualifying as “assault weapons.”

Second, an “assault weapon” includes any semiautomatic centerfire rifle that has (1) the capacity to accept a detachable magazine and (2) one or more of five specified military-style features, any one of which satisfies a one-feature test.⁷ *See* Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53-202a(1)(E)

6. A selective-fire firearm permits its operator “to choose between semiautomatic and fully automatic” firing capability. Decl. of Brindiana Warenda ¶ 22, *NAGR* App’x 199. Whereas semiautomatic firearms “fire[] one round for each squeeze of the trigger,” fully automatic firearms (i.e., machine guns) “fire continuously for as long as the trigger is pressed.” *Id.* ¶¶ 20-21.

7. A centerfire rifle is one designed to be used with centerfire cartridges, in which the gunpowder explosion is initiated by the firing pin striking the primer in the center of the cartridge base. Br. of Amicus Int’l Law Enforcement Educators & Trainers Ass’n at 21 n.11. Centerfire cartridges have larger bullets, higher velocity, greater range, and more foot pounds of energy or “stopping power” than other types of cartridges, such as rimfire or pistol ammunition. Warenda Decl. ¶ 29, *NAGR* App’x 200.

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(i). The Bushmaster XM15-E2S used in the Sandy Hook school shooting and other AR-15-style rifles that Plaintiffs would seek to purchase and possess are representative examples of semiautomatic centerfire rifles qualifying as “assault weapons.”⁸

Third, an “assault weapon” includes a semiautomatic rimfire rifle that has (1) an ability to accept a detachable magazine and (2) two or more of five specified military-style features, any two of which satisfy a two-feature test.⁹ Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53-202a(1)(H). To be considered

A magazine is a “container that holds ammunition for a firearm” and feeds the ammunition into the firearm. Warenda Decl. ¶ 39, *NAGR* App’x 201. A detachable magazine is one that can be removed without disassembling the firearm. Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53-202a(4).

A semiautomatic centerfire rifle is an “assault weapon” if it (1) is able to accept a detachable magazine and (2) has one or more of the five following military-style features: (A) a folding or telescoping stock; (B) a pistol grip, thumbhole stock, or any other stock that would result “in any finger on the trigger hand in addition to the trigger finger being directly below any portion of the action of the weapon when firing”; (C) a forward pistol grip (i.e., a vertical forward grip or a foregrip); (D) a flash suppressor; or (E) a grenade launcher or flare launcher. Conn. Gen. Stat. §§ 53-202a(1), (1)(E), (6), (8).

8. The original AR-15 was manufactured as a selective-fire machine gun and adopted by the U.S. military as the M-16 during the Vietnam War. Warenda Decl. ¶ 24, *NAGR* App’x 199. The Colt Manufacturing Company retained the AR-15 trademark, however, and used that name for the semiautomatic version of the M-16 later developed for the civilian market. *Id.* ¶ 25; *see also Staples v. United States*, 511 U.S. 600, 603 (1994).

9. A rimfire weapon is one in which the firing pin strikes the rim of the cartridge, releasing a less powerful charge than centerfire

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“assault weapons,” rimfire firearms are subject to a two-feature test that is less stringent than the one-feature test applicable to their more powerful centerfire counterparts.

Fourth, an “assault weapon” includes numerous specified semiautomatic firearms, identified by make and model, and their “copies or duplicates.” Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53-202a(1)(A)-(D). Most of these specified firearms, which generally would also satisfy the applicable “features test,” are “semiautomatic versions of the original selective-fire AR-15/M-16, the AK-47, or variants of these weapon platforms in an assortment of calibers.” Decl. of Brindiana Warena ¶ 23, *NAGR* App’x 199. Firearms prohibited by name include the Bushmaster XM15 and variants of AR-15-style firearms.

cartridges. *See* Richard Mann, *Rimfire vs. Centerfire, What’s the Difference?*, FIELD & STREAM (July 4, 2023), <https://www.fieldandstream.com/guns/rimfire-vs-centerfire/> [<https://perma.cc/5FLY-RAM6>].

A rimfire rifle is an “assault weapon” if it has (1) an ability to accept a detachable magazine and (2) two or more of the five following military-style features: (A) a folding or telescoping stock; (B) a pistol grip that protrudes conspicuously beneath the action of the weapon; (C) a bayonet mount; (D) a flash suppressor or threaded barrel designed to accommodate a flash suppressor; and (E) a grenade launcher. 2001 Conn. Pub. Acts 01-130; *see also* CONN. OFF. OF LEG. RSCH., 2024-R-0163, Summary of State Gun Laws 28 (2024) (explaining that Connecticut law also classifies as an assault weapon “rimfire weapons that met the two-feature test under the [2001 amendment to the assault weapons] law”).

*Appendix A***B. 2023 Assault Weapons**

In 2023, Connecticut further expanded its definition of “assault weapon” to include “[a]ny semiautomatic firearm *other than* a pistol, revolver, rifle or shotgun” (colloquially, an “other”) that has one or more of seven specified military-style features, any of which satisfy a one-feature test.¹⁰ 2023 Conn. Pub. Acts 23-53, § 23 (codified at Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53-202a(1)(G)) (emphasis added). Consistent with Connecticut law, we refer to those “other” undefined firearms (with one or more of the specified military-style features) as “2023 assault weapon[s].” Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53-202a(10).

Prior to the 2023 amendment, there was a “loophole” in Connecticut’s regulatory scheme. Warenda Decl. ¶ 21,

10. An “other,” i.e., a firearm that is not a “pistol,” “revolver,” “rifle,” or “shotgun,” as defined in Connecticut law (*see supra* note 5), is an “assault weapon” if it has one or more of the seven following military-style features: (A) any grip that permits its operator to grip the weapon in a manner “resulting in any finger on the trigger hand in addition to the trigger finger being directly below any portion of the action of the weapon when firing” (e.g., a pistol grip or thumbhole stock); (B) an ability to accept a detachable ammunition magazine that attaches at some location outside of the pistol grip; (C) a fixed magazine with the ability to accept more than ten rounds; (D) a flash suppressor or silencer, or a threaded barrel capable of accepting a flash suppressor or silencer; (E) a shroud that is attached to, or partially or completely encircles, the barrel and that permits the operator to fire the firearm without being burned, except a slide that encloses the barrel; (F) a second hand grip; or (G) an arm brace or other stabilizing brace that could allow such firearm to be fired from the shoulder, with or without a strap designed to attach to an individual’s arm. Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53-202a(1)(G); *see also Grant* Sp. App’x 2-3.

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Grant App’x 328. Connecticut’s reliance on applying varying one- or two-feature tests to firearms that met the statutory definition of a “pistol,” “revolver,” “rifle,” or “shotgun,” as defined in Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-3, allowed firearms that were *not* pistols, revolvers, rifles, or shotguns to avoid the statute’s proscriptions, Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53-202a(1)(G). The 2023 amendment closed the loophole by extending the features test to those “other” firearms. Warenda Decl. ¶ 21, *Grant* App’x 328.

Those weapons now categorized as 2023 assault weapons frequently use pistol braces, which attach to a person’s forearm to provide stability. Such an “other” firearm equipped with a pistol brace looks similar to a rifle like an AR-15, even though those “other” firearms were not designed to be fired from the shoulder.¹¹ Br. of *Grant* Appellants at 8; Warenda Decl. ¶¶ 20-22, *Grant* App’x 328.

C. Features and Features Tests

As discussed above, Connecticut’s definition of “assault weapon” takes into account, for some categories of firearms, whether the firearm has one or more or two or more specified features. The applicable features tests pertain to military-like features that, in the legislature’s judgment, enhance the lethality or concealability of the firearm. We discuss some of them here.

11. We observe, like the district court, that the *Grant* Plaintiffs acknowledge that the 2023 assault weapons are all semiautomatic firearms. *Grant* Sp. App’x 11. We likewise infer “significant overlap” in the key features of “assault weapons” and “2023 assault weapons.” *Id.*

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Pistol grips and thumbhole stocks are protruding handles underneath the action of the firearm¹² that permit the rifle's operator to grip the firearm at a more vertical angle (as one might hold a pistol). Similarly, forward pistol grips are protruding grips for the non-trigger hand shaped like a standard pistol grip that are fitted to the front end of the firearm. Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53-202a(6); Warenda Decl. § 17, *NAGR* App'x 199. Pistol grips, thumbhole stocks, and forward pistol grips facilitate quickly “spray[ing] . . . a large number of bullets over a broad killing zone, without having to aim at each individual target.” *NAGR* App'x 381; *see also* Decl. of John J. Donohue § 65, *NAGR* App'x 224.

Barrel shrouds are ventilated covers that shield the operator from the burning temperatures caused by firing multiple rounds, enabling the operator to hold the overheated barrel during continuous firing.

Telescoping, collapsing, and folding stocks shorten firearms and make them easier to conceal.

Flash suppressors reduce firearms' visible signature when firing and help shooters avoid detection.

D. Large Capacity Magazines

The challenged statutes further restrict the acquisition and possession of “large capacity magazine[s],” which the

12. The “action” of the firearm is “the part of the firearm that loads, fires and ejects a cartridge, which part includes, but is not limited to, the upper and lower receiver, charging handle, forward assist, magazine release and shell deflector.” Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53-202a(3).

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statute defines as “any firearm magazine, belt, drum, feed strip or similar device that has the capacity of, or can be readily restored or converted to accept, more than ten rounds of ammunition.” Conn Gen. Stat. §§ 53-202w(a) (1), (b). Consistent with Connecticut law, we refer to these devices as “large capacity magazines.”

Firearms that come with or can accommodate large capacity magazines permit a shooter to fire more than eleven rounds¹³ without pausing to reload, enabling the firing of a barrage of bullets.

E. Exemptions

The challenged statutes exempt from their restrictions, among others, certain trained professionals and grandfathered individuals who timely obtained a certification of possession. *See* Conn. Gen. Stat. §§ 53-202b(b)(1), 53-202c, 53-202d.

II. Procedural History

As noted above, in the two related cases before us, groups of plaintiffs challenge Connecticut’s highly specific restrictions on assault weapons, 2023 assault weapons, and large capacity magazines as violating their Second Amendment right to keep and bear arms.

13. The eleven rounds encompass one bullet in the chamber and the ten rounds in the full magazine.

*Appendix A***A. *National Association for Gun Rights v. Lamont*,
No. 23-1162**

The first case is *National Association for Gun Rights v. Lamont*, No. 23-1162-cv (“*NAGR*”). The *NAGR* Plaintiffs-Appellants are the National Association for Gun Rights, a nonprofit organization, and Toni Theresa Spera Flanigan, a Connecticut resident legally qualified to possess firearms who wants to own an AR-15 or a similar rifle and magazines that hold more than 10 rounds. On November 3, 2022, predating the latest restrictions, the *NAGR* Plaintiffs sought from the district court a preliminary injunction enjoining the governor of Connecticut and various state prosecutors from enforcing the restrictions on assault weapons and large capacity magazines on the basis that the restrictions violated Plaintiffs’ Second Amendment right to keep and bear arms.

The district court denied the injunction on the basis that the *NAGR* Plaintiffs were unlikely to succeed on the merits of their claims. In assessing the merits, the district court recognized that *New York State Rifle & Pistol Association v. Bruen*, 597 U.S. 1 (2022), had abrogated in part *New York State Rifle & Pistol Association v. Cuomo*, 804 F.3d 242 (2d Cir. 2015), which addressed both New York and Connecticut firearm regulations and had previously stood as the leading circuit authority for type-of-weapons cases. The district court therefore developed a new Second Amendment analytical framework based on *Bruen*. The district court held that (1) plaintiffs bear the burden of demonstrating that their conduct is protected

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by the Second Amendment's plain text, and (2) they must do so by producing evidence that the specific firearms they seek to use and possess are in common use for self-defense, that the people possessing them are typically law-abiding citizens, and that the purposes for which the firearms are typically possessed are lawful ones. Defendants may attempt to demonstrate that the regulated firearms are instead unprotected dangerous and unusual weapons by showing either that the weapons are unusually dangerous or that they are not commonly used or possessed for self-defense.

If plaintiffs successfully show that the Second Amendment's plain text covers their conduct, the burden then shifts to defendants to justify their regulation based on *Bruen*'s requirements for establishing relevant similarity to history and tradition.

Applying that framework, the district court concluded that the *NAGR* Plaintiffs did not carry their burden of demonstrating that their conduct was protected by the Second Amendment—that is, that the regulated weapons and accessories are commonly sought out, purchased, and used for self-defense. The district court accepted Defendants' argument that assault weapons and large capacity magazines are typically acquired for their military characteristics, not self-defense; are disproportionately dangerous because of their increased capacity for lethality; and are more often used in committing crimes and mass shootings than in self-defense.

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In the alternative, the district court concluded that the record evinced a history and tradition of regulating arms associated with growing rates of violence and lethality, both because of technological innovations in the arms themselves and changing patterns of human behavior. The district court found a history and tradition of regulating the particular kinds of weapons or modes of carry that were most often employed by those causing violence, while permitting the possession of other weapons for the purpose of self-defense. Because the challenged statutes restrict only a subset of each category of firearms that possess new and dangerous characteristics that make them susceptible to abuse by non-law-abiding citizens wielding them for unlawful purposes, the district court found the challenged statutes analogous to regulations in their day of Bowie knives, percussion cap pistols, and other dangerous or concealed weapons.

B. *Grant v. Rovella*, No. 23-1344

The second case is *Grant v. Rovella*, No. 23-1344-cv (“*Grant*”). The *Grant* Plaintiffs-Appellants are Eddie Grant, Jr.; Jennifer Hamilton; and Michael Stiefel, Connecticut residents who seek to own AR-15 platform firearms and firearms qualifying as 2023 assault weapons, including “a .300 Blackout in a Connecticut ‘other’ configuration” with pistol grips and fore grips, Br. of *Grant* Appellants at 11;¹⁴ the Connecticut Citizens

14. The *Grant* Plaintiffs provide scant information about the .300 Blackout in their briefs. It appears to be a type of ammunition rather than a firearm. See Dep. of Eddie Grant, *Grant* Suppl. App’x 83:23 (referring to “.300 Blackout rounds”); Richard Mann, *The*

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Defense League, Inc., and the Second Amendment Foundation, Inc., two nonprofit associations. On February 3, 2023, the *Grant* Plaintiffs sought from the district court a preliminary injunction enjoining the Connecticut Department of Emergency Services and Public Protection Commissioner and various state prosecutors from enforcing the restrictions on assault weapons, 2023 assault weapons, and large capacity magazines.

The district court denied the preliminary injunction after concluding that the *Grant* Plaintiffs were unlikely to succeed on the merits of their claims for substantially the same reasons as in *NAGR*. Because the *Grant* Plaintiffs had failed to provide specific evidence that the 2023 assault weapons were commonly used for self-defense where pre-June 2023 assault weapons were not, the district court again concluded that they had failed to establish that the weapons were protected by the Second Amendment. And in the alternative, the district court upheld the law based on its determination that the challenged restrictions were consistent with the Nation’s history and tradition of firearm regulation for the same reasons as in *NAGR*.

New Black, SHOOTING ILLUSTRATED (Dec. 16, 2013), <https://www.shootingillustrated.com/content/the-new-black/> [https://perma.cc/54P2-A3YV] (describing the .300 Blackout as a “30-caliber cartridge that would fit in a standard AR-15 magazine”). Plaintiffs nevertheless contend that the .300 Blackout, in their intended configuration, is prohibited by Connecticut law. We accept Plaintiffs’ characterization of the .300 Blackout, from which we infer that Plaintiffs refer to a semiautomatic “other” firearm chambered with a .300 Blackout cartridge. *See* Warenda Decl. ¶¶ 67-68, *Grant* App’x 358-60 (discussing the Aero Precision X15, an AR-15 type firearm that can be chambered in .300 Blackout).

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Both the *NAGR* and the *Grant* Plaintiffs timely appealed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1). Amici curiae lined up on both sides.

DISCUSSION**I. Standard of Review**

A preliminary injunction is “an extraordinary remedy” that courts may only award “upon a clear showing that the plaintiff is entitled to such relief.” *Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc.*, 555 U.S. 7, 22 (2008). To establish their entitlement to a preliminary injunction, Plaintiffs must show that (1) they are likely to succeed on the merits of their claims, (2) they are likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief, (3) the balance of equities tips in their favor, and (4) issuing an injunction is in the public interest.¹⁵ *Id.* at 20. We review the denial of a preliminary injunction for abuse of discretion but “assess *de novo* whether the court proceeded on the basis of an erroneous view of the applicable law.” *Friends of the E. Hampton Airport, Inc. v. Town of E. Hampton*, 841 F.3d 133, 143 (2d Cir. 2016) (quotation marks omitted).

15. The parties dispute whether Plaintiffs seek a mandatory injunction and must meet the higher standard applicable to obtain that kind of relief. *See N. Am. Soccer League, LLC v. U.S. Soccer Fed’n, Inc.*, 883 F.3d 32, 36-37 (2d Cir. 2018) (discussing the differences between mandatory and prohibitory injunctions). Because we conclude that Plaintiffs are unlikely to succeed on the merits under the lower standard for prohibitory injunctions, it is unnecessary to resolve this dispute.

*Appendix A***II. Likelihood of Success on the Merits**

To assess the merits of Plaintiffs’ request for a preliminary injunction, we first determine whether the challenged statutes likely violate Plaintiffs’ Second Amendment right. To prevail, Plaintiffs must show that: (1) the Second Amendment’s plain text, as informed by history, covers acquiring and possessing assault weapons, 2023 assault weapons, and large capacity magazines; and (2) Defendants cannot carry their burden of justifying the challenged statutes by demonstrating that they comport with the Nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation. *See Nken v. Holder*, 556 U.S. 418, 433-34 (2009) (providing that the party seeking the injunction bears the burden of showing that they are entitled to the relief sought).

Although Plaintiffs bring a facial challenge to the entirety of the Connecticut restrictions, they have offered no arguments or evidence in opposition to many of the challenged statutes’ applications, thereby failing to “establish that no set of circumstances exists under which the [challenged statutes] would be valid.” *Rahimi*, 602 U.S. at 693 (quoting *United States v. Salerno*, 481 U.S. 739, 745 (1987)). We therefore focus our review on Plaintiffs’ specific challenge to the statutes as-applied to the weapons they seek to possess: AR-15-style rifles, a .300 Blackout-chambered “other” firearm in Plaintiffs’ intended configuration, and large capacity magazines (together, the “desired firearms and magazines”).¹⁶ *Accord*

16. The Court has acknowledged that the distinction between facial and as-applied challenges “goes to the breadth of the remedy employed by the court, not what must be pleaded in a complaint.” *Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n*, 558 U.S. 310, 331 (2010).

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Bianchi v. Brown, 111 F.4th 438, 452-55 (4th Cir. 2024) (en banc), *cert. denied sub nom. Snope v. Brown*, 145 S. Ct. 1534 (2025).

We undertake our analysis with the benefit of the district court’s thorough opinions and the extensive preliminary records assembled by the parties.

A. The Second Amendment

The Second Amendment to the United States Constitution provides: “A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed.” U.S. Const. amend. II. Over the course of the last two decades, the Supreme Court has issued four opinions that principally inform our understanding of that command. We summarize them here.

So while we would have to conclude the law has no conceivable constitutional application to grant the requested remedy—the complete invalidation of the statutes at issue—the Supreme Court has instructed us to consider partial invalidation (and by extension, a provision’s severability), when evaluating facial challenges. *See Brockett v. Spokane Arcades, Inc.*, 472 U.S. 491, 507 (1985) (holding that “the Court of Appeals should have pursued . . . partial invalidation”); *Regan v. Time, Inc.*, 468 U.S. 641, 652 (1984) (explaining that when a law “contains unobjectionable provisions separable from those found to be unconstitutional, it is the duty of this court to so declare, and maintain the act in so far as it is valid”). We therefore accept Plaintiffs’ theory that we may consider their challenge as limited to the portions of the statutes restricting possession of their desired firearms and magazines and proceed to consider the constitutionality of only those specific sections of the statutes.

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In *District of Columbia v. Heller*, the Court announced for the first time that the Second Amendment “confer[s] an individual right to keep and bear arms.” 554 U.S. 570, 595 (2008). To reach that conclusion, the Court found determinative the operative clause of the Amendment: “the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed.” *Id.* at 577-95. Notably, it found that “Arms” encompasses “all instruments that constitute bearable arms, even those that were not in existence at the time of the founding,” *id.* at 582, and that the textual elements of the operative clause “guarantee the individual right to possess and carry weapons in case of confrontation,” *id.* at 592. The Court also concluded that the prefatory clause of the Amendment (“A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State”) supported its reading of the operative clause. *Id.* at 598-600. Applying its interpretation of the Second Amendment, the Court ruled that the regulation at issue in *Heller*, an absolute ban of handgun possession in the home, was unconstitutional. *Id.* at 635.

But even as it announced the Second Amendment right to keep and bear arms, the Court in *Heller* made clear that this right was “not unlimited.” *Id.* at 595. The Court did “not read the Second Amendment to protect the right of citizens to carry arms for *any sort* of confrontation.” *Id.* at 595. Instead, *Heller* recognized that the Second Amendment “codified a *pre-existing* right” to keep and bear arms, *id.* at 592, which was understood at the founding to be a “right of self-preservation,” *id.* at 595 (quoting 1 Blackstone’s Commentaries 145-46, n.42 (St. George Tucker ed., 1803)); *see also id.* at 594 (“[Americans]

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understood the right to enable individuals to defend themselves.”). The Court emphasized that self-defense was “the *central component* of the right.” *Id.* at 599.

In cautioning that the right was not unlimited, the Court noted that nothing in *Heller* “should be taken to cast doubt on” certain “longstanding prohibitions on the possession of firearms.” *Id.* at 626. The Court indicated “that the sorts of weapons protected were those ‘in common use at the time,’” *id.* at 627 (quoting *United States v. Miller*, 307 U.S. 174, 179 (1939)), and limitations on Second Amendment protections for certain types of arms were “fairly supported by the historical tradition of prohibiting the carrying of ‘dangerous and unusual weapons,’” *id.* (citing, *inter alia*, 4 William Blackstone, Commentaries *148-49 (1769)). The Court acknowledged that some weapons “most useful in military service,” such as M-16 rifles and machineguns, “may be banned,” observing that a typical militia was “formed from a pool of men bringing arms in common use at the time for lawful purposes like self-defense.” *Id.* at 624 (quotation marks omitted), 627. The Court did not elaborate further on the types of arms that are, or are not, protected by the Second Amendment.

Soon after *Heller*, the Court decided *McDonald v. City of Chicago*, which held “that the Second Amendment right is fully applicable to the States” under the Fourteenth Amendment. 561 U.S. 742, 750 (2010). The Court stressed that the right to bear arms is not “a second-class right” subject to “different” rules than other guarantees in the Bill of Rights. *Id.* at 780. And the Court repeated *Heller*’s

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emphasis on the centrality of self-defense to the Second Amendment right, *see id.* at 767, as well as *Heller*'s assurance that the Second Amendment right was not "a right to keep and carry any weapon whatsoever in any manner whatsoever and for whatever purpose," *id.* at 786 (quoting *Heller*, 554 U.S. at 626).

Following *Heller* and *McDonald*, appellate courts were left to determine the extent of the Amendment's protections on a case-by-case basis. Our court, like others, adopted a two-step framework for evaluating challenges to arms regulations, which combined an historical analysis with means-end scrutiny. *See, e.g., Kachalsky v. Cnty. of Westchester*, 701 F.3d 81, 96 (2d Cir. 2012), *abrogated by Bruen*, 597 U.S. 1. Under our pre-*Bruen* standard, we inquired at step one whether the challenged statutes burdened conduct covered by the Second Amendment, as informed by text and history. *Antonyuk v. James*, 120 F.4th 941, 963 (2d Cir. 2024) (describing our pre-*Bruen* standard), *cert. denied*, 145 S. Ct. 1900 (2025). If so, we proceeded at step two to evaluate whether the challenged statutes burdened "the core of the Second Amendment, defined by *Heller* as self-defense in the home." *Id.* (describing our pre-*Bruen* standard). If we determined that the burden was *de minimis*, we subjected the challenged statutes to intermediate scrutiny. *Id.* If we determined that the burden was substantial and affected the core of the right, we subjected the challenged statutes to strict scrutiny. *Id.* Applying that analysis, we held in *New York State Rifle & Pistol Association v. Cuomo* that the same 2013 legislation challenged by the plaintiffs in this case survived constitutional scrutiny. 804 F.3d 242, 263-64 (2d Cir. 2015).

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Eventually, the Supreme Court intervened to course correct the analytical framework. Its decision in *New York State Rifle & Pistol Association v. Bruen* rejected the two-part framework we had employed. 597 U.S. 1, 17 (2022). The Court reasoned that means-end scrutiny was inconsistent with *Heller* and established a different two-step framework “rooted in the Second Amendment’s text, as informed by history.” *Id.* at 19, 22. Under this framework, courts are to consider first whether “the Second Amendment’s plain text covers an individual’s conduct.” *Id.* at 17. If not, our inquiry ends and there is no Second Amendment protection. But if it does, “the Constitution presumptively protects that conduct,” and we must determine if the regulator—whether the federal government, a state, or a municipality—has carried its burden to show “that the regulation is consistent with this Nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation.” *Id.*; *see also id.* at 33-34 (discussing burden). “Only if a firearm regulation is consistent with this Nation’s historical tradition may a court conclude that the individual’s conduct falls outside the Second Amendment’s unqualified command.” *Id.* at 17 (quotation marks and citation omitted).

In terms of analytical methodology, *Bruen* acknowledged that, while some cases would present straightforward comparisons between historical and modern firearms regulation, courts might have to use a “more nuanced approach” in “cases implicating unprecedented societal concerns or dramatic technological changes.” *Id.* at 27. In such cases, a court may compare the regulations at issue to “relevantly similar” historical regulations. *Id.* at 28-29. The Court noted two important

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metrics of similarity: “*how* and *why* the regulations burden a law-abiding citizen’s right to armed self-defense.” *Id.* at 29 (emphasis added).

Two years after *Bruen*, the Supreme Court decided *United States v. Rahimi*, which held that 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8)—a statute that criminalizes the possession of firearms by certain individuals subject to domestic violence restraining orders—was facially constitutional. 602 U.S. 680, 700 (2024). Although the regulation at issue in *Rahimi*, restricting who may possess firearms, is notably distinct from the regulation at issue here, restricting what firearms may be possessed, *Rahimi* remains instructive. For one thing, *Rahimi* rejected the contention that the Second Amendment permits only “those regulations *identical* to ones that could be found in 1791.” *Id.* at 692 (emphasis added); *see also id.* at 691-92 (observing that the Court’s Second Amendment “precedents were not meant to suggest a law trapped in amber”). Thus, *Rahimi* applied *Bruen*’s “relevantly similar” analysis to § 922(g)(8) without first determining that the statute implicated unprecedented societal concerns or dramatic technological changes. *Id.* at 692 (quotation marks omitted). And *Rahimi* demonstrated that we may look to different historical traditions “[t]aken together” in assessing the constitutionality of challenged statutes. *Id.* at 698. Applying those principles, *Rahimi* identified an historical tradition of disarming individuals that pose a clear threat of physical violence to another person and identified relevantly similar historical regulations from the founding era, such as surety and going armed

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laws. *See id.* at 693-98.¹⁷ *Rahimi* thus serves as a useful methodological guide for the use of historical analogues.

With the background from these cases in mind, we consider the constitutionality of the challenged Connecticut statutes.

B. Preliminary Considerations

We begin our analysis by discussing three concepts, as to each of which the parties have offered competing interpretations, that guide our analysis..

1. “In Common Use”

Plaintiffs insist that the challenged restrictions on the desired firearms and magazines violate the Second Amendment because they constitute a categorical ban on “widely popular” weapons in common use today for lawful purposes. Br. of *Grant* Appellants at 7. This, Plaintiffs contend, is “sufficient” for finding that possessing the regulated weapons is protected by the Second Amendment.

17. Surety laws “authorized magistrates to require individuals suspected of future misbehavior to post a bond.” *Rahimi*, 602 U.S. at 695. Some surety laws specifically targeted the misuse of firearms, and authorized the imposition of bonds from individuals “who went armed with” certain weapons, including “a dirk, dagger, sword, pistol, or other offensive and dangerous weapon.” *Id.* at 696 (cleaned up). Going armed laws, also known as affray laws, “prohibited riding or going armed, with dangerous or unusual weapons, to terrify the good people of the land.” *Id.* at 697 (cleaned up).

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Br. of *NAGR* Appellants at 8. Even assuming *arguendo* that the desired firearms and magazines are “typically possessed” and “in common use” for lawful purposes, *see Cuomo*, 804 F.3d at 255-57, we disagree.

Plaintiffs distort the precedents on which their argument relies. *Heller* and *Bruen* provide that the Second Amendment “protects *only* the carrying of weapons that are those ‘in common use’ at the time, as opposed to those that ‘are highly unusual in society at large.’” *Bruen*, 597 U.S. at 47 (quoting *Heller*, 554 U.S. at 627) (emphasis added). The cases do not hold that the Second Amendment *necessarily* protects *all* weapons in common use. They do not shield popular weapons from review of their potentially unusually dangerous character. And further, Plaintiffs’ proposed “common use” standard would strain both logic and administrability, as it would hinge the right on what the Fourth Circuit aptly called a “trivial counting exercise” that would “lead[] to absurd consequences” where unusually dangerous arms like the M-16 or “the W54 nuclear warhead” can “gain constitutional protection merely because [they] become[] popular before the government can sufficiently regulate [them].” *Bianchi*, 111 F.4th at 460.

2. “Unusually Dangerous”

The Supreme Court has recognized an “historical tradition of prohibiting the carrying of ‘dangerous and unusual weapons.’” *Bruen*, 597 U.S. at 21. Defendants argue that the challenged statutes fall within this tradition. Plaintiffs and their amici counter that this

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limitation on the Second Amendment right applies only to those weapons that, unlike AR-15s and large-capacity magazines, are *both* dangerous *and* unusual. *See* Br. of *Grant* Appellants at 22, 31-35; Br. of Firearms Policy Coalition Amici at 10-12. We conclude, however, that this historical tradition encompasses those arms that legislators determined were *unusually dangerous* because of their characteristics.

Our understanding of the Second Amendment is informed by history. *Bruen*, 597 U.S. at 26. Historical prohibitions on affray used both the formulations “dangerous *and* unusual” *and* “dangerous *or* unusual.”¹⁸ Notwithstanding the variations, both the conjunctive and disjunctive formulations were traditionally understood as meaning “unusually dangerous.” Decl. of Saul Cornell ¶ 20, *Grant* App’x 1220-21 (“Educated readers in the Founding era would have interpreted both phrases to mean the same thing, a ban on weapons that were ‘unusually dangerous.’”).

Plaintiffs challenge our “unusually dangerous” interpretation by pointing to a concurring Supreme Court opinion characterizing the exception as a “conjunctive

18. Blackstone defined the offense of affray as the act of riding or going armed with “dangerous *or* unusual” weapons. *Bruen*, 597 U.S. at 46 (quoting 4 William Blackstone, Commentaries *148-49). Contemporary and historic judicial authorities have repeated Blackstone’s disjunctive formulation. *See id.* (“dangerous or unusual weapons”); *Rahimi*, 602 U.S. at 697 (same); *State v. Huntly*, 25 N.C. 418, 420 (1843) (same); *State v. Lanier*, 71 N.C. 288, 289 (1874) (same); *English v. State*, 35 Tex. 473, 476 (1871) (same).

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‘dangerous *and* unusual test.’” Br. of *Grant* Appellants at 31-33 (quoting *Caetano v. Massachusetts*, 577 U.S. 411, 417 (2016) (Alito, J., concurring)). But given the historical evidence cited here, this non-binding concurrence cannot bear the weight Plaintiffs place on it.

What is more, Plaintiffs’ argument strips coherence from the historical limitation to the Second Amendment right applicable to dangerous and unusual weapons. It is axiomatic that to some degree all firearms are “dangerous,” *see Caetano*, 577 U.S. at 417-18 (Alito, J., concurring), so that word does no work by itself. And the phrase “and unusual” or the phrase “or unusual” standing alone raises more questions than it answers. What is meant by “unusual” standing alone? “Dangerous” needs a modifier, and its companion “unusual” needs something to modify. *Unusually dangerous* is the obvious fit to describe weapons that are so lethal that legislators have presumed that they are not used or intended to be used for lawful purposes, principally individual self-defense.¹⁹

In an excellent concurring opinion, our colleague Judge Nathan further elaborates on why Plaintiffs’ emphasis on

19. Defendants’ expert describes the phrase “dangerous and unusual” as a hendiadys, which individuals in the founding era would have interpreted as “unusually dangerous.” Cornell Decl. ¶ 20, *Grant* App’x 1220-21. A hendiadys is “two terms,” often with one modifying the other, that are “separated by a conjunction” (here, “and”) “that work together as a single complex expression.” *Lac du Flambeau Band of Lake Superior Chippewa Indians v. Coughlin*, 599 U.S. 382, 413 (2023) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting) (quotation marks and alteration omitted).

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the “and” in the phrase “dangerous and unusual” does not survive the historical scrutiny that we must undertake and contributes to the historical provenance of the “unusually dangerous” formulation that we posit. We fully join in Judge Nathan’s concurrence..

3. “Interest Balancing by the People”

The Supreme Court has made clear that, “[l]ike most rights, the right secured by the Second Amendment is not unlimited.” *Heller*, 554 U.S. at 626. Historically, the right “was not a right to keep and carry any weapon whatsoever in any manner whatsoever and for whatever purpose.” *Id.* These historical limitations make apparent that the Second Amendment “is the very *product* of an interest balancing by the people.” *Id.* at 635. We endeavor to faithfully apply “the terms of the [*people’s*] balance enshrined in the Constitution’s text” based on history and tradition rather than our personal intuitions or preferences about how to balance individual rights with societal prerogatives. *Bianchi*, 111 F.4th at 472. We thus engage in analogical reasoning that invokes historical practice without resorting to judicial interest balancing.

C. Presumptive Constitutional Protection

Under *Bruen* step one, we first ask whether the Second Amendment presumptively protects Plaintiffs’ individual right to acquire and possess the desired firearms and magazines because the “plain text of the Second Amendment protects [Plaintiffs’] proposed course of conduct.” *Bruen*, 597 U.S. at 32.

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Supreme Court authority has not settled the precise scope of the Second Amendment’s protections. The Court has elucidated that the Constitution only protects possession of arms that are typically possessed and in common use by law-abiding citizens for lawful purposes (principally individual self-defense), and that are not dangerous and unusual. *Heller*, 554 U.S. at 625, 627. This Court has understood the “in common use” analysis to fall under the first step of *Bruen*. *Antonyuk*, 120 F.4th at 981 (holding that the “threshold inquiry” at *Bruen* step one “requires courts to consider . . . whether the weapon concerned is in common use” (quotation marks omitted)). But the Supreme Court has not made clear how and at what point in the analysis we are to consider whether weapons are unusually dangerous. Nor has the Court clarified how we are to evaluate a weapon’s “common use.” The Court’s opinions may reasonably be read to require such considerations at the first step of *Bruen*’s two-step inquiry, cabining the meaning of “Arms” to those that are not unusually dangerous and that are generally owned and used by ordinary citizens for lawful purposes, principally self-defense.²⁰ Or the

20. See *Bianchi*, 111 F.4th at 461 (concluding that because the AR-15 “is a combat rifle that is both ill-suited and disproportionate to self-defense,” it is “outside the scope of the Second Amendment”); *Bevis*, 85 F.4th at 1193 (defining “bearable Arms” to reach “only . . . weapons in common use for . . . individual self-defense”); *Hanson v. District of Columbia*, 120 F.4th 223, 232 (D.C. Cir. 2024), *cert. denied*, No. 24-936, 2025 WL 1603612, at *1 (U.S. June 6, 2025) (considering at step one whether extra-large capacity magazines “constitute bearable arms,” and, if so, whether they are “in common use for a lawful purpose, such as self-defense” (cleaned up)).

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Court’s precedents may reasonably be read to require those considerations at *Bruen*’s second step, as part of our analogical comparison of contemporary restrictions to historical analogues embodying constitutionally sound exceptions to the Second Amendment right.²¹ This lack of clarity has led to disagreement among the parties in this case and confusion among courts generally.²²

We prefer not to venture into an area in which such uncertainty abounds and that is not necessary to resolve this appeal. Because of the outcome we reach on other grounds, we will simply assume without deciding that the desired firearms and magazines are bearable arms within the meaning of the Second Amendment and that their acquisition and possession is presumptively entitled to constitutional protection. We thus proceed to *Bruen* step two, which provides a resolution to our quest.

21. See *Ocean State Tactical, LLC v. Rhode Island*, 95 F.4th 38, 47 (1st Cir. 2024) (situating the “dangerous and unusual” inquiry at step two), *cert. denied sub nom. Ocean State Tactical v. Rhode Island*, No. 24-131, 2025 WL 1549866 (U.S. June 2, 2025); *Hanson*, 120 F.4th at 235 (same).

22. See, e.g., *Harrel v. Raoul*, 144 S. Ct. 2491, 2492 (2024) (Mem.) (statement of Thomas, J.) (The Court’s “minimal guidance” is “far from a comprehensive framework for evaluating restrictions on types of weapons” and “leaves open essential questions such as what makes a weapon ‘bearable,’ ‘dangerous,’ or ‘unusual.’”); *Bevis*, 85 F.4th at 1198 (observing that there is “no consensus whether the common-use issue belongs at *Bruen* step or *Bruen* step two”).

*Appendix A***D. Historical Tradition of Firearm Regulation**

We now turn to whether Defendants, at this preliminary stage, have provided sufficient evidence that the challenged statutes are “consistent with the Nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation.” *Bruen*, 597 U.S. at 24. For the reasons that follow, we conclude that they have done so.

Because the challenged statutes are state laws, “the prevailing understanding of the right to bear arms” in both 1791 (the year in which the states ratified the Second Amendment) and in 1868 (the year that the Fourteenth Amendment, which *McDonald* held to incorporate the Second Amendment against the states through the Due Process Clause, was ratified) are relevant to our analysis. *Antonyuk*, 120 F.4th at 972-73. We therefore consider limitations imposed on the Second Amendment right during these time periods and whether these historical traditions of regulation are analogous to the challenged statutes. 691-92. We also note that while the Court has not “provide[d] an exhaustive survey of the features that render regulations relevantly similar,” it has provided “two metrics: how and why the regulations burden a law-abiding citizen’s right to armed self-defense.” *Bruen*, 597 U.S. at 29. We therefore attend to the Court’s instruction to consider “whether modern and historical regulations impose a comparable burden on the right of armed self-defense and whether that burden is comparably justified” as “*central* considerations” in our “analogical inquiry.” *Id.* (quotation marks omitted). If we determine that the challenged statutes’ restrictions on acquiring and possessing the desired firearms and magazines are

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relevantly similar to the Nation’s historical tradition of firearms regulation, we may conclude that Plaintiffs are unlikely to succeed on the merits of their challenge and thus the preliminary relief Plaintiffs seek should be denied.

Plaintiffs are unlikely to succeed on the merits. Connecticut’s restrictions on AR-15s, .300 Blackout-chambered “other” firearms (in Plaintiffs’ intended configuration), and large capacity magazines are one more chapter in the historical tradition of limiting the ability to “keep and carry” dangerous and unusual weapons. *Heller*, 554 U.S. at 627. The challenged statutes are “relevantly similar,” *Bruen*, 597 U.S. at 29, to historical antecedents that imposed targeted restrictions on unusually dangerous weapons of an offensive character—dirk and Bowie knives, as well as machine guns and submachine guns—after they were used by a single perpetrator to kill multiple people at one time or to inflict terror in communities. At the same time, the historical antecedents, like the challenged statutes, preserved alternative avenues for the legal possession of less inherently dangerous arms for self-defense and other lawful purposes. The challenged statutes thus impose a “comparable burden” and are “comparably justified” as those historical comparators offered by Defendants. *Id.*

1. The Need for Nuanced Analogical Reasoning

Defendants have not identified, and we have not independently found in the record before us, any exact

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historical analogues to the challenged statutes. The apparent absence of an exact historical analogue, however, is not necessarily determinative. *See Rahimi*, 602 U.S. at 692. To be sure, *Bruen* instructs that “when a challenged regulation addresses a general societal problem that has persisted since the 18th century, the lack of a distinctly similar historical regulation addressing that problem is relevant evidence that the challenged regulation is inconsistent with the Second Amendment.” 597 U.S. at 26-27. But the Court also instructs that in cases that are not so “straightforward,” the lack of a distinctly similar historical analogue may be excused in favor of “nuanced” analogical reasoning. *Bruen*, 597 U.S. at 27-28. Here, we conclude that because the challenged legislation addresses novel societal problems stemming from newly developed technology, a nuanced analysis is warranted.

As we discuss below, there is no evidence before the twentieth century that any firearms could be used to carry out mass shootings. Indeed, commonly used firearms “did not have the capacity to occasion a societal concern with mass shootings . . . until dramatic technological changes vastly increased their capacity and the rapidity of firing.” *Hanson v. District of Columbia*, 120 F.4th 223, 240 (D.C. Cir. 2024), *cert. denied*, No. 24-936, 2025 WL 1603612 (U.S. June 6, 2025). Therefore, there “simply is no relevantly similar historical analogue to a modern, semiautomatic [firearm] equipped with [a large capacity magazine].” *Id.*

As technology has facilitated an increase in mass shootings, mass shootings have become the object of

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widespread fear and societal concern. Together they have provoked a spate of state legislation to address a problem that is without direct historical precedent. *Bruen* had this type of situation in mind when it counseled that where direct analogues are absent and the analysis is not “straightforward,” we may employ a “more nuanced approach” to evaluate relevant historical antecedents. *Bruen*, 597 U.S. at 26-27.

We will say a bit more about the situation we face: (a) the dramatic technological changes and (b) the unprecedented societal concerns..

a. Dramatic Technological Changes

The record before us reveals that contemporary assault weapons represent dramatic technological changes. Their advanced military-like features enable them to inflict catastrophic injuries that bear no similarity to those injuries caused by the comparatively primitive firearms that were widely available in the founding and reconstruction eras.

Plaintiffs and their amici identify unregulated firearms invented in the founding and reconstruction eras capable of shooting a dozen or more shots before reloading. In their view, this means that there has been no dramatic technological change. They contend that the existence of historical multi-shot firearms, coupled with the absence of distinctly similar historical regulations, is dispositive evidence that the challenged statutes are unconstitutional. *Br. of Grant Appellants* at 53. But the cherry-picked arms

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on which Plaintiffs rely were different. Unlike today's assault weapons and large capacity magazines, the early multi-shot firearms were neither reliable nor widely used.

Plaintiffs cite Joseph Belton's 16-shot repeating rifle, the Jennings 12-shot flintlock rifles, Pepperbox pistols capable of firing 6 to 24 shots, the Winchester Model 1866 (which could shoot 18 rounds), the 1873 Evans Repeating Rifle (which could shoot 34 rounds), and Bennet and Haviland Rifles (which could shoot 12 rounds), among others. Br. of *Grant* Appellants 48-51; *see also* Br. of Firearms Policy Coalition Amici 19-37. These multi-shot firearms, however, were substantially more difficult to operate and prone to technological failings than contemporary firearms like AR-15s. *See Hanson*, 120 F.4th at 242, 249-51 (explaining that because of these differences, the Jennings multi-shot flintlock rifles, Pepperbox pistols, Bennet & Haviland Revolving Rifles, and the Winchester Model 1866 are irrelevant and unpersuasive comparators). And these malfunctions did not merely cause the weapon to jam or misfire. Rather, early multi-shot arms using "superposed loads," like Belton's 16-shot repeating rifle, were prone to explode if "the sequencing between rounds was off." Brian DeLay, *The Myth of Continuity in American Gun Culture*, 113 Calif. L. Rev. 1, 23, 27 (2025). The technological limitations of these arms prevented their use for most practical purposes and assuredly prevented a single gunman from using them to unleash a massacre in a matter of seconds.

The purported multi-shot analogues, moreover, do not appear to have been widely used. In the founding and reconstruction eras, most firearms were muskets

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and fowling pieces, which are flintlock muzzle-loading firearms. Plaintiffs and their amici discuss the designs of early multi-shot firearms, but they do not provide evidence of their prevalence. This makes sense, as many of the proffered multi-shot firearms were expensive curios, more likely to be seen in exhibitions than in practical use. *Id.* at 23. But even if they were prevalent, there is no evidence that these arms were used for mass murder. The record instead reveals that early multi-shot firearms never “achieve[d] sufficient market penetration to impact gun violence.” Cornell Decl. ¶ 41, *NAGR* App’x 955.

The prevalent firearms of the founding and reconstruction eras, as Plaintiffs concede, are technologically distinguishable from modern AR-15-style firearms. Flintlock muzzle-loaders generally held just one round at a time (and often had to be pre-loaded); had a maximum accurate range of 55 yards; had a muzzle velocity of roughly 1,000 feet per second; required at least thirty seconds for the shooter to manually reload a single shot; and were frequently liable to misfire. *See* Decl. of Randolph Roth ¶ 16, *NAGR* App’x 894; Br. of Amici Giffords Law Center to Prevent Gun Violence et al. at 11. As a result, they could do much less harm. A shooter using such a firearm could kill only at a rate of less than one person per minute. *NAGR* Sp. App’x 57. After all, in the 1770 Boston Massacre, seven British soldiers firing flintlock muskets into a crowd managed to take only five lives. Roth Decl. ¶ 41, *NAGR* App’x at 918-19.

By contrast, today’s assault weapons—fed continuously by large capacity magazines—are dramatically and

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reliably lethal. An AR-15 can hold 30 rounds; is accurate within 400 yards; has a muzzle velocity of approximately 3,251 feet per second; can be reloaded with full magazines in as little as three seconds; and can empty a thirty-round magazine in five seconds. *See* Decl. of Randolph Roth ¶ 49, *NAGR* App'x 926; Br. of Amici Giffords Law Center to Prevent Gun Violence et al. at 11. That's how, in 2019, one terrorist in Dayton, Ohio armed with an AR-15 equipped with 100-round magazines could fire 41 shots in just 32 seconds, killing nine people and wounding 17 others before he was stopped.²³ And unlike their predecessors, contemporary semiautomatic firearms are also widely commercially available, though only recently so.²⁴

Modern assault weapons, such as the AR-15, and large capacity magazines represent dramatic technological changes that have given rise to the unprecedented societal concern of mass shootings fueled by this dependable, widespread, and substantially more lethal technology..

b. Unprecedented Societal Concerns

We find in the record no direct historical precedent for the contemporary, growing societal concern over and fear of mass shootings resulting in ten or more fatalities.

23. Holly Yan, et al., *The Dayton gunman killed 9 people by firing 41 shots in 30 seconds. A high-capacity rifle helped enable that speed*, CNN (Aug. 5, 2019), <https://www.cnn.com/2019/08/05/us/dayton-monday-shooter-stopped-in-seconds/index.html> [<https://perma.cc/8RZG-HNXG>]; *Bianchi*, 111 F.4th at 463-64.

24. Automatic and semiautomatic weapons initially became widely commercially available in the twentieth century. AR-15s, in particular, proliferated among civilians in the twenty-first century.

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Plaintiffs point to historical mass casualty events for the proposition that mass killings are not an unprecedented societal concern. But there is “no direct precedent for the contemporary and growing societal concern that [assault weapons with large capacity magazines] have become the preferred tool for murderous individuals intent on killing as many people as possible, as quickly as possible.” *Ocean State Tactical, LLC v. Rhode Island*, 95 F.4th 38, 44 (1st Cir. 2024), *cert. denied*, No. 24-131, 2025 WL 1549866 (U.S. June 2, 2025); *see also Hanson*, 120 F.4th at 241 (concluding “mass shootings incidents cause outsized collective trauma on society” and constitute an “unprecedented societal concern”).

Early firearms by themselves did not facilitate mass killings. In the founding era, firearms were common but rarely used to perpetuate homicides. Mass murders have occurred throughout history, but the “limits of existing technologies” meant that they generally involved the use of multiple people and multiple weapons. Roth Decl. ¶ 41, *NAGR* App’x 918. Until the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, mass homicides could only be carried out by groups using primitive firearms and melee weapons—clubs, knives, and nooses—that, though lethal, “did not provide individuals or small groups of people the means to inflict mass casualties on their own.” *Id.*

The Founders faced no problem comparable to a single gunman carrying out a mass murder in seconds. How could they, when there was “no known occurrence of a mass shooting resulting in double-digit fatalities at any point in time during the 173-year period between

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the nation’s founding in 1776 and 1948”? Decl. of Louis Klarevas ¶ 18, *NAGR* App’x 285. The first single-gunman shooting resulting in ten or more deaths did not occur until 1949. *Id.*²⁵ From 1949 to 2004, there were ten mass shootings with double-digit fatalities. *Id.* ¶ 21, *NAGR* App’x 288.

The proliferation of unusually dangerous weapons, however, has led to a frequent, growing, and extremely lethal threat to public safety, actual and widely perceived. An assault weapon was first used to perpetuate a mass shooting resulting in ten or more fatalities in 1982. *Id.* ¶ 20, *NAGR* App’x 288. After there were five such mass shootings within five years, Congress enacted three significant federal firearms restrictions. *Id.* ¶¶ 20-21, *NAGR* App’x 285-88. In the eighteen years after the most significant of those restrictions expired in 2004, there were *twenty* mass shootings each resulting in ten or more deaths. *Id.* ¶ 21, *NAGR* App’x 288. Mass shootings continue to be a growing threat unlike anything that the Framers could have imagined.

Certainly it would have been shocking to the Framers to witness the mass shootings of our day, to see children’s bodies “stacked up . . . like cordwood” on the floor of a church in Sutherland Springs, Texas; to hear a Parkland, Florida high school student describe her classroom as

25. See also Patrick Sauer, *The Story of the First Mass Shooting in U.S. History*, SMITHSONIAN MAG. (Oct. 14, 2015), <https://www.smithsonianmag.com/history/story-first-mass-murder-us-history-180956927/> [<https://perma.cc/ZS89-AL6J>].

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a “war zone” with “blood everywhere”; to be at a movie in Aurora, Colorado when suddenly gunfire erupted, leaving “bodies” strewn and “blood on seats, blood on the wall, blood on the emergency exit door”; to run past “shoes scattered, blood in the street, bodies in the street” while bullets blazed through the sky in Dayton, Ohio; to watch law enforcement officers encounter “a pile of dead children” in Sandy Hook, Connecticut; to stand next to one of those officers as he tried to count the dead children, but “kept getting confused,” as his “mind would not count beyond the low teens.”

Bianchi, 111 F.4th at 463 (quoting Silvia Foster-Frau et al., *Terror on Repeat: A Rare Look at the Devastation Caused by AR-15 Shootings*, WASH. POST (Nov. 16, 2023)) (cataloguing thirty-three mass shootings resulting in nine or more fatalities); *see also Ocean State Tactical*, 95 F.4th at 44; *Duncan v. Bonta*, 133 F.4th 852, 873 (9th Cir. 2025); *Hanson*, 120 F.4th at 241. And such incidents remain distressingly frequent.

Bruen thus had in mind the very situation we face here when it counseled that where direct analogues are absent because of unprecedented societal concerns and dramatic technological changes, our analysis may adopt a “more nuanced” approach. It is that approach we undertake here. In employing this “nuanced approach,” we examine how the challenged statutes work and the reasons behind them.

*Appendix A***2. The Challenged Statutes**

The challenged statutes—as applied to AR-15s, .300 Blackout-chambered “other” firearms in Plaintiffs’ intended configuration,²⁶ and large capacity magazines—are, as Defendants contend, targeted restrictions on unusually dangerous weapons that leave open many lawful alternatives to Connecticut residents for armed self-defense.

The challenged statutes focus on unusually dangerous firearms, in substantial part those more powerful semiautomatic centerfire rifles that can accept a large capacity magazine and have an additional military-style feature that increases the firearm’s lethality. In so doing, these statutes restrict unusually dangerous weapons that have grave capacity for inflicting harm disproportionate to the Second Amendment’s “core lawful purpose of self-defense.” *Heller*, 554 U.S. at 630. Consider, as a

26. The relevant features of a .300 Blackout-chambered “other” firearm in Plaintiffs’ intended configuration (i.e., with a pistol grip and fore grip) make this firearm substantively similar to the AR-15. *See NAGR* App’x at 381 (discussing how such features enable user to “spray . . . a large number of bullets over a broad killing zone, without having to aim at each individual target”). And Plaintiffs have not argued or provided evidence distinguishing between these categories of challenged weapons. *See Grant* Sp. App’x 11 (observing that “neither side argues that there are any significant differences in the key functionality between the 2023 assault weapons and the more limited group of firearms classified as assault weapons prior to” the 2023 legislation). The reasoning applicable to the AR-15 set forth in this section therefore applies to both types of desired firearms.

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paradigmatic example, the AR-15s and large capacity magazines that Plaintiffs seek to purchase.

The AR-15 was initially developed for modern military combat. It has the same basic structure and operation, as well as near-equivalent muzzle velocity as its military counterpart, the M-16. Warenda Decl. ¶ 22, *NAGR* App'x 199; Roth Decl. ¶ 49, *NAGR* App'x 925; *Capen v. Campbell*, 708 F. Supp. 3d 65, 85 (D. Mass. 2023), *aff'd*, 134 F.4th 660 (1st Cir. 2025). The AR-15 is more lethal to victims, bystanders, and law enforcement than ordinary handguns typically used for self-defense. Its powerful centerfire ammunition can penetrate standard construction walls, car doors, and law enforcement officers' body armor. *Kolbe v. Hogan*, 849 F.3d 114, 127 (4th Cir. 2017). Its standard configuration comes equipped with .223 caliber rounds "designed to fragment and mushroom" in a victim's body, though it may alternatively be configured to fire larger .300 Blackout rounds that inflict even larger entry wounds. Donohue Decl. ¶ 66, *NAGR* App'x 224. Whereas an ordinary handgun causes injuries equivalent to a "stabbing with a bullet," an AR-15 exacts serious injuries tantamount to being shot "with a Coke can." *Id.* ¶ 109, *NAGR* App'x 242. It has combat-functional features—like the ability to accept large capacity magazines as well as grips and barrel shrouds that facilitate spray firing—that dramatically increase its utility for lethality and its appeal to mass shooters. *See id.* ¶ 65, *NAGR* App'x 224.

The primary difference between the M-16 and AR-15 is that the AR-15 does not have fully automatic

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firing capability.²⁷ Warenda Decl. ¶ 22, *NAGR* App'x 199. Plaintiffs point to this distinction as the critical difference between weapons that can be permissibly regulated and those that cannot. Br. of *Grant* Appellants at 41. But Plaintiffs have not offered evidence that this distinguishing factor fundamentally transforms the AR-15 into a weapon that is substantially less dangerous than its military counterpart. Rather, Defendants have offered evidence that “[a]t ranges over 25 meters, rapid semiautomatic fire is superior to automatic fire in all measures: shots per target, trigger pulls per hit, and time to hit.” Donohue Decl. ¶ 168, *NAGR* App'x 263 (quoting Dep't of the U.S. Army, FM 3-22.9: Rifle Marksmanship M16-/M4-Series Weapons, § 7-15 (2008));²⁸ see also *Capen*, 708 F. Supp. 3d at 85 (noting that the “U.S. Marine Corps discarded” the M-16’s fully automatic function “in favor of a maximum setting of a three-round burst” to “enhance lethality by. . . improving accuracy”).

27. An M-16 set to fully automatic can fire approximately 750 to 900 rounds per minute. Roth Decl. ¶ 49, *NAGR* App'x 925. The maximum rate of fire over the same period for a semi-automatic rifle, which requires the user to pull the trigger for each shot, will vary based on the experience and skill of the user. The U.S. Army, however, defines “rapid semiautomatic fire” as 45 rounds per minute. Dep't of the U.S. Army, TC 3-22.9: Rifle and Carbine, § 8-19 (2016).

28. This U.S. Army manual has since been replaced with an updated version, which again emphasizes the drawbacks of automatic fire, noting that “[a]utomatic or burst fires drastically decrease the probability of hit due to the rapid succession of recoil impulses and the inability of the Soldier to maintain proper sight alignment and sight picture on the target.” TC 3-22.9: Rifle and Carbine, *supra* note 27, § 8-21.

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In addition, the AR-15, unlike an ordinary handgun, has features that actually limit its usefulness for self-defense. *Cf. Heller*, 554 U.S. at 629 (discussing characteristics of handguns that make them “the quintessential self-defense weapon”). It is “significantly heavier and longer,” “less concealable, more difficult to use, and less readily accessible, particularly for an inexperienced user” than a typical pistol. *Capen*, 708 F. Supp. 3d at 86. And with their high muzzle velocity, AR-15-style weapons are more likely to penetrate a house or apartment wall when fired in a self-defense scenario, threatening family members or the building’s other occupants. Donohue Decl. ¶ 154, *NAGR* App’x 257; Roth Decl. ¶ 50, *NAGR* App’x 926.

Moreover, assault rifles with large capacity magazines, like the AR-15, are especially dangerous in mass shootings. An assault weapon, large capacity magazine, or both, has been used in each of the ten deadliest mass shooting events in American history.²⁹ *See* Donohue Decl. ¶ 49, tbl. 1, *NAGR* App’x 217. Criminals, terrorists, and the mentally ill armed with such weapons may easily fire more than eleven rounds before pausing to reload, thereby eliminating breaks that afford victims time to escape and law enforcement time to intervene.

29. In addition, the perpetrators of one-third of the more numerous high-fatality mass shooting events in the last 32 years used assault weapons or other firearms outfitted with large capacity magazines. Klarevas Decl. ¶ 23, *NAGR* App’x 289. And AR-15 or AK-47 type assault rifles were used in “every major terrorist attack on U.S. soil in the past decade.” *Bianchi*, 111 F.4th at 457 (citing attacks in San Bernadino, CA; Orlando, FL; Pittsburg, PA; El Paso, TX; and Buffalo, NY).

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At the same time that the Connecticut statutes restrict access to unusually dangerous weapons, Defendants show, the statutes still allow the lawful possession of many popular weapons, including semiautomatic weapons deemed to be less dangerous by the legislature for self-defense and other lawful purposes. *See* Warenda Decl. ¶ 33, *NAGR* App’x 200. And while Plaintiffs at times characterize Connecticut’s law as a “categorical[] ban [on] the possession of multi-shot, semi-automatic firearms,” Br. of *Grant* Appellants at 52, Connecticut residents remain able to purchase and possess more than 1,000 firearms for self-defense, hunting, and sport shooting. Among others, the challenged statutes permit Connecticut residents to own and possess popular semiautomatic handguns like the Glock 17 and M9 Barretta, and popular semiautomatic hunting rifles like the Ruger Mini-14 and the Ruger 10/22 Target.³⁰

30. Many popular hunting rifles fall outside of Connecticut’s definition of “assault weapon” because they are bolt-action rather than semiautomatic. *Top 25 Rifles for Hunting in the Last 50 Years*, PETERSEN’S HUNTING, <https://www.petersenshunting.com/editorial/top-25-hunting-rifles-last-50-years/389930> [<https://perma.cc/6UQK-QVJT>] (last visited May 30, 2025) (including 22 bolt-action rifles in a list of the top 25 hunting rifles in the last 25 years); Richard Mann, *The 6 Best Rifles, Tested and Reviewed*, FIELD & STREAM (Jan. 20, 2021), <https://www.fieldandstream.com/guns/best-rifles> [<https://perma.cc/K5T5-Z8MC>] (listing sixteen of the “most exciting” rifles of 2024, including 15 bolt-action rifles, one lever-action, and no semiautomatic rifles); Jordan Sillars, *The Best Deer Hunting Rifle at Every Price Point*, MEATEATER (June 7, 2024), <https://www.themeateater.com/gear/general/the-best-deer-hunting-rifle-at-every-price-point> [<https://perma.cc/2L7B-RXNY>] (recommending only bolt-action rifles). These bolt-action rifles are often preferred due to their superior accuracy. Texas Parks

*Appendix A***3. The Comparators**

Having considered “how and why” the challenged statutes “burden a law-abiding citizen’s right to armed self-defense,” *Bruen*, 597 U.S. at 29, we next look to whether Defendants are likely to succeed in establishing there are “relevantly similar” historical analogues that “work[] in the same way” and “for the same reasons,” as required by our nuanced approach. *Rahimi*, 602 U.S. at 711 (Gorsuch, J., concurring). On the record at this stage, we find that Defendants have provided sufficient evidence of analogous historical regulations and that Plaintiffs are therefore unlikely to succeed on the merits.

& Wildlife, *Common Firearms*, <https://tpwd.texas.gov/education/hunter-education/online-course/firearms-and-ammunition-1/common-firearms> [<https://perma.cc/XN9N-RP3V>] (last visited June 25, 2025). But the ability of semiautomatic weapons to quickly place follow-up shots has led to the popularity of some semiautomatic guns for hunting small- to medium-sized game. Examples of guns popular for this use include the Ruger Mini-14 and the Ruger 10/22 Target. See Joseph von Benedikt, *Is it Better to Have a Bolt Action or Semiauto?*, PETERSEN’S HUNTING (Feb. 22, 2023), <https://www.petersenshunting.com/editorial/great-debate-boltaction-semiauto/469183> [<https://perma.cc/A29D-LTWC>] (explaining that for hunting under 60 or 70 yards, “a Ruger Mini-14 or the like can serve”); David E. Petzel, *Field & Stream’s Ultimate Guide to Hunting Rifles*, FIELD & STREAM, Aug. 2017 (listing the Ruger 10/22 Target as the “top pick” for small game hunting). Because the Ruger Mini-14 and the Ruger 10/22 Target are not specifically banned weapons and lack features that would otherwise result in their classification as assault weapons, both of these popular hunting weapons are lawful in Connecticut today.

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While the Connecticut statutes lack an “historical twin,” *id.* at 701 (quotation marks omitted), Defendants have provided evidence of a longstanding tradition of restricting novel weapons that are particularly suited for criminal violence—a tradition that was “liquidate[d] and settle[d]” by “a regular course of practice” of regulating such weapons throughout our history. *Bruen*, 597 U.S. at 35-36.

This tradition can be traced back to pre-colonial England, with the enactment of laws prohibiting “riding or going armed, with dangerous or unusual weapons [to] terrify[] the good people of the land.” *Rahimi*, 602 U.S. at 697 (quoting 4 William Blackstone, *Commentaries* *148-49). The Statute of Northampton prohibited the carrying of launcegays, which were shorter and lighter than a full knights’ lance and designed for thrusting, that were “generally worn or carried only when one intended to . . . breach the peace.” *Bruen*, 597 U.S. at 41; *see also* 7 Rich. 2, ch. 13 (1383) (prohibiting riding with launcegays in pre-colonial England).

The tradition of regulating weapons used for criminal violence continued in the 19th century, with state legislatures targeting unusually dangerous, novel, and concealable weapons, including uniquely configured dirk and Bowie knives. *Hanson*, 120 F.4th at 237. These ubiquitous historical restrictions on dirk and Bowie knives exemplify a relevantly similar historical tradition. *See Capen*, 708 F. Supp. 3d at 83 (observing that Bowie knives were subject to regulation by 49 states). The relevance of this history is supported by the text of the Second Amendment, which speaks to the right to keep and bear

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“arms,” not just firearms. *See* U.S. Const. amend. II; *State v. DeCiccio*, 315 Conn. 79, 117, 128 (2014) (concluding that dirks are “Arms” within the meaning of the Second Amendment).

Like the weapons regulated by the challenged statutes, dirk and Bowie knives were technological advancements over ordinary defensive arms because they were designed “expressly for fighting,” with longer blades, crossguards to protect fighters’ hands, and clip points to facilitate cutting or stabbing adversaries. Roth Decl. ¶ 25, *NAGR* App’x 903. In certain respects, these knives were superior even to contemporary firearms, which had limited effectiveness in close quarters.³¹ As with the regulated weapons before us, legislators singled out fighting knives after they were first used in a widely-publicized act of violence resulting in multiple fatalities: Colonel Jim Bowie’s “Sandbar Fight” at the Mississippi River on September 19, 1827 that led to two deaths and multiple non-fatal casualties.³² Ultimately, these knives were used, among other concealable weapons liable to criminal misuse, in “an alarming proportion of the era’s murders and serious assaults.” Roth Decl. ¶ 24, *NAGR* App’x 902. And, like the regulated weapons here, the large blades of Bowie knives wreaked particularly “bloody” and “gruesome” injuries.³³

31. Roth Decl. ¶ 25, *NAGR* App’x 903; David B. Kopel et. al., *Knives and the Second Amendment*, 47 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 167, 185 (2013).

32. Kopel, *supra* note 31, at 180; *The Bowies and Bowie Knives*, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 27, 1895, at 2.

33. Kopel, *supra* note 31, at 187 (comparing Bowie knife wounds to the “surgical” and “cosmetic” consequences of low-velocity early firearms).

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Restrictions on dirk and Bowie knives could be severe, whereas restrictions on other types of household and utility knives were nonexistent. Most states and territories restricted their concealed carry.³⁴ *Kachalsky*, 701 F.3d at 95. These prohibitions at times restricted the concealed carry of all, or nearly all, weapons,³⁵ failing to provide support for the existence of an historical tradition of heightened regulations on unusually dangerous weapons. But many laws specifically targeted the concealed carry of only those “unlawful weapons,” Act of Jan. 14, 1820, ch. 23, 1820 Ind. Acts at 39, “usually used for the infliction of personal injury,” Act of Dec. 24, 1880, no. 362, 1880 S.C. Acts 448, § 1C, such as Bowie and dirk knives.³⁶

34. *See, e.g.*, Act of Feb. 1, 1839, ch. 77, 1839 Ala. Acts at 67-68; Act of Feb. 1, 1881, 1881 Colo. Sess. Laws at 74; Act of Jan. 14, 1820, ch. 23, 1820 Ind. Acts at 39; 29 Ky. Gen. Stat. art. 29, § 1 (as amended through 1880); Act of Mar. 25, 1813, 1813 La. Acts at 172; 1886 Md. Laws, ch. 375, § 1; Act of Mar. 5, 1879, ch. 127, 1879 N.C. Sess. Laws at 231; Act of Mar. 18, 1859, 1859 Ohio Laws at 56; Act of Feb. 18, 1885, 1885 Or. Laws at 33; Act of Dec. 24, 1880, no. 362, 1880 S.C. Acts at 447-48; S.D. Terr. Pen. Code § 457 (1883); Act of Feb. 2, 1838, ch. 101, 1838 Va. Acts at 76; Wash. Code § 929 (1881); W. Va. Code, ch. 148, § 7 (1891); *see Kachalsky*, 701 F.3d at 96 n.21 (also collecting statutes).

35. *See, e.g.*, Act of Mar. 25, 1813, 1813 La. Acts at 172 (prohibiting carrying “any concealed weapon”); 29 Ky. Gen. Stat. art. 29, § 1 (as amended through 1880) (prohibiting the concealed carry of any weapon “other than an ordinary pocket knife”); Act of Feb. 18, 1885, 1885 Or. Laws at 33 (same); Wash. Code § 929 (1881) (prohibiting carrying “any concealed weapon”).

36. *See, e.g.*, Act of Feb. 1, 1839, ch. 77, 1839 Ala. Acts at 67-68 (prohibiting, *inter alia*, the concealed carry of “any bowie knife, Arkansas tooth-pick, or any other knife of the like kind”); Act of Jan. 14, 1820, ch. 23, 1819 Ind. Acts at 39 (prohibiting the

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Defendants also offer evidence of state laws banning the open carry of Bowie knives, dirks, and weapons identified as unusually dangerous, with no or limited exceptions. *See* Act of Apr. 1, 1881, ch. 96, § 1, 1881 Ark. Acts at 191 (prohibiting “carry[ing], in any manner whatever . . . any dirk or bowie knife”); Act of Apr. 12, 1871, ch. 34, 1871 Tex. Gen. Laws at 25-27 (imposing severe limitations on the “carry[]” of a “bowie-knife, or any other kind of knife manufactured or sold for the purposes of offense or defense”); *see also* *Hanson*, 120 F.4th at 237 (collecting statutes). And Defendants provide examples of states imposing severe taxes on the sale of such weapons. In 1837, Alabama imposed a law placing a tax of “one hundred dollars” on the sale of “Bowie Knives,” “Arkansaw [sic] Tooth-picks,” or knives that “resemble” these weapons. Act of June 30, 1837, No. 11, § 2, 1837 Ala. Acts 7. Florida imposed a tax of “two hundred dollars per annum” on sellers of “dirks, pocket pistols, sword canes, or bowie knives,” and levied a tax of “ten dollars per annum” on those carrying such weapons. Act of Jan. 30, 1838, No. 24, § 1, 1838 Fla. Laws 36. And Tennessee outright banned the sale of such weapons in 1838. Act of Jan. 27, 1838, ch. 137, § 1, 1837 Tenn. Pub. Acts 200.

concealed carry of any “unlawful weapon,” such as a “dirk” or “sword in cane”); Act of Mar. 5, 1879, ch. 127, 1879 N.C. Sess. Laws at 231 (prohibiting the concealed carry of “deadly weapon[s]” including the “bowie-knife”); Act of Dec. 24, 1880, no. 362, 1880 S.C. Acts at 447-48 (prohibiting the concealed carry of specific “deadly weapon[s] usually used for the infliction of personal injury,” including “dirk[s]”); 1838 Va. Acts at 76 (prohibiting the concealed carry of any “dirk, bowie knife, or any other weapons of the like kind, from this use of which the death of any person might probably ensue”).

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These laws imposing the most severe restrictions on unusually dangerous weapons were enacted largely by those southern states facing the most severe increases in violence in the pre-Civil War period. Roth Decl. ¶ 23, *Grant* App’x 1148-49. Contemporaneous state court decisions indicate that such regulations were considered permissible exercises of state police power—with different states permitted to make different decisions on how best to protect their citizens. There is limited historical evidence that courts viewed constitutional rights to self-defense as impaired by regulations that restricted unusually dangerous weapons of an offensive character (including dirk and Bowie knives) while preserving the availability of alternative weapons for self-defense.³⁷ To the contrary, state courts repeatedly upheld the constitutionality of such restrictions, affirming that these state legislatures acted “within the scope of their police powers in responding to the demands of [their] own citizens.” *Bianchi*, 111 F.4th at 447; *see also Heller*, 554 U.S. at 626 (“[T]he majority of the 19th-century courts to consider the question held that prohibitions on carrying concealed weapons were lawful under the Second Amendment or state analogues.”); *Bruen*, 597 U.S. at 50-55.

Among other examples, the Tennessee Supreme Court rejected the argument of a defendant convicted under an 1837 Tennessee law banning the concealed carry

37. For example, in 1837, Georgia forbade the sale, possession, or carry of dirk and Bowie knives, among others. The Georgia Supreme Court later held that the statute violated the Second Amendment, except to the extent that it prohibited concealed carry. *See Nunn v. State*, 1 Ga. 243 (1846).

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of Bowie knives that the law violated his rights arising under Tennessee's constitutional analogue to the Second Amendment. *Aymette v. State*, 21 Tenn. 154, 155 (1840). There, the court noted that "[t]he Legislature . . . ha[d] a right to prohibit the wearing or *keeping* [of] weapons dangerous to the peace and safety of the citizens" that was not impeded by the state constitutional right to bear arms. *Id.* at 159. The Tennessee Supreme Court recognized that the state's restrictions were justified to protect the community from acts of terror by individuals employing unusually dangerous weapons:

To hold that the Legislature could pass no law upon this subject by which to preserve the public peace, and protect our citizens from the terror which a wanton and unusual exhibition of arms might produce, or their lives from being endangered by desperadoes with concealed arms, would be to pervert a great political right to the worst of purposes, and to make it a social evil of infinitely greater extent to society than would result from abandoning the right itself.

Id. at 159. Other courts rejected similar constitutional challenges for nearly identical reasons.³⁸

38. See *Cockrum v. State*, 24 Tex. 394, 402-03 (1859) (rejecting a constitutional challenge to a law imposing higher penalties for killings committed with Bowie knives because Bowie knives were an "instrument of almost certain death" and because "[h]e who carries such a weapon, for lawful defense, as he may, makes himself more dangerous to the rights of others . . . than if he carried a less dangerous weapon"); *State v. Workman*, 35 W. Va. 367, 373

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Twentieth-century regulation of automatic and semiautomatic weapons continued the relevantly similar tradition of imposing targeted restrictions on unusually dangerous weapons after their use in multiple-fatality homicides and terror.³⁹ The development of the Thompson submachine gun in 1918, and its subsequent use by gangsters in mass shootings, led to the National Firearms Act of 1934, which prohibited ownership of machine guns, submachine guns, and short-barreled shotguns, as well as numerous state analogues. *See* Cornell Decl. ¶¶ 41, 53, *NAGR* App'x 956 (analogizing “pre-Civil War fears about weapons of ‘bravado[] and affray’” to “[f]ears about gangster weapons” because both reflected the “ancient common law tradition of singling out weapons capable of

(1891) (“So, also, in regard to the kind of arms referred to in the [Second A]mendment, it must be held to refer to the weapons of warfare to be used by the militia . . . and not to” weapons including Bowie knives that “are usually employed in brawls, street fights, duels, and affrays, and are only habitually carried by bullies, blackguards, and desperadoes, to the terror of the community and the injury of the state.”).

39. Historical evidence postdating ratification of the Second and Fourteenth Amendments is less instructive than earlier evidence but may be considered so long as it does not contradict the text of the Second Amendment or evidence from before or during the period of ratification. *See Bruen*, 597 U.S. at 34-37 (“[T]o the extent later history contradicts what the text says, the text controls.”); *id.* (“[P]ost-ratification adoption or acceptance of laws that are *inconsistent* with the original meaning of the constitutional text obviously cannot overcome or alter that text.” (quotation marks omitted)); *Antonyuk*, 120 F.4th at 990 n.41 (“Twentieth-century evidence is not as probative as nineteenth-century evidence. . . . But such laws are not weightless.”).

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producing a terror”); *Ocean State Tactical*, 95 F.4th at 47 (observing that Congress began regulating sawed-off shotguns after they were used by the “mass shooters of their day” (quotation marks omitted)). But even the National Firearms Act’s severe restrictions on these unusually dangerous weapons did not unlawfully burden the Second Amendment right. *See United States v. Miller*, 307 U.S. 174, 178 (1939) (upholding the constitutionality of the Act’s prohibition on possession of sawed-off shotguns).

We acknowledge that statutes that restricted the concealed or open carry of particular arms in public are distinguishable from restrictions on the acquisition and possession of certain weapons. But that does not diminish the constitutionality of appropriate restrictions that, like the Connecticut statutes, do not impair the core constitutional right under the Second Amendment. We conclude that historical prohibitions on unusually dangerous weapons used in affray and restrictions on the concealed or open carry of unusually dangerous weapons, when accompanied by statutes that imposed taxes on the sale and possession of such weapons, provide an historical tradition of restricting unusual weapons that is relevantly similar to the challenged statutes. Historical legislators regulated these unusually dangerous arms, like here, after observing the regulated weapons’ unprecedented lethality. They did so, like here, to prevent the use of these especially dangerous variants of otherwise lawful types of weapons in further acts of mass homicide and terror. And they did so, in a relevantly similar fashion, by singling out unusually dangerous weapons.

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In sum, we conclude that Defendants have, at this preliminary stage, satisfied their burden to demonstrate that permissible historical arms regulations that singled out the unusually dangerous weapons of their day are “relevantly similar” to the challenged statutes.⁴⁰ At the same time, both the historical and the contemporary legislatures did not impair the Second Amendment right to self-defense by allowing many weapons to go unchecked.

The less-than-absolute right codified by the Second Amendment permits Connecticut legislators to honor the constitutional balance captured by its text, as interpreted by the Supreme Court in light of history. The Second

40. Today, we join the First, Fourth, Seventh, Ninth, and D.C. Circuits (every Circuit to address the question) in approving restrictions on assault weapons and large capacity magazines and in recognizing a historical tradition of regulating unusually dangerous weapons after their use in terror or to perpetuate mass casualties. *See Ocean State Tactical*, 95 F.4th at 46 (recognizing the tradition of regulating dangerous aspects of weapons “once their popularity in the hands of murderers became apparent”); *Capen*, 134 F.4th at 671 (recognizing a tradition of “protect[ing] the public from the danger caused by weapons that create a particular public safety threat”); *Bianchi*, 111 F.4th at 464-72 (describing “a strong tradition of regulating those weapons that were invented for offensive purposes and were ultimately proven to pose exceptional dangers to innocent civilians” and that are “excessively dangerous”); *Bevis*, 85 F.4th at 1199 (describing “the long-standing tradition of regulating the especially dangerous weapons of the time”); *Duncan*, 133 F.4th at 874 (identifying tradition of “laws to protect innocent persons from especially dangerous uses of weapons once those perils have become clear”); *Hanson*, 120 F.4th at 237-38 (recognizing the tradition of regulating “weapons that are particularly capable of unprecedented lethality”).

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Amendment thus allows these legislators to do what they did here: implement targeted regulations designed to protect residents and their children from experiencing tragedies like the one at Sandy Hook Elementary School that Connecticut and the nation experienced on December 14, 2012, without sacrificing the self-defense core of the “right of the people to keep and bear Arms.” U.S. Const. amend. II.

Accordingly, based upon the foregoing discussion in this section, we have no difficulty concluding that Plaintiffs have failed to establish a likelihood of success on the merits.

III. Other Preliminary Injunction Factors

The district court did not reach, and Plaintiffs only cursorily argue on appeal, that they will be irreparably harmed absent injunctive relief and that the balance of equities and the public interest favor an injunction. Such cursory treatment is not unexpected, given that Plaintiffs define the irreparable harm as the denial of their constitutional rights and describe the equities and public interest as disfavoring such a denial. In other words, Plaintiffs argue that each of the injunction factors depends upon the merits of their constitutional claims.

But the Supreme Court has made clear that Plaintiffs must do more to warrant the extraordinary remedy of preliminary injunctive relief. An injunction “does not follow from [a likelihood of] success on the merits as a matter of course.” *Winter*, 555 U.S. at 32;

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see also Del. State Sportsmen's Ass'n, Inc. v. Del. Dep't of Safety & Homeland Sec., 108 F.4th 194, 197 (3d Cir. 2024) (explaining that a preliminary injunction “is not a shortcut to the merits”). Rather, plaintiffs “must make a clear showing” on the remaining factors, which have persisted as “commonplace considerations” in awarding injunctive relief throughout “several hundred years of history.” *Starbucks Corp. v. McKinney*, 602 U.S. 339, 346 (2024) (quotation marks omitted). As we have been recently reminded, our power to grant equitable relief “encompasses only those sorts of equitable remedies ‘traditionally accorded by courts of equity’ at our country’s inception.” *Trump v. CASA, Inc.*, 145 S. Ct. 2540, 2551 (2025) (quoting *Grupo Mexicano de Desarrollo, S.A. v. All. Bond Fund, Inc.*, 527 U.S. 308, 319 (1999)). Accepting Plaintiffs’ argument and concluding that these factors are essentially superfluous when a constitutional harm is alleged would be the sort of “major departure from the long tradition of equity practice” that “should not be lightly implied.” *Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo*, 456 U.S. 305, 320 (1982).

Accepting that “[o]ur authority to alter legal rights and obligations generally derives from . . . our determination of the merits,” we attend closely to these factors, as they “enforce a vital, structural limitation on the role of courts” by restricting grants of relief before the opportunity for a full adversarial testing of the merits. *Hanson*, 120 F.4th at 243; *see also Del. State Sportsmen's Ass'n*, 108 F.4th at 199-201.

*Appendix A***A. Irreparable Harm**

For Plaintiffs to satisfy the irreparable harm requirement, they “must demonstrate that absent a preliminary injunction they will suffer an injury that is neither remote nor speculative, but actual and imminent, and one that cannot be remedied if a court waits until the end of trial to resolve the harm.” *Faiveley Transport Malmo AB v. Wabtec Corp.*, 559 F.3d 110, 118 (2d Cir. 2009) (quoting *Grand River Enter. Six Nations, Ltd. v. Pryor*, 481 F.3d 60, 66 (2d Cir. 2007) (alterations accepted)). This requirement stems from the fundamental purpose of a preliminary injunction, which is not to guarantee the parties suffer no harm during the pendency of litigation but “merely to preserve the relative positions of the parties until a trial on the merits can be held.” *Starbucks*, 602 U.S. at 346 (quoting *Univ. of Tex. v. Camenisch*, 451 U.S. 390, 395 (1981)). To satisfy this requirement, however, Plaintiffs argue only that a “violation of constitutional rights per se constitutes irreparable injury.” Br. of NAGR Appellants at 66. This general assertion is incorrect.

To be sure, we have presumed irreparable harm for alleged deprivations of certain constitutional rights. *Brewer v. W. Irondequoit Cent. Sch. Dist.*, 212 F.3d 738, 744 (2d Cir. 2000) (noting this Circuit has presumed that the requirement of irreparable harm was met when plaintiffs alleged deprivations of their Fourth and Eighth Amendment rights). But the Supreme Court has never applied this presumption outside the First Amendment context. See *Elrod v. Burns*, 427 U.S. 347, 373 (1976) (“The loss of First Amendment freedoms, for even minimal

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periods of time, unquestionably constitutes irreparable injury.”).¹ And even in that context, our Court has not axiomatically applied the presumption that plaintiffs alleging deprivations of First Amendment rights have satisfied the requirement of irreparable harm. *See, e.g., Latino Officers Ass’n v. Safir*, 170 F.3d 167, 171 (2d Cir. 1999) (concluding that the plaintiffs had not “establish[ed] real and imminent irreparable harm” stemming from the alleged First Amendment violation).

Plaintiffs offer little argument as to why we should extend the presumption of irreparable harm in the context of this case. And the Supreme Court’s recent emphasis on the limits of our equitable powers caution against extending the presumption to new contexts. But we are also reluctant to run afoul of the Supreme Court’s admonishment that the Second Amendment is not a “second-class right,” *McDonald*, 561 U.S. at 780, by treating this constitutional harm differently than we have treated others in the past. We therefore proceed to the final requirement for this Court to grant Plaintiffs’ requested relief without ruling on the nondispositive issue of whether Plaintiffs have established irreparable harm.

B. Balance of the Equities and Public Interest

Even if we accept Plaintiffs’ argument that we may presume irreparable harm in this context, we must also “balance the competing claims of injury and . . . consider the effect on each party of the granting or withholding of the requested relief.” *Winter*, 555 U.S. at 24. And we are instructed to “pay particular regard for the public

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consequences in employing the extraordinary remedy of injunction.” *Id.* (quoting *Romero-Barcelo*, 456 U.S. at 312). These two factors merge when the government is party to the suit. *We The Patriots USA, Inc. v. Hochul*, 17 F.4th 266, 295 (2d Cir. 2021) (per curiam).

In balancing the equities, we first acknowledge the harm the government Defendants would suffer if “enjoined . . . from effectuating statutes enacted by representatives of its people.” *CASA*, 145 S. Ct. at 2562 (quoting with approval *Maryland v. King*, 567 U.S. 1301, 1303 (2012) (Roberts, C.J., in chambers)). And specific to these challenged statutes, Defendants have provided evidence that granting the requested preliminary injunction would lead to a “flood” of currently restricted weapons entering Connecticut—and that these weapons will be near-impossible to retrieve once within the state.⁴¹ Defendants also provide evidence that the enforcement of laws restricting assault weapons, large capacity magazines, or both, “is associated with a statistically significant decrease in per capita rates of deaths and casualties due to mass shootings.” Donohue Decl. ¶ 82, *NAGR* App’x at 232. Taken together, these considerations—implicating both the government’s interest in enforcing laws enacted by duly-elected legislators and in protecting the lives of its citizens—weigh heavily in the balance.

41. Br. of *NAGR* Appellees at 72-73 (citing Matthew Green, *Gun Groups: More Than a Million High-Capacity Magazines Flooded California During Weeklong Ban Suspension*, KQED (Apr. 12, 2019), <https://www.kqed.org/news/11740000/gun-groups-more-than-a-million-high-capacity-magazines-flooded-california-during-weeklong-suspension-of-ban> [<https://perma.cc/3R62-X6VL>]).

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For their part, Plaintiffs rely only on the assertion that “securing constitutional rights is always in the public interest.” Br. of *NAGR* Appellants at 66. We agree that the potential denial of a party’s constitutional rights is surely a significant consideration. But the fact that a plaintiff alleges constitutional harm does not end our balance-of-the-equities inquiry. *See, e.g., Am. Civ. Liberties Union v. Clapper*, 785 F.3d 787, 825-26 (2d Cir. 2015). While Plaintiffs point to their inability to use the desired firearms for self-defense, Br. of *NAGR* Appellants at 12; Br. of *Grant* Appellants at 9-14, they do not explain why the thousands of firearms Connecticut’s statutes leave available, including several semiautomatic handguns, are insufficient for this purpose during the pendency of the case. And although Plaintiffs have been unable to possess the desired AR-15s and large capacity magazines since 2013, when the relevant legislation was enacted, they offer no instances in which the many remaining available firearms in the years since were insufficient for self-defense purposes. Plaintiffs have offered no other argument or consequences to the public that outweigh the serious effects of granting the requested relief highlighted by Defendants. We require more of plaintiffs seeking the “extraordinary and drastic remedy” of preliminary injunctive relief. *Mazurek v. Armstrong*, 520 U.S. 968, 972 (1997). Plaintiffs have not demonstrated that the balance of equities and public interest tip in their favor.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons and for the reasons set forth in Judge Nathan’s opinion, we **AFFIRM** the district court’s denial of the preliminary injunctions in both cases.

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NATHAN, *Circuit Judge*, joined by LIVINGSTON, *Chief Judge*,
and WALKER, *Circuit Judge*, concurring:

I join Judge Walker’s excellent and thorough opinion for the Court in full. I write additionally to explain why Plaintiffs’ proposed “dangerous and unusual” standard is particularly untenable in light of our duty—as instructed by the Supreme Court—to engage in actual historical analysis.

Judge Walker’s opinion carefully explains why historical restrictions on “dangerous and unusual” weapons would have been contemporaneously understood as “unusually dangerous.” *See* Op. at 29-31. Nonetheless, Plaintiffs urge a contrary historical analysis based on one word in *Heller*—the “and” in “dangerous and unusual.” *District of Columbia v. Heller*, 554 U.S. 570, 627 (2008) (quotation marks omitted). Plaintiffs contend that *Heller*’s use of the word “and” means that only those weapons both dangerous *and* unusual are unprotected. Br. of NAGR Appellants at 59; Br. of *Grant* Appellants at 31-32. In this view, only weapons that are numerically uncommon, and therefore unusual, may be regulated.

Adoption of Plaintiffs’ conjunctive test would flatly betray our duty to engage in a careful historical analysis. *Bruen* instructs that the contours of the Second Amendment right are historically determined. *New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n, Inc. v. Bruen*, 597 U.S. 1, 17 (2022). Accordingly, when the people challenge a law on Second Amendment grounds, the judicial role is to “examin[e] text, pre-ratification and post-ratification

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history, and precedent.” *United States v. Rahimi*, 602 U.S. 680, 714 (2024) (Kavanaugh, J., concurring).

Our commitment to history requires us to look beyond Plaintiffs’ reliance on one word in *Heller* and journey to the historical sources of their proposed standard. *Heller*, the first time the Supreme Court seems to have referenced the “dangerous and unusual” tradition, reads as follows:

We also recognize another important limitation on the right to keep and carry arms. *Miller* said, as we have explained, that the sorts of weapons protected were those “in common use at the time.” [*United States v. Miller*, 307 U.S. 174, 179 (1939)]. We think that limitation is fairly supported by the historical tradition of prohibiting the carrying of “dangerous and unusual weapons.” See 4 Blackstone 148-149 (1769); 3 B. Wilson, Works of the Honourable James Wilson 79 (1804); J. Dunlap, The New-York Justice 8 (1815); C. Humphreys, A Compendium of the Common Law in Force in Kentucky 482 (1822); 1 W. Russell, A Treatise on Crimes and Indictable Misdemeanors 271-272 (1831); H. Stephen, Summary of the Criminal Law 48 (1840); E. Lewis, An Abridgment of the Criminal Law of the United States 64 (1847); F. Wharton, A Treatise on the Criminal Law of the United States 726 (1852).

Heller, 554 U.S. at 627. Thus, the line in *Heller* on which Plaintiffs rely appears to be a quote of Blackstone. *Id.*

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And indeed, *Rahimi* confirms that *Heller* derived the “dangerous and unusual” language from Blackstone. 602 U.S. at 691 (quoting *Heller* for the “dangerous and unusual” formulation and noting that *Heller* cited Blackstone).

A historically faithful analysis would therefore lead us to the text of Blackstone itself, which reads as follows:

The offence of riding or going armed, with dangerous or unusual weapons, is a crime against the public peace, by terrifying the good people of the land; and is particularly prohibited by the Statute of Northampton, 2 Edw. III c. 3. upon pain of forfeiture of the arms, and imprisonment during the king’s pleasure: in like manner as, by the laws of Solon, every Athenian was finable who walked about the city in armor. [Pott. Antiqu. b. 1. c. 26].

4 Blackstone 148-49 (1769). As is clear, Blackstone did not use the phrase “dangerous and unusual” and instead described prohibitions on the carrying of “dangerous *or* unusual weapons.” *Id.* (emphasis added). It would seem a serious subversion of our commitment to history to enshrine a conjunctive test based on the *Heller* opinion’s possible misquote of Blackstone.

Even if *Heller* were not quoting Blackstone and instead derived “dangerous and usual” from the string cite of treatises and cases that followed the cite to Blackstone, our historical analysis still requires us to reject Plaintiffs’ argument. The remaining sources to

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which *Heller* cites use a mix of “dangerous or unusual” and “dangerous and unusual.” *See, e.g.*, H. Stephen, Summary of the Criminal Law 48 (1840) (“dangerous or unusual”); 3 B. Wilson, Works of the Honourable James Wilson 79 (1804) (“dangerous and unusual”). In light of this historical context, the word “and” cannot do the work that Plaintiffs ask it to do. Instead, the interchangeable use of “dangerous and unusual” and “dangerous or unusual” supports the proposition that neither “and” nor “or” should be read so literally. *See* Cornell Decl. ¶ 20, *Grant* App’x 1220-21; Elizabeth Fajans & Mary R. Falk, *Hendiadys in the Language of the Law: What Part of “And” Don’t You Understand?*, 17 Legal Comm. & Rhetoric: JAWLD 39, 40 (2020). Molding these variegated historical descriptions into a doctrinal test—as we must—the majority rightly reconstructs “unusually dangerous” as the most faithful formulation.

What’s more, the historical *reasons* for regulating “dangerous or unusual” weapons further counsel against Plaintiffs’ interpretation. *See Rahimi*, 602 U.S. at 692 (“Why and how the regulation burdens the [Second Amendment] right are central to this inquiry.”). Closer scrutiny of historical regulations on “dangerous and unusual weapons” reveals a tradition of restrictions on public affray—that is, terrifying the public. Blackstone, for example, described “[t]he offence of riding or going armed, with dangerous or unusual weapons” as a crime that “terrif[ies] the good people of the land.” Blackstone, *supra*, at 148 (emphasis omitted). Hawkins, another historical source that does use “dangerous and unusual,” conveys in substance something identical. 1 W. Hawkins, A Treatise of the Pleas of the Crown, 135 (1716) (describing

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the offense of affray as “where a Man arms himself with dangerous and unusual Weapons, in such a Manner as will naturally cause a Terror to the People”).

Taken together, the various historical sources on affray laws reveal a common concern about how “terrifying” dangerous and unusual weapons are to the public. In fact, Blackstone, Hawkins, and other historical sources repeatedly cite one particular statute: the Statute of Northampton of 1328. *See* Blackstone, *supra*, at 148-49; Hawkins, *supra*, at 135; 1 W. Russell, *A Treatise on Crimes and Indictable Misdemeanors* 271-72 (2d. Am. ed. 1831); F. Wharton, *A Treatise on the Criminal Law of the United States* 726 (2d ed. 1852); Stephen, *supra*, at 48; W. Lambard, *Eirenarcha: Or of the Office of the Justices of Peace* 128-29 (4th ed. 1599); *see also Rahimi*, 602 U.S. at 693-94. And that statute—without explicit reference to the type of weapon used—prohibits “bring[ing]” any “force in affray of the peace.” 2 Edw. III c. 3.¹ This broad

1. In relevant part:

[I]t is enacted, that no man great nor small, . . . except the King’s servants in his presence and his ministers] . . . , be so hardy to come before the King’s justices, or other of the King’s ministers doing their office, with force and arms, nor bring no force in affray of the peace, nor to go nor ride armed by night nor by day, in fairs, markets, nor in the presence of the justices or other ministers, nor in no part elsewhere, upon pain not forfeit their armour to the King, and their bodies to prison at the King’s pleasure.

2 Edw. III c. 3 (1328) (“ne force mesner en affrai de la pees”). A translation of the statute, which was originally written in

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restriction, at the heart of the “dangerous and unusual” standard, makes clear that the tradition emerges from concern about danger to the public, not statistical commonality of the threatening weapon. Indeed, glaringly absent from these historical laws is any particular focus on the commonality of the weapons used to cause that terror. Rather, when these historical sources mention weapons, they name ones that were certainly in common use. *See* Blackstone, *supra*, at 149 (citing Pott. Antiqu. b. 1. c. 26 for an Athenian law that fined those who were seen carrying a sword or wearing armor on the city streets); E. Coke, Third Part of the Institutes of the Laws of England: Concerning High Treason, and Other Pleas of the Crown, and Criminal Causes 161 (1797) (understanding armed force, in the context of the Statute of Northampton, to include the use of sticks and stones if picked up during the course of an argument).²

Plaintiffs ask us to go no further than our first intuition about the word “and.” But we *must* go further because the Supreme Court has instructed us to take historical analysis seriously. And history requires us to reject the argument that the “dangerous and unusual” tradition focused on the numerosity of the weapons in

Law French, can be found at <https://firearmslaw.duke.edu/laws/statute-of-northampton-1328-2-edw-3-c-3-eng> [<https://perma.cc/P396-JVBH>; PDF available at <https://perma.cc/2FLM-NNTU>].

2. The relevant passage in Coke, which is in Latin, quotes 3 H. Bracton, On the Laws and Customs of England 20 (c. 1235) [<https://perma.cc/Z3EM-NZ2C>]. A translation of Bracton can be found at <https://amesfoundation.law.harvard.edu/Bracton/> [<https://perma.cc/6MNE2NJJ>].

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modern society. The majority's "unusually dangerous" test earnestly and faithfully carries out the historical inquiry the Supreme Court has mandated. For these reasons and those stated in Judge Walker's opinion, I join the opinion of the Court in full.

**APPENDIX B — DECISION OF THE UNITED
STATES DISTRICT COURT, DISTRICT OF
CONNECTICUT, FILED AUGUST 3, 2023**

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT

Civil No. 3:22-1118 (JBA)

NATIONAL ASSOCIATION FOR GUN RIGHTS
AND TONI FLANIGAN,

Plaintiffs,

v.

EDWARD M. LAMONT, JR.,
IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY, *et al.*,

Defendants.

Filed August 3, 2023

**DECISION ON PLAINTIFFS' MOTION
FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION**

[TABLES INTENTIONALLY OMITTED]

I. Summary of Decision

On December 14, 2012, at Sandy Hook Elementary school, a shooter armed with an AR-15 and two semiautomatic pistols fired 154 shots in less than five minutes and killed 26 people. In response, the Connecticut

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State Legislature passed “An Act Concerning Gun Violence Prevention and Children’s Safety” in 2013. Two provisions of that law are Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53-202c(a) and Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53-202w(b) and (c) (the “Challenged Statutes”), which restrict the ability of individuals in the state of Connecticut to own, purchase, and use specific types of firearms and accessories, collectively defined as “assault weapons”, as well as large capacity magazines (“LCMs”), which are magazines with the capacity to hold more than ten rounds of ammunition.

Plaintiffs National Association for Gun Rights (“NAGR”) and Toni Theresa Spera Flanigan believe that by prohibiting them from purchasing the banned assault weapons and LCMs, the Challenged Statutes violate their Second Amendment right to keep and bear arms. Their view is grounded in the Supreme Court’s decision in *District of Columbia v. Heller*, 554 U.S. 570, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 171 L. Ed. 2d 637 (2008), that a complete ban on handguns violates the individual Second Amendment right to keep and bear arms, as well as the Supreme Court’s more recent holding in *New York State Rifle & Pistol Association, Inc. v. Bruen*, 597 U.S. 1, 142 S. Ct. 2111, 213 L. Ed. 2d 387 (Jun. 23, 2022) that any law restricting the right to keep and bear arms under the Second Amendment is only justified if the government can demonstrate that it is consistent with this Nation’s history and tradition of firearm regulation. Plaintiffs’ suit against Defendants Connecticut Governor Ned Lamont, Chief State’s Attorney Patrick Griffin, and Sharmese Walcott, State’s Attorney for the Hartford Judicial District seeks to have enforcement of the Challenged Statutes permanently

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enjoined as unconstitutional. Currently before the Court is Plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction [Doc. # 28] seeking to temporarily enjoin enforcement of the Challenged Statutes until final disposition of this case.

For the reasons discussed below, the Court denies Plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction because they have failed to meet their burden to demonstrate a likelihood of success on their claim that the challenged statutes unconstitutionally burden their Second Amendment right to keep and bear arms. Plaintiffs' proposed ownership of assault weapons and LCMs is not protected by the Second Amendment because they have not demonstrated that the specific assault weapons and LCMs in the Challenged Statutes are commonly sought out, purchased, and used for self-defense. Although this failure alone would have been fatal to Plaintiffs' claim, Defendants have submitted persuasive evidence that assault weapons and LCMs are more often sought out for their militaristic characteristics than for self-defense, that these characteristics make the weapons disproportionately dangerous to the public based on their increased capacity for lethality, and that assault weapons and LCMs are more often used in crimes and mass shootings than in self-defense. Defendants also show through the submission of historically analogous statutes and expert declarations that when a modern innovation in firearm technology results in a particular type of weapon or method of carrying being utilized for unlawful purposes to terrorize and endanger the public, the Nation has a longstanding history and tradition of regulating those aspects of the weapons or manners of carry that correlate with rising firearm violence. The record shows that the

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Challenged Statutes are consistent with that purpose and impose a comparable level of burden to the relevantly similar historical analogues Defendants submitted.

II. Background**A. Parties to the Lawsuit**

Plaintiff NAGR is a nonprofit organization that “seeks to defend the right of all law-abiding individuals to keep and bear arms.” (Third Amended Complaint [Doc. # 69] ¶ 10). Plaintiff Toni Flanigan is a Connecticut resident, a US citizen, and member of NAGR who “is affected by State’s prohibition of commonly possessed arms.” (*Id.* ¶ 9.) She claims “a present intention of exercising her constitutionally protected right to acquire, keep and bear commonly possessed arms, and specifically commonly possessed firearms and magazines that fall with the definition of Banned Firearms and the Banned Magazines, without being subjected to criminal prosecution,” and “is presently ready, willing, able and eligible to acquire such arms and, but for her reasonable fear of criminal prosecution, would do so.” (*Id.*) “Specifically, she would acquire and keep an AR-15 or similar rifle and magazines that hold more than 10 rounds.” (*Id.*) Defendants are Ned Lamont, in his official capacity as the Governor of the State of Connecticut; Patrick Griffin, in his official capacity as the Chief State’s Attorney of the State of Connecticut; and Sharmese Walcott, in her official capacity as the State’s Attorney, Hartford Judicial District.

*Appendix B***B. Challenged Statutes**

The challenged statutes regulate certain—but not all—types of both fully automatic and semiautomatic firearms. Semiautomatic firearms fire “one round for each squeeze of the trigger.” (Defs.’ Ex. A, Decl. of Detective Brindiana Warend¹ [Doc. # 37-10] ¶ 20.) After each discharge, another round is automatically loaded into the chamber for the next shot, permitting a faster rate of fire than a manually operated gun. (*Id.* ¶ 20.) Automatic weapons fire continuously as long as the trigger is held down. (*Id.* ¶ 21.) Selective fire weapons allow the operator “to choose between semiautomatic and fully automatic.” (*Id.* ¶ 22.) Prior to the passage of the Challenged Statutes, the Connecticut General Assembly passed an assault weapon ban in 1993, which prohibited firearms “capable of fully automatic, semiautomatic or burst fire at the option of the user,’ including 67 specifically enumerated semiautomatic firearms.” *New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n, Inc. v. Cuomo*, 804 F.3d 242, 248 (2d Cir. 2015) (quoting 1993 Conn. Pub. Acts 93–306, § 1(a)). In 2001, the Connecticut State Legislature passed Public Act 01-130, which expanded the definition of assault weapon to include semiautomatic rifles, pistols, and shotguns with certain features, and to include particular parts that could be used to convert a firearm into an assault weapon. (Warend¹ Decl. ¶ 12.) In 2013, Public Act 13-3, which includes Conn. Gen. Stat. §§ 53-202a-c and 53-202w, was passed as part of a “An Act Concerning Gun Violence Prevention and

1. Brindiana Warend¹, a trooper with the Connecticut State Police and the primary detective serving in the Firearms Vault, was submitted as an expert in firearms by Defendants.

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Children’s Safety” after “the 2012 massacre at Sandy Hook Elementary School.” (Defs.’ Mem. at 4.)

Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53-202a (a)(1) defines an “assault weapon” as:

- (A) (i) “Any selective-fire firearm capable of fully automatic, semiautomatic or burst fire at the option of the user or any of the following specified semiautomatic firearms: . . .”, [enumerating several dozen specific fully automatic, semiautomatic or burst fire selective-fire firearms];
- (ii) “A part or combination of parts designed or intended to convert a firearm into an assault weapon, as defined in subparagraph (A)(i) of this subdivision, or any combination of parts from which an assault weapon, as defined in subparagraph (A)(i) of this subdivision, may be rapidly assembled if those parts are in the possession or under the control of the same person”;
- (B) “Any of the following specified semiautomatic centerfire rifles, or copies or duplicates thereof with the capability of any such rifles, that were in production prior to or on April 4, 2013: . . .”, [enumerating a list of several dozen specified semiautomatic centerfire rifles, including the AK-47 and the AR-15];

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- (C) “Any of the following specified semiautomatic pistols, or copies or duplicates thereof with the capability of any such pistols, that were in production prior to or on April 4, 2013: . . .” [enumerating a list of several dozen specified semiautomatic pistols];
- (D) “Any of the following semiautomatic shotguns, or copies or duplicates thereof with the capability of any such shotguns, that were in production prior to or on April 4, 2013: All IZHMAISH Saiga 12 Shotguns;”
- (E) Any semiautomatic firearm regardless of whether such firearm is listed in subparagraphs (A) to (D), inclusive, of this subdivision, and regardless of the date such firearm was produced, that meets the following criteria: . . .”, [enumerating further criteria for centerfire rifles, semiautomatic, centerfire rifles, semiautomatic pistols, semiautomatic shotguns, shotguns with revolving cylinders, or semiautomatic firearms generally that would qualify them as “assault weapons”]; or
- (F) “A part or combination of parts designed or intended to convert a firearm into an assault weapon, as defined in any provision

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of subparagraphs (B) to (E), inclusive, of this subdivision, or any combination of parts from which an assault weapon, as defined in any provision of subparagraphs (B) to (E), inclusive, of this subdivision, may be assembled if those parts are in the possession or under the control of the same person.”²

A centerfire rifle is designed for “centerfire cartridges which are more powerful projectiles” because “they have a larger bullet, higher velocity, greater range, and more ‘foot pounds of energy’ or stopping power, than other cartridges such as rimfire or pistol ammunition.” (Warenda Decl. ¶ 29.) One example of a centerfire cartridge is the .223 round often used in an AR-15 type rifle. (*Id.*) A pistol is “any firearm that has a barrel under twelve inches in length” under Connecticut General Statute § 29-27. (*Id.* ¶ 30.)

Under Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53-202c (a), except as provided by statute, “any person who, within this state, possesses an assault weapon, except as provided in sections 53-202a to 53-202k, inclusive, and 53-202o, shall be guilty of a class D felony and shall be sentenced to a term of imprisonment. . . .” Some of the carveouts include

2. On June 6, 2023, 2023 Conn. Legis. Serv. P.A. 23-53 (H.B. 6667) further expanded the definition of what constitutes an assault weapon by adding several new subsections; however, the sections of each statute challenged by Plaintiffs are not substantively changed, and no motion to amend has since been filed to include a challenge to the new subsections.

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provisions allowing various law enforcement agencies to possess assault weapons and a process by which persons who lawfully possessed assault weapons prior to the enactment of Connecticut’s assault weapon bans could apply for a certificate of possession to retain the firearm. Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53-202c (b)-(c). As of January 30, 2023, 81,982 Certificates of Possession had been issued to individuals lawfully permitted to possess assault weapons. (Warenda Decl. ¶ 18-19.)

Under Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53-202w(b), except as provided by statute, “any person who, within this state, distributes, imports into this state, keeps for sale, offers or exposes for sale, or purchases a large capacity magazine shall be guilty of a class D felony.” Section 53-202w(a) (1) defines a “large capacity magazine” as “any firearm magazine, belt, drum, feed strip or similar device that has the capacity of, or can be readily restored or converted to accept, more than ten rounds of ammunition, but does not include: (A) A feeding device that has been permanently altered so that it cannot accommodate more than ten rounds of ammunition, (B) a .22 caliber tube ammunition feeding device, (C) a tubular magazine that is contained in a lever-action firearm, or (D) a magazine that is permanently inoperable.”

C. Assault Weapons**1. Firearms**

The AR-15 originated in response to the U.S. military’s request for an improved infantry weapon

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in the 1950s and was initially manufactured as a selective-fire machine gun by ArmaLite Corporation. (Warenda Decl. ¶ 24.) The ArmaLite AR-15, which was the predecessor of the modern AR-15, went into mass production in June 1959; it was adopted as the M-16 machine gun during the Vietnam War. (*Id.*) Colt Manufacturing Company obtained the trademark for the AR-15 semiautomatic version, without the fully automatic fire option, and began selling to the civilian market in the early 1960s. (*Id.* ¶ 25.) The AK-47 was created by Mikhail Kalashnikov with the intent that it would replace rifles and submachine guns carried by Soviet forces at the end of World War II, was officially adopted by the Soviet Army in 1949, and has been used by countries “throughout the world.” (*Id.* ¶ 26.)

Based on her firearms expertise, Warenda’s opinion is that “the majority of the firearms specifically named in the statutes are semiautomatic versions of the original selective-fire AR-15/M-16, the AK-47, or variants of these weapon platforms in an assortment of calibers.” (*Id.* ¶ 23.) Specifically, of the 49 assault rifles listed by name in Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53-202a, nineteen are AK-47 variants, thirteen are AR-15 or M-16 variants, and three are HK 91 or FN type variants. (*Id.* ¶ 27.) The remaining rifles are “unique” rather than falling into a “type”. (*Id.* ¶ 28.) The rifles are all semiautomatic centerfire rifles except for the Remington Tactical 7615, a “pump action” rifle using detachable magazines that “can accept more than ten rounds of ammunition.” (*Id.* ¶ 29, 32.) The Second Circuit declared the ban on the Remington Tactical 7615 was unconstitutional in

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Cuomo, 804 F.3d 242, because it was a non-automatic or semi-automatic firearm. Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53-202a also bans certain semiautomatic pistols; six are AK-47 variants and seven are M-16/AR-15 variants, with the remaining nine not falling into “a type.” (Warenda Decl. ¶ 30.) The one shotgun specifically listed in Public Act 13-3 is the IZHMASH SAIGA 12, which is “based on an AK-47 platform.” (*Id.* ¶ 31.)

2. Firearm Parts and Accessories

A magazine is a “container that holds ammunition for a firearm,” typically by holding bullets and feeding the ammunition into the firearm, but does not contain a firing mechanism. (*Id.* ¶¶ 39, 40.) A detachable magazine may be removed and replaced with another fully loaded magazine; fixed magazines are typically reloaded by reloading bullets into the magazine attached to the firearm. (*Id.* ¶ 39.) Ordinary ammunition magazines “extend perpendicularly from the frame of the firearm and are fed with one round on top of the other,” while tubular magazines are generally “fixed magazines that run horizontally along the length of the barrel and are fed with cartridges end to end” and are typically only for “lever action rifles, rimfire rifles and shotguns.” (*Id.* ¶ 41.) Large capacity magazines have been manufactured for a variety of firearms, and most firearms that accept large capacity magazines “can also function using a magazine that has a capacity of under ten rounds.” (*Id.* ¶¶ 42, 43.)

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Other accessories to firearms banned by Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53-202a include telescoping stocks, flash suppressors, and forward pistol grips. A telescoping stock, also known as a collapsible stock, is “a stock that can retract into and shorten itself to make a firearm more compact.” (*Id.* ¶ 15.) A flash suppressor is “a device attached to the muzzle of a firearm that reduces its visible signature while firing.” (*Id.* ¶ 16.) A forward pistol grip, also known as a second pistol grip, is a “grip on the front of the firearm or simply a second grip on a firearm.” (*Id.* ¶ 17.)

D. Procedural Background

Plaintiffs filed suit in September 2022 under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claiming violations of their Second Amendment rights. An amended complaint was filed on September 13, 2022, and a second amended complaint was filed on October 25, 2022; Plaintiffs filed their motion for a preliminary injunction on November 3, 2022, and Defendants filed their motion to dismiss the complaint on November 18, 2022. After new standing arguments were raised in Defendants’ reply brief, Defendants’ motion to dismiss was denied without prejudice and Plaintiffs were granted leave to file a third amended complaint to address the arguments, which they filed on March 7, 2023. Defendants filed an answer, rather than moving again to dismiss. The Court granted leave to file three amici briefs by Everytown for Gun Safety [Doc. # 78], the Brady and March for Our Lives groups [Doc. # 80], and the Giffords Law Center to Prevent Gun Violence [Doc. # 75].

*Appendix B***III. Legal Standard****A. Preliminary Injunctions**

To obtain a preliminary injunction against the Defendant, “the movant has to demonstrate (1) irreparable harm absent injunctive relief, (2) a likelihood of success on the merits, and (3) public interest weighing in favor of granting the injunction. The movant also must show that the balance of equities tips in his or her favor.” *Yang v. Kosinski*, 960 F.3d 119, 127 (2d Cir. 2020).³ When “the moving party seeks to stay governmental action taken in the public interest pursuant to a statutory or regulatory scheme,” the injunction will only be granted if both irreparable harm and a likelihood of success on the merits are shown. *Plaza Health Laboratories, Inc. v. Perales*, 878 F.2d 577, 580 (2d Cir. 1989).

If the injunction is prohibitory in nature, seeking only to maintain the status quo, the likelihood of success standard requires a demonstration of a “better than fifty percent” probability of success. *Abdul Wali v. Coughlin*, 754 F.2d 1015, 1025 (2d Cir. 1985), *disapproved on other grounds*, *O’Lone v. Estate of Shabazz*, 482 U.S. 342, 349, n.2, 107 S. Ct. 2400, 96 L. Ed. 2d 282 (1987). The status quo is measured as “the last actual, peaceable uncontested status which preceded the pending controversy.” *Mastrio v. Sebelius*, 768 F.3d 116, 120 (2d Cir. 2014) (per curiam).

3. Unless otherwise indicated, this opinion omits internal quotation marks, alterations, citations, and footnotes in text quoted from court decisions.

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However, if the injunction seeks to “alter the status quo by commanding some positive act,” *Citigroup Global Markets, Inc. v. VCG Special Opportunities Master Fund Ltd.*, 598 F.3d 30, 35, n.4 (2d Cir. 2010) then a preliminary injunction is “mandatory” in nature and “the standard is [more] exacting: a district court may enter a mandatory preliminary injunction against the government only if it determines that, in addition to demonstrating irreparable harm, the moving party has shown a clear or substantial likelihood of success on the merits.” *Libertarian Party of Conn. v. Lamont*, 977 F.3d 173, 176-77 (2d Cir. 2020). This heightened standard also applies if the requested injunction “(1) would provide the plaintiff with all the relief that is sought and (2) could not be undone by a judgment favorable to defendants on the merits at trial.” *Mastrovincenzo v. City of New York*, 435 F.3d. 78, 90 (2d Cir. 2006).

Defendants submit that this is a mandatory injunction, and that Plaintiffs must “carry the burden of persuasion by a clear showing for each factor,” but submit nothing demonstrating that positive action by them would be required. *Bergamaschi v. Cuomo*, No. 20 CIV. 2817 (CM), 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 68937, 2020 WL 1910754, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 20, 2020) (citations omitted). Plaintiffs maintain that they need show only a likelihood of success on the merits, which they characterize as a “probable” success on the merits. District courts in this circuit have split on whether injunctions enjoining enforcement of gun regulations are mandatory or prohibitive. *Compare Christian v. Nigrelli*, No. 22-CV-695 (JLS), 642 F. Supp. 3d 393, 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 211652, 2022 WL 17100631, at

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*5 (W.D.N.Y. Nov. 22, 2022) (currently on appeal) (finding that injunction enjoining enforcement of a regulation prohibiting firearms on private property without permission was prohibitory because it would “restore the status that existed before implementation of the private property exclusion”) *with Frey v. Nigrelli*, 661 F. Supp.3d 176, 2023 WL 2473375, at *1, (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 13, 2023) (currently on appeal) (injunction enjoining enforcement of several New York City gun laws would require “altering, rather than maintaining, the status quo.”). However, *Mastrovincenzo v. City of New York*, 435 F.3d. 78, 90 (2d Cir. 2006) held that an injunction which “enjoined” the defendants “from enforcing” a city code provision “clearly prohibits, rather than compels, government action by enjoining the future enforcement of § 20-453 against plaintiffs” and that it “clearly” did not command defendants “to perform any specific tasks.” The language of the requested injunction here is similarly prohibitory, and nearly indistinguishable from *Mastrovincenzo*; the status quo that the injunction of the statute would return the state to would be the status quo pre-1993, before semiautomatic and automatic firearms were subject to the 1993, 2001, and 2013 restrictions enacted through the statutory sections now being challenged. Thus, the lower standard for likelihood of success on the merits applies.

B. Facial vs. As-Applied Challenge

Although Plaintiff Flanigan submits that she would seek to own an LCM and AR-15-type firearm, Plaintiffs nevertheless seek an injunction that will enjoin enforcement of *all* provisions of each of the statutes,

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including provisions that apply to non-AR-15-type firearms; as such, this challenge is a facial one. The Supreme Court has held that “[a] facial challenge to a legislative Act is . . . the most difficult challenge to mount successfully, since the challenger must establish that no set of circumstances exists under which the Act would be valid.” *United States v. Salerno*, 481 U.S. 739, 745, 107 S. Ct. 2095, 95 L. Ed. 2d 697 (1987). Because “[t]he fact that [a statute] might operate unconstitutionally under some conceivable set of circumstances is insufficient to render it wholly invalid,” litigants bringing facial challenges must meet a “heavy burden.” *Id.*

Defendant views the distinction between facial and as-applied challenges as important because “the challenged statutes restrict ownership and possession of a range of weapons and features,” and that Plaintiffs must show “that the statute is [un]constitutional in all aspects, which means here that every weapon and feature merits Second Amendment protection and that the challenged restrictions fail to meet the *Bruen* test,” to succeed. (Defs.’ Opp’n Mem. [Doc. # 37] at 10.) Defendants point to the fact that some of the restricted weapons in Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53-202(a) are grenade launchers, Uzis, and certain shotguns, all of which have been found dangerous or unusual by other courts and which do not fall within the Second Amendment’s protection. (*Id.* at 11.) Because Plaintiffs do not contend that these particular firearms are constitutionally protected, Defendants aver that Plaintiffs fail to carry their “unconstitutional in all” applications burden required for a facial challenge. (*Id.*)

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Plaintiffs claim that *Bruen* created an exception to the Second Circuit’s “no set of circumstances” standard. (Pls.’ Reply [Doc. # 64] at 44.) In Plaintiffs’ view, “if the Second Amendment covers the Plaintiffs’ conduct, and the government cannot ‘demonstrate that the regulation is consistent with the Nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation,’ then the regulation is invalid” because *Bruen*’s standard would be meaningless if a statute “inconsistent with history and tradition” could be “saved by the one possible application that may be constitutional.” (*Id.* at 44-45.) *Bruen* aside, Plaintiffs also argue that *Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey*, 505 U.S. 833, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 120 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1992), *abrogated on other grounds*, *Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Organization*, 142 S. Ct. 2228, 213 L. Ed. 2d 545, (2022), and *Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt*, 579 U.S. 582, 136 S. Ct. 2292, 195 L. Ed. 2d 665 (2016), *abrogated on other grounds in Dobbs*, established a “large fraction” exception to the general “no set of circumstances” rule by allowing a facial challenge to a statute when the statute would unconstitutionally impact a “large fraction” of the cases to which it would be applied. (*Id.*)⁴

4. Plaintiffs argue further that the “no set of circumstances” rule does not apply to cases involving the loss of “fundamental rights” because the “rules are different” for fundamental rights, such as the general rule disfavoring facial vagueness challenges outside the First Amendment context. (Pls.’ Reply at 45) (quoting *Farrell v. Burke*, 449 F.3d 470, 496 (2d Cir. 2006)). However, *Farrell* does not stand for the sweeping proposition that the rules go out the window for fundamental rights, and instead recognizes that “that the Supreme Court ha[s] not spoken clearly as to whether a facial challenge outside the First Amendment context had to

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District courts have taken a variety of approaches to resolving the issue of facial challenges; while one court held that “[o]utside of the First Amendment context, a facial challenge generally must show that ‘no set of circumstances exists under which the [law] would be valid,’” *Copeland v. Vance*, 230 F. Supp. 3d 232, 248 (S.D.N.Y. 2017), another court used the less demanding “plainly legitimate sweep” portion of the facial challenge test for a Second Amendment claim. *See Christian*, 642 F. Supp. 3d 393, 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 211652, 2022 WL 17100631, at *11. Yet another court found that, as Plaintiff maintains, *Bruen* essentially created a binary in which either the regulation itself is or is not inconsistent with the nation’s tradition of firearm regulation, and so necessarily requires permitting facial challenges that invalidate statutes as unconstitutional even if there might theoretically be certain constitutional applications of them. *See Antonyuk v. Hochul*, No. 122CV0986GTSCFH, 639 F. Supp. 3d 232, 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 201944, 2022 WL 16744700, at *47 (N.D.N.Y. Nov. 7, 2022), *reconsideration denied sub nom. Antonyuk v. Nigrelli*, No. 122CV0986GTSCFH, 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 239835, 2022 WL 19001454 (N.D.N.Y. Dec. 13, 2022).

Nothing in *Bruen* suggests that plaintiffs now may challenge a statute implicating Second Amendment rights

show that a statute was impermissibly vague in all applications, or merely that the statute was ‘permeated’ with vagueness” declining to adopt or express a preference for either analysis, and that at best, prior Second Circuit precedent “arguably suggests” that “at least some facial vagueness challenges may be brought outside the First Amendment context” despite other “suggestion to the contrary.” *Id.* at n. 11.

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without being held to the higher facial challenge standard, and the Second Circuit’s most recent holding on the issue of the standard for facial challenges in *Cnty. Hous. Improvement Program v. City of New York*, 59 F.4th 540, 548 (2d Cir. 2023) (petition for certiorari filed) settles the question in this Circuit. There, the Second Circuit rejected arguments by a group of landlords challenging a statute under the 14th Amendment that the stricter *Salerno* standard no longer applied, holding instead that while “a different, more challenge-friendly standard has developed in the context of statutes affecting First Amendment rights,” “*Salerno* provides the prevailing standard for facial challenges to statutes outside the context of the First Amendment.” *Id.* at 549. However, Plaintiffs fail to meet their burden under either standard because they cannot show even that a “large fraction” of the regulated firearms and accoutrements are unconstitutionally restricted.

C. Second Amendment Jurisprudence

Under the Second Amendment, “[a] well-regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed.” Both the Second Circuit and the Supreme Court have issued cases over the last two decades interpreting that right that are critical to the Court’s analysis, beginning with *District of Columbia v. Heller*, 554 U.S. 570, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 171 L. Ed. 2d 637 (2008).

1. *District of Columbia v. Heller*

Until *Heller*, the scope of the Second Amendment was largely unexplored territory, last addressed by the

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Supreme Court in *United States v. Miller*, 307 U.S. 174, 179, 59 S. Ct. 816, 83 L. Ed. 1206, 1939-1 C.B. 373 (1939). As *Heller* noted, the matter went “judicially unresolved” for so long because “for most of our history,” the question of whether the Second Amendment could invalidate firearms regulations “did not present itself.” *Heller*, 552 U.S. at 625-26. When the issue of the Second Amendment’s protections came before the Supreme Court in *Heller*, the litigants posed two questions: whether “the Second Amendment protects an individual right to possess firearms,” and whether a “total ban on handguns” violated the Second Amendment. *Id.* at 576.

a) Scope of the Right

Given the “very different interpretations” by the parties of the right conferred by the Second Amendment, the *Heller* court embarked on a comprehensive analysis of the Second Amendment’s meaning, beginning with its textual analysis of the prefatory and operative clauses. *See id.* at 577-79. *Heller* divided the operative clause into two parts: the holder (“the people”) and the substance (“to keep and bear arms.”) *Id.* at 579. When interpreting the latter, *Heller* relied on dictionaries from the Founding era defining “arms” as “[w]eapons of offence, or armour of defence,” or as “any thing that a man wears for his defence, or takes into his hands, or useth in wrath to cast at or strike another.” *Id.* at 581. Although it adopted these definitions, *Heller* cautioned that the scope of the right is not limited to only the embodiments of that definition that might have existed in the 1700s: “[j]ust as the First Amendment protects modern forms of communications,

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and the Fourth Amendment applies to modern forms of search, the Second Amendment extends, *prima facie*, to all instruments that constitute bearable arms, even those that were not in existence at the time of the founding.” *Id.* at 582.

After reviewing additional Founding era sources and documents to determine both the textual definition of and the contextual use of the phrase “keep” and “bear” arms, the Supreme Court concluded that the Second Amendment guarantees “the individual right to possess and carry weapons in case of confrontation,” as “confirmed by the historical background of the Second Amendment.” *Id.* at 592; *see also* 601-03 (discussing state constitutions codifying Second Amendment analogues that secured “an individual right to bear arms for defensive purposes”). This history demonstrated that the Second Amendment did not *create* a right, but codified a pre-existing right to “protect[] against both public and private violence,” including “to keep arms for their own defense.” *Id.* at 593-94. While the fear that the citizens’ militias would be disarmed by the government might have been the primary reason for the Second Amendment’s codification, as evidenced by the prefatory clause, *Heller* stressed that self-defense is the “*central component* of the right.” *Id.* at 599 (emphasis in original). A review of relevant history and case law, *Heller* found, confirmed that its interpretation of the Second Amendment was consistent with public understanding and interpretation of the right from “immediately after its ratification through the end of the 19th century.” *Id.* at 605-06, 606-19.

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Constitutional rights, *Heller* explained, are “enshrined with the scope they were understood to have when the people adopted them,” including the historical limitations that were part of that understanding, *id.* at 634. The Second Amendment is subject to those same limitations and has never been understood as conferring the right “to keep and carry any weapon whatsoever in any manner whatsoever and for whatever purpose.” *Id.* at 626. One of the most explicitly recognized limitations came from *Miller*, which held that “the ***type of weapon at issue***,” a short-barreled shotgun, was “not eligible for Second Amendment protection” *id.* at 622 (emphasis in the original), because it did not “have some reasonable relationship to the preservation or efficiency of a well-regulated militia.” *Id.* (quoting *Miller*, 307 U.S. at 178.) *Heller* characterized *Miller* as standing for the proposition that the Second Amendment “extends only to certain types of weapons,” *id.* at 622-23; weapons “used in defense of person and home” are constitutionally protected, but “weapons not typically possessed by law-abiding citizens for lawful purposes, such as short-barreled shotguns,” are not. *Id.* at 624-25. The historical tradition of “prohibiting the carrying of ‘dangerous and unusual weapons’” as discussed in 18th and 19th century treatises, *Heller* held, supported *Miller*’s restriction on the scope of the Second Amendment, which *Heller* described as an “important limitation on the right.” *Id.* at 627.⁵ Despite the fact that

5. *Heller* also pointed to 19th century case law and Founding era commentary such as Blackstone as defining several (“although not an ‘exhaustive’ list”) of further limitations on the “scope of the Second Amendment,” including “prohibitions on carrying concealed weapons,” “longstanding prohibitions on the possession

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developments in warfare like the invention of modern-day bombers and tanks, may render militias without “highly unusual” and “sophisticated arms” less than effective against a standing army, *Heller* nevertheless held that “weapons that are most useful in military service—M-16 rifles and the like—may be banned.” *Id.* at 627-28.

b) Constitutionality of the Handgun Prohibition

Once the scope of the right had been determined, *Heller* reached the challenged statute at issue, and held that the “prohibition of an entire class of ‘arms’” such as handguns that were “overwhelmingly chosen by American society” for the lawful purpose of self-defense” and were “the most preferred firearm in the nation to ‘keep’ and use for protection of one’s home and family,” where “the need . . . is most acute,” would “fail constitutional muster” under “any of the standards of scrutiny.” *Id.* at 628-29. *Heller* explained that it was not “permissible to ban the possession of handguns so long as the possession of other firearms (*i.e.*, long guns) is allowed” because the handgun was the “quintessential self-defense weapon,” “possessing characteristics making it well-suited for self-defense.” *Id.* at 629. “Whatever the reason,” *Heller* found, “handguns

of firearms by felons and the mentally ill,” laws “forbidding the carrying of firearms in sensitive places such as schools and government buildings,” and “laws imposing conditions and qualifications on the commercial sale of arms.” *Id.* at 626-27. In a footnote, Justice Scalia cautioned that its list of “presumptively lawful regulatory measures” was meant “only as examples” and that the “list does not purport to be exhaustive.” *Id.* at n. 26.

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are the most popular weapon chosen by Americans for self-defense in the home, and a complete prohibition of their use is invalid.” *Id.* at 629.

In rejecting the idea that a complete ban on a category of commonly used firearms was constitutional, *Heller* cited to other cases⁶ that had reached similar conclusions regarding laws that impermissibly burdened the right to self-defense. *Heller* also distinguished laws that the government had argued were comparable, like gunpowder storage laws and a 1783 law that permitted seizure of any loaded firearm found in a house, stable, shop, or other similar building. *Id.* at 631-32. *Heller* found that the purpose of these laws was to limit danger to firefighters, not to prevent loading a gun or accessing gunpowder for self-defense, and neither did the laws “remotely burden the right of self-defense as much as an absolute ban on handguns.” *Id.* Similarly, laws punishing the discharge of a gun at certain times or in certain areas were meant to prevent “indiscreet” firing of guns, not their use for self-defense, and came with only minor fines or penalties as opposed to a significant prison sentence. *Id.* at 632-33.

6. These cases included *Nunn v. State*, 1 Ga. 243, 251 (1846), which struck down a prohibition on open carry of pistols while upholding a prohibition on concealed carry prohibitions; *Andrews v. State*, 50 Tenn. 165, 183-84 (1871), which struck down a prohibition on open carry of pistols that was “without regard to time, place, or circumstances”; and *State v. Reid*, 1 Ala. 612, 616-17 (1840), which held that “[a] statute which, under the pretence of regulating, amounts to a destruction of the right, or which requires arms to be so borne as to render them wholly useless for the purpose of defence, would be clearly unconstitutional.”

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Because none of these regulations “c[a]me close” to the level of restriction imposed by the challenged statute, *Heller* concluded that there was no historical evidence contradicting its holding that such a prohibition was constitutionally impermissible.

2. *McDonald v. City of Chicago, Ill.*

Two years later, the Supreme Court in *McDonald v. City of Chicago, Ill.*, 561 U.S. 742, 749, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 177 L. Ed. 2d 894 (2010) held that the Second Amendment right is fully applicable to the states because it was incorporated through the Fourteenth Amendment. *Id.* at 750. The Supreme Court explained that the right to self-defense by bearing arms was “deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition,” dating back centuries, and was considered fundamental by those who drafted and ratified the Bill of Rights. *Id.* at 767-69. *McDonald* reaffirmed, however, the ability of the states to continue devising “solutions to social problems that suit local needs and values,” including to limit firearm violence, so long as they were “reasonable” firearms regulations that complied with the limits of the Second Amendment. *Id.* at 784-85. It further reiterated language from *Heller* that there were “longstanding regulatory measures” that remained valid, and that “incorporation does not imperil every law regulating firearms.” *Id.* at 786.

3. *New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n, Inc. v. Cuomo*

Like *Heller*, *McDonald* cast doubt on the idea of interest-balancing as a method of evaluating firearm

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regulations but offered no alternative method or test for determining whether a regulation “infringed” on Second Amendment rights. As a result, circuit courts differed as to what the exact scope of the Second Amendment right to bear arms was, and how to evaluate regulations that applied to conduct within the scope of the Second Amendment. *See, e.g., Kachalsky v. County of Westchester*, 701 F.3d 81, 101 (2d Cir. 2012). A number of circuits eventually coalesced around a “two step” where courts asked (1) whether the regulated activity fell inside or outside the scope of the right as originally understood, and if it fell within that scope, (2) applied either strict or intermediate scrutiny depending on how close the law came to the “core” of the Second Amendment right, and how severe the burden was on that right. *See id.*

In 2015, the Second Circuit used this same two-step analysis to reject a challenge to the same statutes at issue in this case, as well as analogous statutes passed in New York, in *Cuomo*, 804 F.3d 242. The Second Circuit acknowledged that *Heller* established the Second Amendment right as an individual one to possess and carry weapons for self-defense, at least in the home, but found that it stopped “well short” of extending its rationale to other firearms restrictions beyond handgun bans by endorsing “the historical tradition of prohibiting the carrying of dangerous and unusual weapons,” *id.* at 253. However, the Second Circuit lamented that “[n]either *Heller* nor *McDonald* [] delineated the precise scope of the Second Amendment or the standards by which lower courts should assess the constitutionality of firearm restrictions,” leaving unresolved which tier of scrutiny might apply. *Id.* at 254.

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In the absence of “more detailed guidance” from the Supreme Court, the Second Circuit followed the two-step test adopted in *Kachalsky*, asking at the first step “whether the challenged legislation impinges on conduct protected by the Second Amendment.” *Id.* at 254. The Second Circuit explicitly divided the step one inquiry into two questions: whether the weapons were in “common use”, and whether they were “typically possessed by law-abiding citizens for lawful purposes.” *Id.* at 254-55. *Cuomo* defined “common use” as being an inquiry into whether the weapons were “commonly owned” by “law-abiding Americans,” and considered arguments from both sides about what the statistics showed regarding the ownership of the challenged firearms. *Id.* at 255. Without identifying a specific metric that would satisfy the threshold for common use, *Cuomo* found that “Americans own millions of the firearms that the challenged legislation prohibits,” as well as LCMs, meaning that they were “in common use” as that term was used in *Heller*. *Id.* While *Cuomo* viewed the “common use” requirement as meaning “the weapons must actually be used lawfully,” it determined that the court “need not consider” any evidence related to lawful use because the mere possession of assault weapons was the proscribed conduct under the statute. *Id.* at n. 52.

While the Second Circuit viewed common use as an “objective and largely statistical inquiry,” it found that typical possession by law-abiding citizens for a lawful purpose required looking into “both broad patterns of use and the subjective motives of gun owners.” *Id.* at 256. *Cuomo* rejected the idea that use in crime, as opposed to lawful purposes, could deprive the firearms of

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constitutional protection because the handguns in *Heller* were also often used in violent crime, and the “evidence of disproportionate criminal use did not prevent the Supreme Court from holding that handguns merited constitutional protection.” *Id.* Instead of considering only a weapon’s association with crime, the Second Circuit also decided it must consider “more broadly whether the weapon is ‘dangerous and unusual’ in the hands of law-abiding civilians,” distinguishing “weapons that are most useful in military service” from civilian weapons. *Id.* *Cuomo* candidly acknowledged that the analysis is “difficult to manage in practice” because the fact that an AR-15 is “the civilian version of the military’s M-16 rifle” could either mean it should be treated as equally dangerous and unusual as an M-16, or that its role as the civilian alternative made it constitutionally protected where the M-16 was not. *Id.* at 256-57.

The Second Circuit concluded that “neither the Supreme Court’s categories nor the evidence in the record cleanly resolves the question of whether semiautomatic assault weapons and large-capacity magazines are ‘typically possessed by law-abiding citizens for lawful purposes.’” *Id.* Because there was a “dearth of evidence” that “law-abiding citizens typically use these weapons for self-defense,” *id.* at 263, the Second Circuit decided in lieu of ruling on the typical possession question that “[i]n the absence of clearer guidance from the Supreme Court or stronger evidence in the record,” it would “proceed on the assumption that these laws ban weapons protected by the Second Amendment” because “the statutes at issue nonetheless largely pass constitutional muster” under step two of the analysis—tiers of scrutiny. *Id.* at 260.

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Cuomo noted that the “instant bans are dissimilar from D.C.’s unconstitutional prohibition of ‘an entire class of ‘arms’ that is overwhelmingly chosen by American society for [the] lawful purpose’ of self-defense” because “New York and Connecticut ban only a limited subset of semiautomatic firearms, which contain one or more enumerated military-style features,” and “[a]s *Heller* makes plain, the fact that the statutes at issue do not ban ‘an entire class of ‘arms’” makes the restrictions substantially less burdensome.” *Id.* at 260. Based on this distinction and because “numerous ‘alternatives remain for law-abiding citizens to acquire a firearm for self-defense’”, *Cuomo* found that the bans did not “effectively disarm individuals or substantially affect their ability to defend themselves” and so imposed a burden that was “real” but not “severe.” *Id.* In evaluating the purpose of the statutes, *Cuomo* also held that the legislation was “tailored” to address “particularly hazardous weapons” and the dangers that many of the “military-style features” posed. *Id.* at 262. The legislation, the Second Circuit found, was “specifically targeted to prevent mass shootings like that in Newtown,” and to reduce “circulation of assault weapons among criminals.” *Id.*

4. *New York State Rifle & Pistol Association, Inc. v. Bruen*

In *Bruen*, the Supreme Court invalidated the majority of circuit court decisions addressing the Second Amendment post-*Heller* by definitively rejecting the tiers-of-scrutiny “two-step” approach to Second Amendment claims and introducing a new test:

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When the Second Amendment’s plain text covers an individual’s conduct, the Constitution presumptively protects that conduct. The government must then justify its regulation by demonstrating that it is consistent with the Nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation. Only then may a court conclude that the individual’s conduct falls outside the Second Amendment’s unqualified command.

142 S. Ct. at 2129-30. While “[s]tep one” of the previous “two-step” framework was “broadly consistent with *Heller*, which demands a test rooted in the Second Amendment’s text, as informed by history,” the Supreme Court held that the second step was “one step too many,” and that “[i]nstead, the government must affirmatively prove that its firearms regulation is part of the historical tradition that delimits the outer bounds of the right to keep and bear arms.” *Id.* at 2127. *Heller*’s methodological approach, *Bruen* explained, began with textual analysis and a review of the historical background of the Second Amendment, followed by a review of the public understanding of the right based on post-enactment sources, to confirm whether the right was an individual one to self-defense and to “demark the limits on the exercise of that right” such as the “historical tradition” of prohibiting dangerous and unusual weapons, and protecting only weapons that were “in common use.” *Id.* at 2128. This methodology, centered on “constitutional text and history,” *id.*, did not allow for balancing the interest protected by the statute with other government interests under traditional means-end scrutiny—instead, courts should respect the fact that

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the Second Amendment “is the very *product* of an interest balancing by the people” and look to the balance “struck by the traditions of the American people” in evaluating the legitimacy of any regulation of firearms. *Id.* at 2130-31.

New York’s licensing scheme prohibited the possession of any firearm without a license and required applicants to show a “special need for self-protection distinguishable from the general community” in order to obtain a general carry license. *Id.* at 2123. Neither side contested that petitioners had demonstrated that they were part of “the people” protected by the Second Amendment, and that handguns were “‘in common use’ today for self-defense,” and so the only preliminary question under the first question of *Bruen*’s newly enunciated test was “whether the “plain text of the Second Amendment” protected “carrying handguns publicly for self-defense.” *Id.* at 2134. *Bruen* had “little difficulty concluding that it does” because the “textual elements” of the Second Amendment guarantees “the individual right to possess and carry weapons in case of confrontation,” which “naturally encompasses public carry” based on the definition of “keep” and “bear.” *Id.*

Because petitioners had met their burden, *Bruen* next turned to determining whether the regulation had a proper historical analogue such that it was consistent with the Nation’s traditions of firearm regulation. *Bruen* embarked once more on a journey through history, reviewing sources from “the late 1200s to the early 1900s” submitted by the respondents and concluding that “apart from a handful of late-19th-century jurisdictions, the historical record

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compiled by respondents does not demonstrate a tradition of broadly prohibiting the public carry of commonly used firearms for self-defense.” *Id.* at 2135-2136, 2138. *Bruen* distinguished a number of pre-19th century regulations directed to the carry of firearms as inapposite, *see, e.g., id.* at 2141-45 (discussing how the Statute of Northampton and successor statutes’ prohibition on riding “armed by night nor by day” only prohibited bearing arms in a way that spread “fear” or “terror” rather than representing a broad prohibition on all forms of public carry) or outliers, *see, e.g., id.* at 2143-44 (finding that a regulation preventing a farmer or plantation owner who settled new territory from carrying any kind of pistol, and more broadly prohibited the concealed carry of pocket pistols or unusual or unlawful weapons, was not meaningful because it only appeared to have been in effect for 8 years). Regarding the latter, *Bruen* held that even if there had been a statute prohibiting handguns as “dangerous and unusual” during the colonial period, handguns are “indisputably in ‘common use’ for self-defense today,” and so could provide no justification for restricting “the public carry of weapons that are unquestionably in common use today.” *Id.* at 2143.

Bruen found after a review of the historical record that the government could regulate “the intent for which one could carry arms,” (such as prohibiting carrying of a firearm in a way that would cause fear and terror,) “the manner by which one carried arms” (such as prohibiting either open or concealed carry so long as the other form of carry remained open) or the “exceptional circumstances under which one could not carry arms” (such as in the case of dangerous or unusual weapons), but it could not broadly

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prohibit the public carry of commonly used firearms for personal defense by requiring individuals to demonstrate a need for a handgun beyond the generalized desire to possess it for self-defense. *Id.* at 2156. Thus, *Bruen* held that New York’s licensing scheme violated the Second and Fourteenth Amendments. *Id.*

IV. Discussion**A. Analytical Framework for Second Amendment Challenges**

Ruling on the merits of the parties’ arguments first requires determining what framework for analyzing Second Amendment claims the Supreme Court has left lower courts with post-*Bruen*, including what the various terms of art used by the Supreme Court mean for purposes of their application, and whose burden it is to produce evidence on each point.

At oral argument, both sides agreed that because there is a degree of overlap between the analyses for ‘common use,’ ‘typical possession,’ and ‘dangerous and unusual’ in the context of the Second Amendment, the structural organization of how the Court addresses each phrase is less important than what the core of the inquiry is. However, the parties’ positions diverge sharply on what that core might be. Plaintiffs’ position is that whether a weapon is “common use,” whether the firearms are “typically possessed by law-abiding citizens for lawful purposes,” and whether the firearms are “dangerous or unusual weapons” are the “flip side of one another.” (June

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5, 2023 Oral Argument Tr. [Doc. # 83] at 39). In their view, common use is an inquiry focused on “the choices commonly made by contemporary law-abiding citizens” to purchase and possess certain weapons and is meant only to distinguish commonly used civilian weapons from “specialized weapons employed by a standing army.” (Pls.’ Mem. at 10.) Broadly, Defendants view the three different phrases as ultimately getting at whether the firearms at issue are suitable and used for self-defense, or for some other purpose—lawful or unlawful—unprotected by the Second Amendment. Defendants maintain that after *Bruen*, Plaintiffs must show not only that the weapons and accoutrements are commonly owned, but that they are commonly possessed and used *for self-defense* based on *Bruen*’s repeated use of the phrase “‘common use’ for self-defense.” (Defs.’ Mem. at 24.) Amici Brady, March for Our Lives, and Giffords Law Center join that position, highlighting that both *Heller* and *Bruen* heavily emphasize that “individual self-defense” is the central component of the Second Amendment, not mere possession of firearms for lawful purposes generally. (Brief for Brady as Amicus Curie, supporting Defendants (“Brady Amicus”) [Doc. # 80] at 4-5); (Brief for Giffords Law Center as Amicus Curie, supporting Defendants (“Giffords Amicus”) [Doc. # 75] at 8, 10.)⁷ Defendants interpret the phrase “typical possession by law-abiding citizens for lawful purposes”

7. Giffords Law Center further argues that the Second Circuit’s discussion of common use and typical possession in *Cuomo* has limited weight given that the court recognized “that reliable empirical evidence of lawful possession for lawful purposes was ‘elusive,’” and primarily relied on its analysis under means-end scrutiny to come to the holding. (Giffords Amicus at 10.)

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to require the Court to determine what the weapon is “useful” for and how it is “used” in practice. (Defs.’ Mem. at 20.)

The first step requires deciding whether *Cuomo*’s holding on these two questions is still binding post-*Bruen*. *Cuomo* interpreted the “common use” analysis as a purely statistical inquiry into ownership, and the “typical possession” analysis as a more qualitative examination “into both broad patterns of use and the subjective motives of gun owners.” *Cuomo*, 804 F.3d at 256. *Cuomo* held that because “Americans own millions of the firearms that the challenged legislation prohibits,” they should be considered “in common use” as that term was used in *Heller* and assumed without deciding that the plaintiffs would succeed on the issue of typical possession. *Cuomo*, 804 F.3d at 255-57. If *Cuomo*’s holding on common use remains good law, then the Court’s task is merely to apply it. However, because *Cuomo* preceded *Bruen*, the Court must determine to what extent *Cuomo* has been abrogated; while the parties agree that the “two-step” and the means-end scrutiny analyses used in *Cuomo* are no longer applicable law⁸, their positions diverge on whether discrete portions of *Cuomo*’s “step one” analysis on common use and typical possession remain binding.

8. While the Second Circuit’s findings regarding means-end scrutiny may no longer constitute a binding holding, its findings as to the level of burden imposed by the Challenged Statutes provides useful guidance to this Court in determining whether the Challenged Statutes impose a similar level of burden to a historical analogue under the *Bruen* test.

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Plaintiffs’ arguments as to *Cuomo*’s applicability are built upon ever-shifting sands, making their precise position difficult to pin down. Plaintiffs devote an entire section of their opening brief, titled “[t]he Second Circuit’s decision in *Cuomo* is no longer good law,” (capitalization omitted), to arguing that both the “mode of review” and “holding” were overturned by *Bruen*, (Pls.’ Mem. at 11-13). This position is consistent with their argument that common use and typical possession are part of the same overlapping inquiry, and that no inquiry into whether the weapons are used for self-defense is required. However, it is fundamentally *inconsistent* with their assertion at oral argument that *Cuomo* is binding on this Court to the extent it held that assault weapons are commonly used, because the method of analysis with which *Cuomo* reached that conclusion divided common use and typical possession into two questions. (See Oral Argument Tr. at 11.) Plaintiffs cannot have it both ways—either *Cuomo*’s common use analysis survived *Bruen* and is thus binding, or common use and typical possession are terms meant to be interchangeably used as part of one analysis, in which case that portion of *Cuomo*’s holding giving the terms distinct meanings is inconsistent with *Bruen* and it is no longer good law.

The Court views the latter option interpretation as the better one. *Cuomo* openly acknowledged that *Heller* provided lower courts with little guidance on what phrases like “common use” or “typically possessed by law-abiding citizens for lawful purposes” meant and how they should be applied; while *Cuomo* strove to faithfully apply the analysis as *Heller* appeared to set it out, continued analysis

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of the question in other circuits revealed that defining the “common use” factor articulated in *Cuomo* leads to a problem of application:

[R]elying on how common a weapon is at the time of litigation would be circular to boot. Machine guns aren’t commonly owned for lawful purposes today because they are illegal; semi-automatic weapons with large-capacity magazines are owned more commonly because, until recently (in some jurisdictions), they have been legal. Yet it would be absurd to say that the reason why a particular weapon can be banned is that there is a statute banning it, so that it isn’t commonly owned. A law’s existence can’t be the source of its own constitutional validity.

Friedman v. City of Highland Park, Illinois, 784 F.3d 406, 409 (7th Cir. 2015).

Bruen, perhaps recognizing the shortcomings of a purely statistical inquiry into possession, avoided that pitfall by framing the relevant inquiry as being whether the weapons are “‘in common use’ today *for self-defense*.” *Bruen*, 142 S. Ct. at 2134 (emphasis added); *see also Heller*, 554 U.S. at 594 (discussing the origins of the pre-existing right codified by the Second Amendment as the “right of self-preservation” permitting a citizen to “repel force by force” when “the intervention of society in his behalf, may be too late to prevent an injury.”) While only a handful of district courts post-*Bruen* have had the occasion to grapple with the question of what common use means, at

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least one has reached the conclusion that *Bruen* requires that common use to be specifically for self-defense. *See Or. Firearms Fed’n, Inc. v. Brown*, 644 F. Supp. 3d 782, 2022 WL 17454829, at *10 (D. Or. Dec. 6, 2022), *appeal dismissed*, No. 22-36011, 2022 U.S. App. LEXIS 34277, 2022 WL 18956023 (9th Cir. Dec. 12, 2022) (noting that the relevant inquiry was whether the weapons were in common use “for lawful purposes *like self-defense*”) (quoting with emphasis *Heller*, 554 U.S. at 624). As such, this Court reads *Bruen* to abrogate *Cuomo* to the extent it treated common use as a solely statistical question.

Plaintiffs next insist that because the Second Amendment guarantees an “individual right to *possess* and carry weapons *in case of confrontation*,” that necessarily means firearms need not be commonly “used” for self-defense—only possessed. (Pls.’ Reply at 36) (quoting with emphasis *Bruen*, 142 S. Ct. at 2134.) The reason for which the firearms are possessed is certainly part of the analysis; however, *Bruen* recognized that the “limitation” on “the sorts of weapons protected” by the Second Amendment to those in common use stems from “the historical tradition of prohibiting the *carrying*” of dangerous and unusual weapons, intrinsically linking the contours of constitutionally protected weapons to how those weapons are used, rather than merely possessed. *Heller*, 554 U.S. at 627 (emphasis added). Further, to adopt Plaintiffs’ proposal would mean allowing the analysis to be driven by nebulous subjective intentions such that if enough individuals filled out a survey stating that they owned high powered shotguns or niche sniper rifles for the purpose of self-defense, that would satisfy the common

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use test regardless of how the weapons were actually used, a result that the Supreme Court does not indicate in the slightest that it intended.

The Supreme Court's holding in *Miller* that "the sorts of weapons protected" by the Second Amendment are those that were "in common use at the time," *Miller*, 307 U.S. at 179, was interpreted in *Heller* to mean that the weapons protected by the Second Amendment were "the sorts of lawful weapons" that are typically "possessed at home," and not "dangerous and unusual" weapons. *Heller*, 554 U.S. at 627. *Caetano v. Massachusetts*, 577 U.S. 411, 411, 136 S. Ct. 1027, 194 L. Ed. 2d 99 (2016) explicitly rejected the idea that a firearm is dangerous and unusual merely because it did not exist at the time of the Founding, and *Bruen* further explained that the tradition of prohibiting "dangerous and unusual" weapons is not meant to prohibit guns that might have been dangerous and unusual during the colonial period if they are now "the quintessential self-defense weapon," *id.* at 2143. All three precedents point towards the inquiry into whether the Second Amendment protects a particular firearm focusing not on whether it was commonly kept and used or would have been considered dangerous and unusual at the time of the Founding, but instead on both the characteristics of the firearm and how the firearm is used by everyday citizens. *See also id.* at 2128 (characterizing the limitation on dangerous and unusual weapons as part of the "the historical understanding of the Amendment to demark the *limits on the exercise* of [the Second Amendment] right.") (emphasis added).

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The Court views the three phrases—common use, typical possession, and dangerous and unusual—as meant to get at both the “how” and the “why” of how a particular weapon is used. Thus, the Court proceeds by seeking to answer two questions: Do law-abiding citizens buy the weapons at issue for the purpose of defending themselves, or because the weapons’ characteristics are well-suited for some unlawful purpose? And once those firearms are purchased, are they actually used for self-defense, or are they more often utilized to achieve unlawful ends? In order to prevail, the answer to both must be that the weapons are obtained and used for self-defense.

Having settled that *Bruen* requires the Court to determine both how and why the firearms are commonly used and possessed, whether it be for self-defense or for some unlawful end that makes the weapons dangerous and unusual, the Court must now decide whose burden it is to provide evidence as to each element. Plaintiffs argue “the Second Amendment’s plain text covers Plaintiffs’ conduct in seeking to acquire bearable arms” and that as such, Plaintiffs’ conduct “is **presumptively** protected by the Second Amendment”; based on the language in *Bruen* stating that “the Second Amendment extends, *prima facie*, to all instruments that constitute bearable arms,” Plaintiffs maintain that no more is required from them. (Pls.’ Mem. at 4-5) (emphasis in original); (Pls.’ Reply at 5.)

Defendants view Plaintiffs’ burden in both *Heller* and *Bruen* to require threshold showings that (1) Plaintiffs are members of “the people”, (2) the regulated instrument is a “bearable arm” under the Second Amendment, (3) the

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arms are not “dangerous or unusual,” (4) such arms are in “common use” for “lawful purposes like self-defense” and that (5) the weapons are “typically owned by ‘law-abiding citizens for lawful purposes.’” (Defs.’ Mem. at 11-12.) They acknowledge that if Plaintiffs meet their burden, the burden to justify their regulation by demonstrating that it is relevantly similar to historical analogues in the nation’s history and tradition of firearm regulation lies with them. (*Id.*)

Bruen’s mandate provides that *if* the Second Amendment’s plain text creates the presumption, “*then*” the government must justify its regulation. *Bruen*, 142 S. Ct. at 2130 (emphasis added). Similarly, the section of *Bruen* in which the Supreme Court applied its newly enunciated test considered whether handguns were arms that were “‘in common use’ today for self-defense” and whether the “plain text” of the Second Amendment covered the petitioner’s “proposed course of conduct” of carrying handguns publicly for “self-defense” *before* shifting the burden to respondents to justify the regulation. *Id.* at 2134. Thus, *Bruen* and *Heller* make clear that Plaintiffs have the burden of making the initial showing that they are seeking to possess or carry firearms that are “‘in common use’ today for self-defense” and are typically possessed by law-abiding citizens for that purpose. *Id.* *Heller* may have discussed the common use test as part of the “historical tradition” of prohibiting dangerous and unusual arms, rather than the “plain text” of the Second Amendment, but *Heller* stressed that text and history are inextricably intertwined; the constitutional right is defined by the text used to immortalize it, but *Heller*

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also teaches that the text itself is defined by its original meaning, including the history and tradition behind it. *See* Eugene Volokh, *Implementing the Right to Keep and Bear Arms for Self-Defense: An Analytical Framework and a Research Agenda*, 56 UCLA L. Rev. 1443, 1459-51 (2009). In short, *Heller* made extensive use of history to define *both* the scope of the right and the types of regulations that, despite burdening the right, are constitutionally permissible; the requirement that the arms be in common use for self-defense falls into the former category, not the latter.

Plaintiffs strenuously contest this interpretation of *Heller* and *Bruen*, maintaining at oral argument that neither case imposes any obligation on plaintiffs to offer empirical evidence on how the arms are used and for what purpose.⁹ In support, they rely on *Bruen*'s acknowledgment that the First Amendment was "repeatedly compared" to the Second Amendment in *Heller* for the purpose of analyzing whether the Supreme Court's holding was consistent with its treatment of other constitutional rights, and *Bruen*'s subsequent comparison of the government's burden in a Second Amendment challenge to First Amendment cases where the government "bears the burden of proving the constitutionality of its actions" when

9. Both *Heller* and *Bruen* also dealt with a type of firearm that neither side disputed was commonly used for self-defense by average citizens, and thus no conclusions can be drawn from the fact that plaintiffs in those cases were not required to provide empirical support for their arguments.

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it restricts speech. *Bruen*, 142 S. Ct. at 2130.¹⁰ However, the quoted language stands only for the well-established principle that when Plaintiffs bring any constitutional challenge, whether in the context of the First or the Second Amendment, the burden shifts to the government to justify its actions once the plaintiffs have satisfied their own preliminary burden. *See, e.g., Kennedy v. Bremerton School District*, 142 S. Ct. 2407, 2421, 213 L. Ed. 2d 755 (2022) (explaining that “a plaintiff bears certain burdens to demonstrate an infringement of his rights under the Free Exercise and Free Speech Clauses,” and it was only “[i]f the plaintiff carries these burdens” that the burden “*then* shifts to the defendant to [justify] . . . its actions[.]”) (emphasis added).

Nothing in *Bruen* or any of the other cases that Plaintiffs cite grants them an automatic presumption that their conduct is constitutionally protected which Defendants are then required to affirmatively rebut.

10. Plaintiffs seize on language from *Bruen* in which the Supreme Court justifies its burden-shifting framework by reference to First Amendment cases where the government bears the burden of “showing whether the expressive conduct falls outside the category of protected speech.” *Bruen*, 142 S. Ct. at 2130. However, the cases *Bruen* cites in support make clear that the Supreme Court is referring to situations where the government seeks to justify its regulation by demonstrating that certain types of speech fall into a new categorically unprotected category akin to fighting words or libel. *See, e.g., United States v. Stevens*, 559 U.S. 460, 130 S. Ct. 1577, 176 L. Ed. 2d 435 (2010). Such a burden might be applicable in, for example, a case in which the government seeks to establish a new category of sensitive place in which firearms can be banned, but has no applicability here.

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Plaintiffs must bear the burden of producing evidence that the specific firearms they seek to use and possess are in common use for self-defense, that the people possessing them are typically law-abiding citizens, and that the purposes for which the firearms are typically possessed are lawful ones.

To the extent that Defendants seek to demonstrate that the regulated firearms are instead dangerous and unusual weapons that are not protected by the Second Amendment, Defendants must demonstrate either that the weapons are unusually dangerous, or that they are not commonly used or possessed for self-defense. Plaintiffs protest, urging that Defendants be required to show both that the assault weapons and LCMs are not commonly used *and* that they are unusually dangerous, because the “dangerous and unusual” test is a conjunctive one. However, it cannot be the case that a grenade launcher or a flamethrower becomes constitutionally protected even if it becomes “common[ly] used” for self-defense if it is also commonly used by military combatants. Further, all firearms are “dangerous” in the sense that they are lethal, and so the Court reads the term “unusual” as implying that there must be some level of lethality or capacity for injury beyond societally accepted norms that makes it especially dangerous. *Heller’s* use of the phrase “dangerous and unusual” does not state that it must be conjunctive, but instead cites to several sources—including 4 Blackstone 148-49 (1769), *State v. Lanier*, 71 N.C. 288, 289 (1874), and *Eng. v. State*, 35 Tex. 473, 476 (1871)—all of which use the phrase “dangerous *or* unusual weapons” (emphasis added). *See also* Volokh, *supra*, 1481 (noting that some

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of the sources *Heller* cites to use the phrase “dangerous and unusual” while others use “dangerous or unusual”). At least one district court has made the same observation and rejected a conjunctive interpretation. *See United States v. Reyna*, No. 3:21-CR-41 RLM-MGG, 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 225896, 2022 WL 17714376, at *3 (N.D. Ind. Dec. 15, 2022) (finding that a weapon can be banned if it is “uncommon or unusually dangerous”).¹¹

Delaware State Sportsmen’s Ass’n, Inc v. Del. Dep’t of Safety & Homeland Sec., 664 F. Supp. 3d 584, 2023 WL 2655150, at *7 (D. Del. Mar. 27, 2023) held to the contrary, finding that even if “dangerous or unusual” was more accurate as a matter of history, the “great weight” of precedent required it to interpret the “dangerous and unusual” test to require the checking of “both boxes.” *Id.* For this “great weight” of authority, however, the court cited to only two cases in support: *Bruen*, and Justice Alito’s concurrence in *Caetano*. *Id.* However, the section of *Bruen* that *Delaware State Sportsmen’s Ass’n* cites to

11. Other courts have reached the same conclusion—that unusually dangerous weapons may be banned by the government—but have done so under the history and tradition prong of the *Bruen* test. *See Herrera v. Raoul*, No. 23 CV 532, 2023 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 71756, 2023 WL 3074799, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 25, 2023); *Bevis v. City of Naperville Ill.*, No. 22 C 4775, 2023 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27308, 2023 WL 2077392, at *13 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 17, 2023). As addressed *infra*, p. 64-65, even if a weapon must be dangerous and unusual to fall under the already enumerated Second Amendment exception from *Heller*, the Court also finds that it is consistent with the nation’s tradition and history of firearm regulation to regulate narrow and specific categories of unusually dangerous weapons resulting from developments in firearm technology.

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immediately follows the phrase “dangerous and unusual” with a citation to the Blackstone commentaries that uses “dangerous *or* unusual,” (emphasis added) and providing such disproportionate weight to the concurrence in *Caetano* is unwarranted given that the majority opinion in *Caetano* holds only that the lower court erred in finding that whether a firearm is in common use or is dangerous and unusual turned on whether the firearm existed during the time of the Founding and was useful in warfare. *Id.* at 412. Justice Alito’s concurrence was joined only by Justice Thomas, and no citation to his concurrence appears in the majority opinion in *Bruen*. The Court declines to follow the analysis of *Delaware State Sportsmen’s Ass’n*.

Thus, the Court finds that the purpose of the “dangerous and unusual” exception to the Second Amendment is to determine whether the firearm’s character is such that it is commonly used and typically possessed for self-defense, or instead for the purpose of causing unlawful or excessive harm or fatalities. This interpretation of the test is also consistent with the interplay between common use, typical possession, and dangerous and unusual; a weapon must be both possessed for the purpose of and actually used for self-defense in order to fall within the Second Amendment’s protection, meaning that if it is either unusual for it to be possessed for self-defense or if it is used in a way that makes it particularly dangerous, the weapon does not fall within the Second Amendment’s purview.

Finally, Plaintiffs must also show that the conduct they seek to engage in is covered by the right to “keep

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and bear arms,” which includes “the right to ‘wear, bear, or carry . . . upon the person or in the clothing or in a pocket, for the purpose . . . of being armed and ready for offensive or defensive action in a case of conflict with another person.’” *Bruen*, 142 S. Ct. at 2134. To prevail on this question, Plaintiffs must show that carrying both a firearm defined as an “assault weapon” and that possessing and using an LCM in conjunction with an assault weapon are part of keeping and bearing arms. If Plaintiffs establish each of those elements, the burden shifts to Defendants to justify their regulation based on *Bruen*’s requirements for establishing relevant similarity to history and tradition.

B. Likelihood of Success on the Merits**1. Whether Plaintiffs’ Proposed Conduct Falls Within the Scope of the Second Amendment**

It is undisputed that Plaintiff Flanigan is a “law-abiding citizen of the United States,” and that she has a valid permit to carry a pistol or revolver. (Third Amend. Compl. ¶¶ 4, 6.) Defendants also do not contest that the firearms defined in Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53-202a(1) are “arms,” or that Plaintiff Flanigan seeks to “keep and bear” those arms. The remaining disputes are (1) whether LCMs and firearm accessories are bearable arms, (2) whether assault weapons and LCMs are in common use for self-defense, and (3) whether they instead are dangerous and unusual weapons not typically possessed by law-abiding citizens for lawful purposes.

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Before delving into the specifics of each prong of the *Bruen* test, the Court notes that many of Plaintiffs' arguments as to the applicability of the Supreme Court's precedent employ the logic that if a broader category of something is constitutional, then the smaller parts within it must also be constitutional. The problem with such a logical fallacy, however, is that even if such generalizations are true of the whole, they cannot account for circumstances that distinguish the individual parts. Plaintiffs attempt to apply this logic at multiple turns, beginning with their interpretation of *Staples v. United States*, 511 U.S. 600, 610, 114 S. Ct. 1793, 128 L. Ed. 2d 608 (1994), in which the Supreme Court sought to determine whether guns *generally* should be considered "highly dangerous devices that should alert their owners to the probability of regulation" such that owning an unregistered rifle with prohibited characteristics could be classified as a public welfare offense. The Supreme Court explained that while it might classify categories of guns including "the machineguns, sawed-off shotguns, and artillery pieces" as having a "quasi-suspect character", other guns "traditionally have been widely accepted as lawful possessions" and so did not put gun owners sufficiently on notice of the likelihood of regulation" simply based on the fact that guns are dangerous possessions. *Id.* at 611-12.¹ Thus, because *Staples* characterized guns other than machine guns, sawed off-shotguns, and artillery pieces as generally lawful possessions, and the assault weapons in the challenged statutes here are guns that do not fall into one of those categories, Plaintiffs conclude that assault weapons must be generally lawful possessions.

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However, this generalization ignores the broader context of *Staples*, such as the fact that the phrase “traditionally have been widely accepted as lawful possessions” was written decades before *Bruen* in 1994, without exhaustive historical analysis, and to answer an entirely different question. *Id.* at 612.

Plaintiffs employ similar logic in their arguments regarding whether use in crimes, military characteristics, or use in mass shootings makes firearms dangerous and unusual, *infra*, Sections IV(B)(1)(b)(2)-(4). However, nothing so clearly illustrates the flaw in Plaintiffs’ logic as *Bruen* itself which acknowledged that traditionally, governments have been permitted to “lawfully eliminate one kind of public carry—concealed carry—so long as they left open the option to carry openly.” *Bruen*, 142 S. Ct. at 2150. In other words, the government cannot ban individuals from carrying firearms, but it can ban different types of carry so long as others are left available. The same principle applies here. The Challenged Statutes do not ban handguns, or all semiautomatic rifles, or even all semiautomatic handguns, but *specific* firearms of enumerated models and features. Because the statutes are not complete bans of the “quintessential self-defense” weapon, Plaintiffs’ arguments directed to general common use of firearms broadly or of similar firearms made throughout their briefing will not suffice, nor will evidence regarding common use of firearms generally satisfy Plaintiffs’ burden to present evidence regarding the *specific* assault weapons enumerated in the Challenged Statutes.

*Appendix B***a) Whether LCMs are Bearable Arms**

Bruen and *Heller* held that “arms” is not limited to only those arms existing in the 18th century, but that the “general definition” of arms fixed according to the historical understanding of it in the 18th century “covers modern instruments that facilitate armed self-defense.” *Bruen*, 142 S. Ct. at 2132. Defendants insist that the LCMs as defined in Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53-202w(a)(1) do not fall within the historical definition of “arms” but are instead analogous to “Founding-era cartridge boxes” that would have been considered “accoutrements” beyond the scope of the Second Amendment’s definition.¹² (Defs.’ Mem. at 12-13.) Defendants rely on an expert declaration maintaining that because ammunition was manually fed into weapons, and kept in cartridge boxes, “magazine” at the time of the Founding would mean “a building designated for storing gunpowder,” and the use of “magazine” as a “bullet storage container” only first appeared in the late 1880s. (Defs.’ Ex. E, Decl. of Prof. Dennis E. Baron¹³ [Doc. # 37-5] ¶ 24.)

12. Defendants make the same argument as to the firearm accessories in Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53-202a(1). However, because the accessories or features enumerated are banned only in conjunction with use as part of a banned firearm, rather than in isolation, there is no need to conduct a separate analysis of whether the accessories warrant Second Amendment protection; whether the underlying firearm itself is constitutionally protected will resolve both questions.

13. Dennis Baron is the Professor Emeritus and Research Professor at the University of Illinois and has served as a member of both the English and Linguistics departments; he has a Ph.D. in English language and literature, and publishes widely on “matters

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Linguistically, Baron argues that the cartridge boxes that held the ammunition, which would have been the closest analogue to modern day magazines, were described as “accoutrements” and were considered separate from “arms” by those in the Founding Era. (Baron Decl. ¶¶ 24, 38, 78).¹⁴ Thus, Defendants contend that LCMs are not ammunition but an “ammunition feeding device” that would qualify as an accoutrement.

Plaintiffs maintain that magazines are covered by the Second Amendment because they are essential to the operation of semi-automatic firearms, and thus are an integral part of the firearm itself. (Pls.’ Reply at 19.) In Plaintiffs’ view, whether LCMs can be banned even if magazines generally are constitutionally protected is a separate question that should be considered under the second step—the historical analysis—rather than the first. If magazines generally are necessary to make semi-automatic rifles effective, then Plaintiffs maintain that magazines generally constitute bearable arms “that

of historical use, in addition to topics related to language and law.” (Baron Decl. ¶ 5.)

14. As corroborating evidence that two separate terms were used for each category, Defendants submit a resolution passed by the 1778 Continental Congress, *Congress Undertakes to Raise a Cavalry Corps.*, in 2 Public Papers of George Clinton, First Governor Of New York 827, 828 (Wynkoop Hallenbeck Crawford Co. ed., 1900); Connecticut militia regulations during the Founding, 1799 Conn Acts 511, *An Act For The Militia*, § 4; and *Miller*, 307 U.S. at 182 (1939) (citing militia regulations passed by the General Assembly of Virginia in October 1785), all of which use “accoutrements” in addition to the word “arms”.

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are prima facie protected by the Second Amendment.” (*Id.* at 25.)

Plaintiffs rely on the declaration of Mark Passamaneck¹⁵ to support their proposition that without detachable magazines, “semi-automatic firearms are inoperable” because the “feed angle, magazine spring pressure, and feed ramps” are all features that are meant to ensure the magazine and firearm function together as intended, making the magazine a “dynamic component” necessary to the firearm’s operation. (Pls.’ Reply Ex. 2, Decl. of Mark Passamaneck [Doc. #64-2] ¶¶ 6-7). Without the magazine, there “is no ability to fire a subsequent cartridge due to a subsequent pull of the trigger,” which is the “defining characteristic of a semi-automatic weapon.” (*Id.* ¶ 7.) Even if it is “technically possible” to fire a semi-automatic weapon without a magazine by “manually opening the action each time the weapon is fired and manually inserting a single round into the chamber,” to do so would make the firearm “unreliable, unsafe, and subject to being damaged.” (Pls.’ Reply at 24.)¹⁶

15. While Plaintiffs did not provide any details on Passamaneck’s credentials beyond his declaration, which states that he has designed magazines, barrels, muzzle devices, gas blocks, and complete firearms for manufacturers, and that he has been admitted in court cases as a firearms expert, Defendants did not challenge his qualifications, and it appears from Westlaw that he was accepted as a firearms expert in *Rocky Mt. Gun Owners v. Hickenlooper*, No. 2013CV33879, 2017 Colo. Dist. LEXIS 85, 2017 WL 4169712, at *4 (Colo. Dist. Ct. July 28, 2017). The Court is thus satisfied that it may consider his testimony as expert testimony.

16. Plaintiffs also find support in a case from the Southern District of California that held that magazines were arms; however,

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Heller noted that the “18th-century meaning” of arms “is no different from the meaning today,” and extends to “all instruments that constitute bearable arms, even those that were not in existence at the time of the founding.” *Heller*, 554 U.S. at 581-82. Several courts have found that components of firearms that are necessary to their operation, such as ammunition, are covered by the Second Amendment. *See Miller*, 307 U.S. at 179- 80 (citing seventeenth-century commentary recognizing that “[t]he possession of arms also implied the possession of ammunition); *Jackson v. City & County of San Francisco*, 746 F.3d 953, 967 (9th Cir. 2014) (“[W]ithout bullets, the right to bear arms would be meaningless.”) Plaintiffs point to Passamaneck’s declaration as evidence that magazines are similarly necessary to the operation of semiautomatic firearms and are thus entitled to Second Amendment protection as a form of “arms,” and note that the Ninth Circuit has reached the same conclusion. *See Fyock v. Sunnyvale*, 779 F.3d 991, 998 (9th Cir. 2015) (“to the extent that certain firearms capable of use with a magazine . . . are commonly possessed by law-abiding citizens for lawful purposes, our case law supports the conclusion that there must also be some corollary, albeit

given the procedural posture of that case, which was vacated and remanded repeatedly and most recently for further proceedings consistent with Bruen, the case has minimal usefulness. *See Duncan v. Becerra*, 366 F. Supp. 3d 1131, 1142 (S.D. Cal. 2019), *aff’d*, 970 F.3d 1133 (9th Cir. 2020), *reh’g en banc granted, opinion vacated*, 988 F.3d 1209 (9th Cir. 2021), *and on reh’g en banc sub nom. Duncan v. Bonta*, 19 F.4th 1087 (9th Cir. 2021), *cert. granted, judgment vacated*, 142 S. Ct. 2895, 213 L. Ed. 2d 1109 (2022), *and vacated and remanded*, 49 F.4th 1228 (9th Cir. 2022).

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not unfettered, right to possess the magazines necessary to render those firearms operable”).)

Defendants’ position is that even if there may be some right to magazines under the Second Amendment, the question is whether an LCM *specifically* is integral to a firearm, because a “firearm can be used for self-defense without a large capacity magazine—any ammunition feeding device of lesser capacity will do the job.” (Defs.’ Mem. at 14.) They point to cases like *Ocean State Tactical, LLC v. Rhode Island*, No. 22-CV-246 JJM-PAS, 646 F. Supp. 3d 368, 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 227097, 2022 WL 17721175, at *12 (D.R.I. Dec. 14, 2022)¹⁷ and *Oregon Firearms Fed’n, Inc.*, 644 F. Supp. 3d 782, 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 219391, 2022 WL 17454829, at *9 in support, but these cases ignore that under *Bruen*, a “modern instrument[] that facilitate[s] armed self-defense” is an arm entitled to the “prima facie” protection of the Second Amendment. 142 S. Ct. at 2132.

17. In *Oregon Firearms*, 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 219391, 2022 WL 17454829 at *9, the district court found that LCMs are not “arms” within the Second Amendment’s protection because they “are neither weapons themselves nor necessary to the use of weapons.” 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 219391, [WL] at *8. Defendants’ evidence was that “all firearms that can accept a detachable large-capacity magazine can also accept a magazine that holds 10 or fewer rounds and function precisely as intended.” *Id.* *Ocean State Tactical*, 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 227097, 2022 WL 17721175 at *12 reached a similar conclusion, noting that the plaintiffs could not carry their burden by “simply assert[ing]” that magazines are “arms” without supporting expert opinion, historical or textual sources.

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The fact that magazines as a general category constitute bearable arms does not automatically render them protected by the Second Amendment; it means, however, that whether an LCM specifically is necessary for self-defense is better addressed in the section of the inquiry focused on the “common use” of LCMs. The Court concludes that LCMs are “arms” for purposes of the Second Amendment as defined in *Bruen* and *Heller*. Plaintiffs have met their burden in this part of the analysis.

b) Determining the Purpose for Which Assault Weapons and LCMs are Commonly Purchased and how they are Commonly Used

(1) Ownership for and Use in Self-Defense

Plaintiffs maintain that the metric used to determine common use should be the percentage of “gun owners” who have an assault weapon and LCM, rather than a percentage of the general population, (Pls.’ Reply at 37), as measured by manufacturing data. They submit that semiautomatic rifles are in common use because the AR-15 is the “best-selling rifle type in the United States” and semiautomatic rifles and semiautomatic handguns are the two most popular types of firearms that are sold. (Pls.’ Reply at 29).¹⁸ According to Plaintiffs, about thirty-five

18. Nicholas J. Johnson, *Supply Restrictions at the Margins of Heller and the Abortion Analogue*, 60 HASTINGS L.J. 1285, 1296 (2009) and National Shooting Sports Foundation, Inc., 2021 *Firearms Retailer Survey Report*, 9, available at <https://bit.ly/3gWhI8E> (last visited Jan. 30, 2023)).

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percent of all newly manufactured guns sold in America as of 2018 were modern semiautomatic rifles¹⁹, and 24.6 million Americans have owned AR-15 or similar rifles.²⁰ As for LCMs, Plaintiffs' expert reports that "[a]t least 150 million magazines with a capacity greater than ten rounds" are owned by law-abiding American citizens, (Pls.' Mot. Ex. 3, Decl. of James Curcuruto²¹ [Doc. # 28-4] ¶ 7), and many handguns, including the Glock 17 pistol (the most popular handgun in America, and legal to own under the Challenged Statutes) come standard with magazines greater than 10 rounds. (Pls.' Mem. at 21).

Plaintiffs also rely on the 2021 National Firearms Survey, which reported that recreational target shooting, home defense, and hunting were the primary reasons for possessing a firearm among the survey participants; specifically, 61.9% of the survey participants reported that they possessed an AR-style firearm for home defense.

19. Bloomberg, *Why Gunmakers Would Rather Sell AR-15s Than Handguns*, FORTUNE (June 20, 2018), available at <https://bit.ly/3R2kZ3s>,

20. See William English, *2021 National Firearms Survey: Updated Analysis Including Types of Firearms Owned* ("2021 National Firearms Survey") at 1 (May 13, 2022), available at <https://bit.ly/3yPfoHw>.

21. James Curcuruto was the Director of Research and Market Development at the National Shooting Sports Foundation from 2009-2021 and was responsible for both internal and external research on industry topics and trends including firearms, ammunition, target shooting, and hunting. Curcuruto has also published and contributed to articles in trade magazines on the subject. (Curcuruto Decl. ¶¶ 2-5.)

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See 2021 National Firearms Survey at 33-34, 23. The same survey found that “[o]f the 25.3 million Americans who have defended themselves with a firearm, 13.1% (3.3 million) have used a rifle.” (*Id.*) For LCMs, the survey reported that out of 16,708 gun owners, 48% (which the survey estimates represents 39 million people when measuring 48% of gun owners as a whole) “have owned magazines that hold over 10 rounds,” including the “most popular semi-automatic rifles” which are “manufactured with standard magazines holding more than ten rounds.” (Pls.’ Reply at 29.)²² According to the survey, of those who owned LCMs, 41% reported owning them for the purpose of defense outside the home, and 62.4% reported owning them for the purpose of home defense. *See* 2021 National Firearms Survey at 23.

Defendants argue that manufacturing or ownership statistics alone shed only limited light on the question of how assault weapons and LCMs are used. *See, e.g., Heller v. District of Columbia* (“*Heller II*”), 670 F.3d 1244, 1261, 399 U.S. App. D.C. 314 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (holding that although 4.7 million LCMs had been imported into the United States between 1995 and 2000, statistics alone did not reveal whether they were “commonly used or are useful” for self-defense.) Professor Donahue²³ reflects

22. The 2021 National Firearms Survey simply asks if the participants have *ever* owned a large capacity magazine without specifying the time period, not whether they currently own one.

23. Professor John Donahue is the C. Wendell and Edith M. Carlsmith Professor of Law at Stanford Law School, and teaches a course on empirical law and economics issues involving crime and

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that “gun ownership is becoming more concentrated in a declining portion of the population,” and that “ownership of private firearms is highly concentrated among a small percentage of gun owners.” (Defs.’ Ex. B, Decl. of Prof. John Donahue [Doc. # 37-2] ¶ 131.) The average “assault weapons owner” has “three or more of the guns”, meaning that far more assault weapons are sold than there are individual owners of such guns. (*Id.* ¶ 92); (*see also* Defs.’ Ex. C, Decl. of Prof. Louis Klarevas²⁴ [Doc. # 37-3] ¶ 27); (Defs.’ Mem. at 24.)²⁵ Donahue also reports that “the vast majority of the time that an individual in the United States is confronted by violent crime, they do *not* use a gun for self-defense,” and that between 2007-2011, 99.2

criminal justice that evaluates the nature of gun regulation in the United States and its impact on crime, a topic on which he is also published. He has served as an expert in several gun regulation-related and Second Amendment cases. (Donahue Decl. ¶¶ 3-20.)

24. Professor Louis Klarevas is a security policy analyst and current Research Professor at Teachers College, Columbia University. He authored the book *Rampage Nation* as a study of gun massacres in America, and his current research is on the nexus between American public safety and gun violence; he is published on the topic of gun regulation and gun violence, and has served as an expert in court cases on the topic as well. (Klarevas Decl. ¶¶ 2-8.)

25. Defendants cite to a 2015 survey finding that 8% of individual gun owners “collectively account[] for 39% of the American gun stock,” and that 20% of gun owners possessed about 60% of the nation’s guns. (Donahue Decl. ¶ 132.) AR-15 rifles “make up approximately 5% of privately owned guns, compared to 50% for handguns,” and most Americans who do own guns do not own assault weapons.” (Klarevas Decl. ¶ 27)

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percent of victims of violent crimes did not defend with a gun. (*Id.* ¶ 150.)²⁶

Defendants, supported by Amici Brady and March for our Lives, contend that “the overwhelming body of case law and empirical data demonstrate that LCMs are not needed for ‘armed self-defense,’” nor are assault weapons commonly used in self-defense. (Brady Amicus at 2.)²⁷ Defendant’s expert Lucy Allen’s²⁸ research on incidents documented by The Heritage Foundation’s database, which is meant to “highlight” stories of successful self-defense, shows only 51 of the 2714 incidents, or 2%, involving any kind of rifle, with no further breakdown indicating whether those rifles were “assault weapons.” (Defs.’ Ex. D, Decl. of Lucy Allen [Doc. # 37-4] ¶¶ 21-

26. Assault weapons are also rarely used defensively in mass shootings; of the 406 active shooter incidents since 2000 documented by the FBI, only one involved an armed civilian intervention with an assault weapon. (Klarevas Decl. ¶ 25.)

27. While Defendants claim there are 3.8 million LCMs lawfully owned in Connecticut by only 41,000 individuals, i.e., about 1% of the state’s population, that statistic has limited relevance given the fact that LCMs are largely illegal under the Challenged Statutes in Connecticut, and thus few individuals are likely to own them. (Defs.’ Mem. at 24.)

28. Lucy Allen is Managing Director of the National Economic Research Associates Economic Consulting (“NERA”), a member of NERA’s Securities and Finance Practice, and Chair of NERA’s Product Liability and Mass Torts Practice. She has previously been qualified as an expert and testified in both federal and state courts on economic and statistical issues relating to the flow of guns into the criminal market. (Allen Decl. ¶¶ 1-3.)

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23.)²⁹ In reported instances of self-defense involving firearm use from 2011-2017, Allen submits evidence that only 2.34 shots are fired in self-defense on average, with individuals firing 5 shots or fewer in 97.3% of all incidents nationally, and in Connecticut specifically, no individual fired more than 10 rounds in self-defense in reported incidents between 2011-2017. (Allen Decl. ¶¶ 10, 16-17.)³⁰ Donahue concludes that in light of those statistics, the fact that “[a]ll firearms that can accept high-capacity magazines can also accept magazines that hold fewer rounds” and the firing rate of a semi-automatic firearm would be irrelevant if only brandishing it was necessary to deter threats, it “cannot be seriously maintained that assault weapons and high-capacity magazines play any important role in furtherance of the Second Amendment goal of self-defense.” (Donahue Decl. ¶ 153.)

“[W]hether a weapon is in common use depends a lot on how generally one defines the weapon; for instance, as a handgun generally, or as a Glock 17 in particular.”

29. That statistic remained consistent when excluding incidents in states that restrict assault weapons. (*Id.* ¶ 24.)

30. Donahue notes that “NRA-affiliated and pro-gun experts” have repeatedly argued that “about 98 percent” of defensive gun uses “involve people brandishing a gun and not using them.” (Donahue Decl. ¶ 151) (quoting John R. Lott testifying on behalf of the NRA in the State of Nebraska’s Committee on Judiciary.) Amici Brady and March for our Lives also point to studies of the NRA’s database of “armed citizen” accounts demonstrating that use of more than ten rounds of ammunition for self-defense is “extremely rare” and the average shots fired by civilians in self-defense was only about two. (Brady Amicus at 6.)

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See Volokh, *supra*, at 1481. Because *Heller* focused on handguns being “the most popular weapon chosen by Americans for self-defense in the home,” the Court views the correct inquiry to be how many Americans actually own and use assault weapons for self-defense. *Heller*, 554 U.S. at 629. The data relied on by both sides, unfortunately, is unhelpfully general in nature to the extent that it divides the statistics only by categories such as handgun or rifle, rather than semiautomatic or non-semiautomatic. Given those limitations, this Court cannot determine whether assault weapons are in “common use” because, importantly, the challenged statute does not ban *all* rifles, pistols, or shotguns; statistics that do not differentiate between assault weapons and other firearms within those categories are thus of limited assistance. Even if the Court were to credit Plaintiffs’ statistics on the common use of rifles, the fact that 13.1% of self-defense incidents involve a rifle of some kind does not assist this Court in determining whether the specific semiautomatic rifles covered by this statute are used commonly for self-defense. As for semiautomatic handguns and the banned shotguns, Plaintiffs offer no evidence regarding the possession or use statistics of either.

Plaintiff’s single survey on the reason for which the survey respondents reportedly bought their assault weapons does not demonstrate that assault weapons and LCMs possess characteristics that make them well-suited for self-defense. To the contrary, Donahue explains that because “[b]ullets fired by assault weapons or a modern weapon with an LCM will easily penetrate walls,” their use threatens family members or occupants of occupied

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dwellings, as illustrated by one instance in which a concealed carry permit holder accidentally fired his gun in a gun safety class, and the bullet passed through a wall to kill the gun store owner in the next room. (Donahue Decl. ¶ 154.) Donahue notes that experts “consider handguns clearly more suitable than assault weapons for self-defense.” (*Id.* ¶ 158.)³¹ *Cf. Heller*, 552 U.S. at 629 (noting that handguns have particular features that make them preferable as a home defense tool).

In the absence of persuasive evidence that the assault weapons or LCMs listed in the statutes are commonly used or are particularly suitable for self-defense, Plaintiffs have failed to carry their burden.

(2) Possession for Use in and Actual Use of Assault Weapons and LCMs in Non-Mass Shooting Crimes

The Second Circuit recognized that after *Heller*, handguns cannot be constitutionally banned despite being disproportionately used in murders and violent crimes as compared to other firearms. *Cuomo*, 804 F.3d at 256. Plaintiffs reason therefore that use in crime alone cannot be enough to find that the assault weapons and LCMs

31. For example, Maryland Police Superintendent Marcus Brown submitted a declaration in *Kolbe v. O'Malley*, 42 F. Supp. 3d 768 (D. Md. 2014) stating that “in many home defense situations assault weapons are likely to be less effective than handguns because they are less maneuverable in confined areas.” (Donahue Decl. ¶ 158.)

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are not protected by the Second Amendment. They also dispute the premise that assault rifles are often used in crime, asserting that “evidence indicates” that under 1% of guns used in crimes were “assault rifles” as of 1997.³² Plaintiffs claim that more recent FBI statistics demonstrate that rifles (with no breakdown between semiautomatic rifles and non-semiautomatic rifles) were used in only 315 murders per year between 2015 and 2019, whereas 669 murders are committed by hands, fists, and feet in that time period.³³

Defendants maintain that assault weapons and LCMs are often used to perpetrate “unlawful violence” and are “particularly popular weapons for drug traffickers and gang members both in the U.S. and Mexico,” citing to Donahue’s assertion that “lost or stolen” guns are “one of the most important sources of weapons for criminals in the United States.” (Donahue Decl. ¶ 115.)³⁴ Donahue

32. Gary Kleck, *Targeting Guns: Firearms And Their Control* 112 (1997).

33. U.S. Dept. of Just., Expanded Homicide Data Table 8: Murder Victims by Weapon, 2015-2019, Crime in the United States, 2019, FBI, available at <https://bit.ly/31WmQ1V>. Donahue also argues that Plaintiffs’ claims are of limited helpfulness because they inaccurately cite the statistics from the FBI; for example, he states that, there were actually 16,425 murders reported by the FBI in 2019, rather than 13,927 as claimed by Plaintiff. (Donahue Decl. ¶¶ 177-79.)

34. According to Donahue, roughly 400,000 guns move “into the hands of criminals” through theft or lost guns every year, making it “orders of magnitudes more likely that a criminal will steal a gun of a law-abiding citizen than a law-abiding citizen will fire an assault weapon in lawful self-defense.” (*Id.*)

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concludes that the 364 killings with rifles is likely an undercount as there were also 3281 murders with “firearms, type not stated” where no information about the type of firearm was available, and the data reported by the FBI does not capture whether any of those murders were committed with semiautomatic pistols—some of which are also defined as assault weapons. (Donahue Decl. ¶¶ 178-79.) Donahue also points out that police departments are not required to report data to the FBI on firearm homicides, and that the figures do not account for shootings committed with assault rifles that did not result in death. (*Id.* ¶ 179.) Because these statistics do not track what types of firearms are used with enough precision to determine whether they are assault weapons as defined by the Challenged Statutes, this data provides limited relevant insight.

Donahue further posits that “[a]ssault weapons pose particular dangers and problems to law enforcement” beyond those of an average handgun because “the types of rounds typically fired by assault weapons as well as the muzzle velocities they tend to have” make them “capable of penetrating the soft body armor customarily worn by law enforcement.”³⁵ Additionally, the “ability to fire rapidly allows criminals to more effectively engage with responding police officers, even from a significant distance,” and despite the “relative rarity” of assault weapons used in crime generally, “one in five law enforcement officers slain in the line of duty was killed

35. (Donahue Decl. ¶ 44) (quoting the declaration of Colonel Marcus Brown, then-Superintendent of the Maryland State Police, submitted in *Kolbe v. O'Malley*, 42 F. Supp. 3d 768 (D. Md. 2014)).

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with an assault weapon” and assault weapons “accounted for 13.2% of the firearms used in [police murders]” from 2009-2013.³⁶ (*See also* Defs.’ Ex. F, Decl. of Prof. Randolph Roth [Doc. # 37-6] ¶ 51) (assault weapons “maintain parity with law enforcement in a standoff, which is why many police and sheriff departments across the United States have purchased semiautomatic rifles and armored vehicles to defend themselves and decrease the likelihood that officers are killed or wounded.”)³⁷

Plaintiffs do not rebut the point that assault weapons and LCMs are substantially more lethal and prone to causing injury when utilized in crime than a non-semi-automatic handgun or rifle, and the Second Circuit has observed that assault weapons are “disproportionately used in crime . . . [and] to kill law enforcement officers: one study shows that between 1998 and 2001, assault weapons were used to gun down at least twenty percent of officers killed in the line of duty.” *Cuomo*, 804 F.3d at

36. (Donahue Decl. ¶ 44) (quoting Violence Policy Center, *Officer Down: Assault Weapons and the War on Law Enforcement*, May 2003, available at <http://www.vpc.org/studies/officer%20down.pdf> (last visited Oct. 12, 2018) at 5) and (Christopher S. Koper et al. 2017, Finding at 317).

37. Professor Randolph Roth is the Arts and Sciences Distinguished Professor of History at The Ohio State University, and is the author of *American Homicide*, a comparative study of homicide in the United States from colonial times to the present. He has published on the topic of violence and the use of firearms in the United States and has served as an expert witness in at least eight cases concerning the constitutionality of state and municipal gun laws. (Roth Decl. ¶¶ 1-9.)

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262. As a result, law enforcement officers and agencies require additional time and resources preparing for encounters with individuals wielding assault weapons, and the consequences when law enforcement are—either as a matter of perception or reality—not timely equipped to confront an individual with an assault weapon may play out tragically. (Donahue Decl. ¶ 44.)

The semi-automatic nature of the assault weapons banned by the Challenged Statutes and the increased danger to law enforcement have led to their increased use in crime, and the evidence as to the suitability of these weapons for crime outweighs the limited evidence Plaintiffs presented on the use of these weapons for self-defense. However, mindful of the fact that the commonality of a particular firearm or weapon's use in crime was not enough to find in either *Heller* or *Cuomo* that the firearms at issue were not typically used for law-abiding purposes, the Court additionally considers the Defendants' other rebuttal evidence regarding the typical use of such weapons.

(3) Possession for Use in and Actual Use of Assault Weapons and LCMs in Mass Shootings

Assault weapons have been used to perpetuate approximately one-third of the high fatality mass shootings in the past 32 years, and between 2014 and the end of 2022, that number has increased to approximately

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half. (Klarevas Decl. ¶ 23).³⁸ When assault weapons and LCMs were used in active shooter incidents, “deaths and injuries were substantially higher for the 61 active shooter incidents using a semiautomatic rifle versus the 187 episodes using some other firearm,” and the average number killed or wounded with a semiautomatic rifle was 9.72, higher than the average 5.47 killed or wounded when some other firearm was used. (Donahue Decl. ¶ 48).³⁹ The ten deadliest mass shootings in American history were all carried out using either an assault weapon or a firearm equipped with an LCM. (*Id.* ¶ 49, Table 1.) The trend of increased use of assault weapons and LCMs in mass shootings also shows “a growing preference for using assault weapons and LCMs” to perpetrate attacks, particularly in high-fatality mass shootings. (Klarevas Decl. ¶ 12-13.)

38. For assault weapons, examples include the 2021 Atlanta spa shooting; the 2022 Buffalo, New York supermarket shooting; the 2022 Robb Elementary school shooting in Uvalde, Texas shooting; and the 2022 Highland Park, Illinois’ Fourth of July parade shooting. (Donahue Decl. ¶¶ 42-43); *see also* (Allen Decl. ¶ 36) (LCMs have been used in 73 out of 115, or 63%, of mass shootings). For LCMs, examples include the 12 people killed in May 2019, at Virginia Beach by a shooter using LCMs; the 23 people killed on August 2019, in El Paso, Texas by a shooter using LCMs, and the nine people killed and 27 wounded just hours later in Dayton, Ohio by another shooter using LCMs; later in August 2019, 7 were killed and 25 were wounded by a shooter using LCMs in Odessa, Texas. (Donahue Decl. ¶ 37.) Defendants’ opposition was filed on January 31, 2023, and so the reports of both sides’ experts make no reference to mass shootings that occurred after that date.

39. The study Donahue relies on excluded the Las Vegas shooting in which 50 were killed and 500 were wounded with semiautomatic rifles, as an extreme outlier.

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Plaintiffs offer no evidence that assault weapons and LCMs are not disproportionately used in mass shootings⁴⁰, and the Court finds the evidence weighs in favor of Defendants’ arguments that the use of such weapons in mass shootings demonstrates that the weapons are commonly used for reasons other than lawful self-defense.

(4) Possession and Use of Assault Weapons and LCMs for their Military Characteristics

Defendants submit that the challenged firearms and LCMs are military style weapons that are “built for killing large numbers of people rapidly in open spaces[;]” “more shots fired, more victims wounded, and more wounds per victim” translates to “more injuries, more lethal injuries, and higher rates of death than incidents involving more conventional firearms. (Defs.’ Mem. at 16.) Detective Warenda’s opinion is that the assault weapons in the challenged statutes are essentially civilian versions of “the most prolific military firearms in the world”: the M-16/AR-15 and the AK-47. (Warenda Decl. ¶ 22.) The

40. Plaintiffs argue that “the fact that a weapon can be used in mass shootings does not disqualify it from Second Amendment protection.” (Pls.’ Reply at 3.) In support, Plaintiffs point to the fact that briefs filed in both *Heller* and *Bruen* drew attention to the fact that the Virginia Tech shooting, “the worst mass shooting in U.S. history” at the time of *Heller*, had been committed with semiautomatic handguns, and *Heller* nevertheless found that handgun bans are unconstitutional. These arguments rehash Plaintiffs’ prior misreading of *Heller* and warrant no further discussion. *See supra*, p. 35-37.

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injuries caused by AR-15s are also particularly severe; the designers have stated that the AR-15 was engineered to generate “maximum wound effect.” Doctor Peter Rhee, a trauma surgeon who saved the life of Congresswoman Gabby Giffords after she was shot in the head with a handgun, said that “[a] handgun [wound] is simply a stabbing with a bullet. It goes in like a nail. [But with the AR-15,] it’s as if you shot somebody with a Coke can.” (Donahue Decl. ¶ 109.)

Defendants also argue that LCMs are uniquely dangerous and deadly because they “allow a shooter to fire more than ten rounds without having to pause to reload.” *Kolbe v. Hogan*, 849 F.3d 114, 125 (4th Cir. 2017), *abrogated by Bruen*. The Fourth Circuit found that this was a “uniquely military feature” intended to “enable a shooter to hit multiple human targets very rapidly.” *Id.* at 137. LCMs were originally designed for military use in World War I and did not become widely available for civilian use until the 1980s. (Roth Decl. ¶¶ 49-51.) The other accessories that are banned in conjunction with certain firearms are also meant to enhance the effectiveness of the weapons and ultimately “enhance the death toll” in mass shooting events; “pistol grips and thumbhole stocks enable easier spray-firing; a collapsible or folding stock allows the weapon to be shortened and more easily concealed; and barrel shrouds are essential for mass shooters to continuously fire their weapons without suffering discomfort from an overheated barrel.” (Donahue Decl. ¶ 65.)

The U.S. Army chose to adopt the M-16 as a military rifle due to its “phenomenal lethality” and reliability, as

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well as its increased ability to penetrate helmets and body armor. (*Id.* ¶¶ 103-06.) Although its progeny, the AR-15, is semiautomatic rather than fully automatic, Donahue notes that the civilian AR-15 “retains all other aspects that made it such a valuable lethal weapon for deadly combat,” and that the Army’s own field manual states that semi-automatic fire is “the most important firing technique during fast-moving, modern combat” given how “devastatingly accurate rapid semi-automatic fire can be.” (*Id.* ¶ 107.) According to Retired Army Maj. Gen. Paul D. Eaton, “[f]or all intents and purposes, the AR-15 and rifles like it are weapons of war. . . . It is a very deadly weapon with the same basic functionality that our troops use to kill the enemy.” (*Id.* ¶ 170.)

The marketing of assault weapons reflects these military roots. Smith & Wesson sells a “Military & Police” (M&P) AR model, which was used in the Aurora, Colorado movie theater shooting. (*Id.* ¶ 111.) A 2016 shooting in Baton Rouge, Louisiana, involved a TAVOR assault rifle, described by the manufacturer as “the ultimate weapon of the 21st century,” and described on the page for Israel Weapon Industries as having been developed in co-operation with the Israeli Defense Forces in response to “dynamic changes in the modern battlefield, the threats of global terrorism and the demands of ever-changing combat situations.” (*Id.* ¶ 112.) Assault weapons have been advertised using phrases such as “[t]he closest you can get without having to enlist,” or as being “for the ‘warrior’ in you.” (*Id.* ¶¶ 91, 101.) The Bushmaster assault rifle used in the Newtown massacre was advertised with the slogan “Forces of opposition, bow down,” and another

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advertisement depicted the Bushmaster rifle with the phrase “consider your man card reissued,” stating that “[i]f it’s good enough for the professional, it’s good enough for you.” (*Id.* ¶¶ 93, 97.) The firearms industry itself sometimes referred to AR-style rifles as “assault rifles.” (*Id.* ¶ 96.)

Plaintiffs assert that *Heller* forecloses any argument that a firearm’s relationship to use in the military bears on its constitutionality based on its conclusion that *Miller*’s use of the phrase “part of ordinary military equipment” meant only that the Second Amendment was supposed to protect arms in common use at the time for self-defense, such as firearms that would have been brought to militia service when men were called up for it, rather than weapons “not typically possessed by law-abiding citizens for lawful purposes.” *Heller*, 554 U.S. at 624-25. Plaintiffs read *Heller* and *Miller* to mean that because “[w]eapons in common use brought to militia service by members of the militia” are protected by the Second Amendment, and militia members “fight wars,” then states cannot ban “all weapons useful for fighting wars.” (Pls.’ Reply at 32.) They reason that only machineguns, bombers, and tanks, aka specialized weapons used by a standing army, can be constitutionally banned. (*Id.* at 33.)

In short, Plaintiffs divide weapons into two categories: “the type of weapons that a nation-state uses in its armed forces,” which are unprotected by the Second Amendment, and “weapons in common use,” which are protected by the Second Amendment regardless of the “relative dangerousness” of the firearm, which Plaintiffs

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view as “irrelevant.” (Oral Argument Tr. at 19-20.) Plaintiffs openly acknowledge that under this logic, even if a gun manufacturer began producing and selling the most dangerous weapon on earth for the military, “if the legislatures of the American people decided to deregulate a particular weapon and over the centuries that weapon became owned by tens of millions of people, it would not be dangerous and unusual[.]” (*Id.* at 21.) The Court rejects this logic; while constitutional protections adapt to the constant evolution of societal norms and technology, no other constitutional right waxes and wanes based solely on what manufacturers choose to sell and how Congress chooses to regulate what is sold, and the Second Amendment should be no exception.

In addition to being built upon flawed logic, Plaintiffs’ argument is also contradicted by history. During the time of the Founding, there *was* a distinction between the guns people typically owned at home and those that were most useful in fighting the Revolutionary War. “Killing pests and hunting birds were the main concern of farmers, and their choice of firearm reflected these basic facts of life. Nobody bayoneted turkeys, and a pair of polished dueling pistols were of limited utility for anyone outside of a small elite group of wealthy, powerful, and influential men.” (Defs. Ex. G, Decl. of Prof. Saul Cornell⁴¹ [Doc. #

41. Professor Saul Cornell is the Paul and Diane Guenther Chair in American History at Fordham University, where he teaches constitutional history to undergraduate and graduate students; he also teaches constitutional law at Fordham Law School. He has written on the topic of the Second Amendment and gun regulation both in the context of his scholarship and has

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37-7] ¶ 19.) Instead, “the guns most Americans owned and desired were those most useful for life in an agrarian society: fowling pieces and light hunting muskets.” (*Id.*) It was because of this discrepancy between militia weapons and weapons typically kept and used at home that it was difficult to equip militias with weapons such as working, battle-suited muskets, and laws “requiring” people to be armed with particular kinds of weapons were passed as a result. (*Id.*) Thus, the Second Amendment’s meaning cannot be read to equate the weapons people had at home with weapons useful for fighting war, because weapons useful for fighting war were not those that men were likely to have lying around the house. (*Id.* ¶)

Finally, Plaintiffs’ cherry-picked quotations of *Heller* disregard the portion of the opinion stating that in banning “dangerous and unusual” weapons, “[i]t may well be true today that a militia, to be as effective as militias in the 18th century, would require sophisticated arms that are highly unusual in society at large,” but that nevertheless, “weapons of war” such as M-16 rifles “and the like” may be banned. 554 U.S. at 627-28. Plaintiffs claim that the distinction between the fully automatic M-16 and semi-automatic weapons such as the AR-15 is legally significant based on *Staples*, but *Staples* does not mention the AR-15, nor does it opine on whether the distinction between an M-16 and AR-15 is significant for the purpose of the Second Amendment.

provided expert declarations and portions of joint briefs in notable Second Amendment cases. (Cornell Decl. ¶¶ 2-4.)

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In sum, the fact that a modern American citizen might want to possess a military-grade weapon that would be effective in warfare is irrelevant given *Heller*'s acknowledgment that "modern developments have limited the degree of fit between the prefatory clause and the protected right" in the Second Amendment; whether a weapon would be useful or necessary for an effective militia is a concern now "completely detached" from the actual right itself. *Heller*, 554 U.S. at 627. Plaintiffs offer no rebuttal for the substantive point that assault weapons and LCMs are more suitable for military use than civilian self-defense. Thus, the Court finds this record to support the conclusion that the militaristic character of assault weapons weighs in favor of finding that they are not typically possessed by the average citizen for self-defense.

c) Overall Conclusion on Plaintiffs' Burden

The foregoing analyses of the record and case law demonstrate Plaintiffs' failure to meet their burden to show that the statutorily defined assault weapons and LCMs are protected by the Second Amendment, and there is thus no likelihood Plaintiffs can succeed on the merits.

2. Whether the Firearm Regulations are Consistent with the Nation's Historical Tradition of Firearm Regulation

Even if Plaintiffs had met their burden under the first part of the test, there is another independent reason for denying the preliminary injunction: Defendants have

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demonstrated under step two of the *Bruen* analysis that the Challenged Statutes pose a comparable burden to relevantly similar historical analogues for comparably justified reasons.

When evaluating Defendants' justifications under the second part of the *Bruen* analysis, courts "assess whether modern firearms regulations are consistent with the Second Amendment's text and historical understanding." *Bruen*, 142 S. Ct. at 2131. Some inquiries, *Bruen* said, would be "straightforward":

For instance, when a challenged regulation addresses a general societal problem that has persisted since the 18th century, the lack of a distinctly similar historical regulation addressing that problem is relevant evidence that the challenged regulation is inconsistent with the Second Amendment. Likewise, if earlier generations addressed the societal problem, but did so through materially different means, that also could be evidence that a modern regulation is unconstitutional. And if some jurisdictions actually attempted to enact analogous regulations during this timeframe, but those proposals were rejected on constitutional grounds, that rejection surely would provide some probative evidence of unconstitutionality.

Id. However, *Bruen* also recognized that "other cases implicating unprecedented societal concerns or dramatic

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technological changes may require a more nuanced approach” because “[t]he regulatory challenges posed by firearms today are not always the same as those that preoccupied the Founders in 1791 or the Reconstruction generation in 1868.” *Id.* at 2132. *Bruen* explained that “history guide[s] our consideration of modern regulations that were unimaginable at the founding,” and that the “historical inquiry . . . will often involve reasoning by analogy.” *Id.* *Bruen* pointed to *Heller* as an example of how “fixed” meanings of terms based on the “understandings of those who ratified it” could be applied to new circumstances, referring to its finding that “arms” applied to more than those arms existing in the 18th century because its “general definition” also covers “modern instruments.” *Id.*

Recognizing the need for some guidance on “which similarities are important and which are not” for purposes of identifying relevantly similar historical analogues, *Bruen* provided two metrics: (1) “how” and (2) “why” the regulations burden a law-abiding citizen’s right to armed self-defense,” with the central inquiry being “whether modern and historical regulations impose a comparable burden on the right of armed self-defense and whether that burden is comparably justified.” *Id.* at 2132-33. *Bruen* noted that “analogical reasoning under the Second Amendment is neither a regulatory straightjacket nor a regulatory blank check,” cautioning courts against upholding any law that only “remotely resembles” an analogue or striking laws down which do not have a historical “twin.” *Id.* at 2133.

*Appendix B***a) Whether Violence Perpetrated through Use of Assault Weapons is an Unprecedented Societal Concern**

Defendants submit that the Challenged Statutes address an unprecedented societal concern and dramatic technological change that requires a more nuanced analogical inquiry to determine if the regulation is consistent with firearms regulation in America. Amici Brady and March for Our Lives support Defendants' position that because semiautomatic firearms were not introduced until "more than half a century after ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment," the lack of a historical tradition of regulating them dating back to the Second and Fourteenth Amendments' enactments is "meaningless," and the Court should instead take a broader view of what may be a comparable analogue. (Brady Amicus at 17.) Plaintiffs rejoin that because lawmakers in the Founding era were familiar with mass casualty and mass murder, mass shootings are instead a "general societal problem that has persisted since the 18th century."⁴² (Pls. Reply at 7) (quoting *Bruen*, 142 S. Ct. at 2132.)

42. Plaintiffs also argue that *Heller* and *Bruen* characterized handgun violence as a problem persisting since the Founding, rather than an unprecedented societal concern; because mass shootings are a form of handgun violence, Plaintiffs interpret *Bruen* and *Heller* to thus hold that mass shootings are not a new societal development because modern handguns are "the product of exactly the same sort of technological innovation" as assault weapons, producing "the same societal problem identified by the State" of mass shootings. (Pls.' Reply at 5, 8.) Neither *Heller* nor *Bruen* held mass shootings are not a modern societal phenomenon that could justify a complete ban of a category of gun, and in fact, neither *Heller* nor *Bruen* even used the words "mass shooting" in the majority opinions.

*Appendix B***(1) History of Firearm-Related Homicides in America**

To determine whether Defendants are correct that mass shootings and assault rifles were being adare a modern societal development, the Court will examine the history of firearm violence in America, and the modern rise of mass shootings in America. Cornell submits that “there was no comparable societal ill to the modern gun violence problem for Americans to solve in the era of the Second Amendment,” primarily because of “the nature of firearms technology and the realities of living life in small face to face and mostly homogenous rural communities that typified many parts of early America.” (Cornell Decl. ¶ 18.) Roth explains that the reason for rare regulation of possession of firearms by colonists of European ancestry, in contrast to heavy regulation of firearm usage and ownership by Native Americans and African Americans between 1688 and 1763, was primarily because Native Americans and African Americans were feared, and because there was a “surge in patriotic fellow feeling” between European-originating colonists as well as “greater trust in government.” (Roth Decl. ¶ 14.)

Around the time of the Founding, fifty to sixty percent of households owned a working firearm, usually a musket or another muzzle-loading gun designed to hunt birds or control vermin. (Roth Decl. ¶ 15.) Firearm use in homicides was “generally rare” because muzzle-loading firearms were “lethal and accurate enough at short range, but they were liable to misfire,” most often could not fire multiple shots without reloading and could

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not be used impulsively unless they were already loaded for some purpose. (*Id.* ¶ 16). Guns were “not the weapons of choice in homicides that grew out of the tensions of daily life,” but firearm use became more common during times of “anticipated violence or during times of political instability,” when American colonists anticipated armed hostile encounters with Native Americans, or when slave catchers were searching out runaway slaves. (*Id.* ¶¶ 17-18.)

(2) Modern Mass Shootings

As Roth explains, while “[m]ass murder has been a fact of life in the United States since the mid-nineteenth century,” it was “a group activity through the nineteenth century because of the limits of existing technologies.” (*Id.* ¶ 41.) “The only way to kill a large number of people was to rally like-minded neighbors and go on a rampage with clubs, knives, nooses, pistols, shotguns, or rifles—weapons that were certainly lethal but did not provide individuals or small groups of people the means to inflict mass casualties on their own.” (*Id.*)

It was only in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century “with the invention and commercial availability of new technologies that gave individuals or small groups of people the power to kill large numbers of people in a short amount of time” that the “character of mass murder began to change.” (*Id.* ¶ 44.) According to Klarevas, “there is no known occurrence of a mass shooting resulting in double-digit fatalities at any point in time during the 173-year period between the nation’s founding in 1766 and 1948,” with the first shooting that resulted in 10 or

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more deaths occurring in 1949. (Klarevas Decl. ¶ 18.) Further, Donahue states that mass shootings first came into public consciousness almost two decades later in 1966, when Charles Whitman used “scoped hunting rifles” from the top of the University of Texas memorial tower to kill 14 and wound 32; he was an “expert Marine marksman perched in a very protected space,” and carried out his assault over 90 minutes. (Donahue Decl. ¶ 84.) Donahue notes that this incident stands in contrast to the November 5, 2009 shooting at Fort Hood, where an inexperienced shooter “was able to fire 214 times” in less than ten minutes to kill nine people and wound 17 others. (*Id.*)

According to Donahue, Americans did not move towards the “pervasive possession of modern weaponry” until the 1980s, during which time the Glock 9 mm semiautomatic pistol was introduced to the market and assault rifles were being advertised more heavily. (*Id.* ¶ 85.) The early 1980s was also when the distribution of double-digit-fatality mass shootings began to increase sharply and was the period during which “assault weapons were used to perpetrate mass shootings resulting in 10 or more deaths” for the first time. (Klarevas Decl. ¶ 20.) In 1994, Congress passed the Public Safety and Recreational Firearms Use Protection Act, 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(30), otherwise known as the Federal Assault Weapons Ban, to “address the problem” of mass shootings and “restrict[] mass shootings” by curtailing the purchase and sale of new assault weapons and high-capacity magazines. The legislation had a sunset provision which took effect in 2004 and Congress did not renew the legislation, at which point gun massacre incidents and fatalities began to increase

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substantially. (Donahue Decl. ¶¶ 85-89; Klarevas Decl. ¶¶ 20-21.)

High-fatality mass shooting violence is “on the rise” and poses a “significant—and growing—threat to American public safety.” (Klarevas Decl. ¶ 11.) Donahue states that mass shootings, which are typically measured by whether at least four individuals are killed excluding the shooter, occurred at an average rate of 2.7 public mass shootings per year in the 1980s, rising to 4.5 events per year from 2010 to 2013, and continuing to rise with 30 mass shootings in 2017 alone, and 61 mass shootings in 2021. (Donahue Decl. ¶¶ 36, 40 n. 13 and Figure 1.)⁴³

Donahue takes the position that the lethality of assault weapons and their use in mass shootings is a unique and modern problem separate from the general issue of gun violence. To illustrate, he points to the attempted assassination of President Ronald Reagan, in which the assassin fired six shots with a .22 caliber revolver before his gun was emptied and he was tackled. (*Id.* ¶ 56.) All four shooting victims survived. However, a semiautomatic pistol with 15 or more bullets “would have enabled the assassin to fire off many more rounds, hitting many more victims” and both the typical caliber of a pistol round used

43. Four gun massacres resulting in double-digit fatalities occurred between October 2017 and May 2018: 60 people were killed at a concert in Las Vegas; 26 at a church in Sutherland Springs, Texas; 17 at a high school in Parkland, Florida; and 10 people at a high school in Santa Fe, Texas. (*Id.* ¶ 37.) Mass school shootings have resulted in more deaths or injuries so far in the 21st century than in the entire 20th century. (*Id.* ¶ 50.)

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in semi-automatic pistols and the use of an LCM to inflict wounds would have increased the chances of lethality. (*Id.* ¶ 57.) Defendants document the increase in the lethality of firearms; a Founding-era flintlock muzzleloader could kill 43 people per hour, and a Civil War-era rifle could kill 102 people per hour; a 1903 bolt-action rifle with a magazine, however, could kill 495. Darrell A.H. Miller & Jennifer Tucker, *Common, Use, Lineage, and Lethality*, 55 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 2495, 2508 (2022).

The psychological impact of mass shootings on the psyche of law-abiding Americans is also new and unique. Mass shootings cause “significant emotional and mental health harms” to survivors, but also cause “broad social damage” such as increased stress in the surrounding community and general population at large.⁴⁴ (Donahue Decl. ¶¶ 58-63.) Donahue notes that “[r]estrictions on weaponry have historically followed growing criminal abuse and social harm, rather than at the time these weapons are first introduced” because “it is not always clear at the outset which inventions will lead to adverse impacts on public safety. Frequently, the dangers of

44. Plaintiffs argue that the “availability heuristic,” or the psychological phenomenon where dramatic incidents influence judgments in such a way that even when rare, people tend to overestimate the likelihood of events like mass shootings and feel less safe as a result, cannot be used to justify a burden on constitutional rights. (Pls.’ Reply at 42.) However, Defendants are instead arguing that the newness of this phenomenon and the lack of such fears at the time of the Founding suggest that mass shootings committed by assault weapons are a new societal phenomenon.

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products and practices fly below the radar until their proliferation generates sufficient social damage to enable the public and the scientific community to become aware of the full extent of their social harm.” (*Id.* ¶ 136.)

“Connecticut’s assault weapons ban was not primarily enacted to address gun crime generally, but rather was adopted in response to the growing mass shooting problem in the United States” and specifically, the Sandy Hook Elementary school shooting. (*Id.* ¶¶ 145-46).⁴⁵ Thus, the record supports the conclusion that mass shootings carried out with assault weapons and LCMs that result in mass fatalities are a modern societal problem; the development of semiautomatic fire has led to a level of casualties and injuries from firearm violence previously unseen in American history and has been spurred by factors and advances in technology that would have been unimaginable to the Founding Fathers. While this conclusion does not automatically dictate that Defendants’ regulation will be upheld, it does mean that the absence of regulations of semiautomatic firearms at the time of the Founding is not dispositive evidence against Defendants’ position, and that a more “nuanced” view is required considering whether particular statutes and traditions of regulation are analogous to the challenged statutes at issue using the guiding principles that both *Heller* and *Bruen* set out for how to evaluate specific time periods and types of historical sources.

45. (See also Klarevas Decl. ¶ 38) (“The legislative intent of Connecticut . . . [in banning] assault weapons and LCMs is to reduce the frequency and lethality of mass shootings . . . associated with the increased kill potential of such firearm technologies.”)

*Appendix B***b) Methodology for Evaluating Historical Sources**

In *Heller*, the Supreme Court looked to “analogous arms-bearing rights in state constitutions that preceded and immediately followed adoption of the Second Amendment” to support the proposition that the right was understood as “an individual right to use arms for self-defense,” but cautioned that it was “dubious to rely on” the “drafting history of the Second Amendment” such as the “various proposals in the state conventions and the debates in Congress” to interpret the Second Amendment’s meaning. *Heller*, 554 U.S. at 603. To interpret public understanding of the right “from immediately after its ratification through the end of the 19th century,” the Supreme Court considered writings from “important founding-era legal scholars,” state and federal court cases during that period, and records of public discussion of the right by antislavery advocates. *Id.* at 605-10. While *Heller* cautioned that the “outpouring of discussion of the Second Amendment in Congress and in public discourse” in the aftermath of the Civil War does “not provide as much insight into [the] original meaning [of the right] as earlier sources,” the Supreme Court nevertheless determined that the public’s “understanding of the origins and continuing significance of the Amendment” during that period is “instructive.” *Id.* at 614. It also noted that it “would not stake our interpretation of the Second Amendment upon a single law, in effect in a single city, that contradicts the overwhelming weight of other evidence.” *Id.* at 632.

Bruen also provided several general principles to guide lower courts in evaluating the historical record. Historical evidence that “long predates” either 1791

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when the Second Amendment was adopted or in 1868 when the Fourteenth Amendment was adopted “may not illuminate the scope of the right if linguistic or legal conventions changed in the intervening years”, and courts should take caution in evaluating English practices and common law to determine whether they “prevailed up to the period immediately before and after the framing of the Constitution” or whether they had become “obsolete in England at the time of the adoption of the Constitution” and were never “acted on or accepted in the colonies.” *Bruen*, 142 S. Ct. at 2136. Evidence of the public understanding of the Second Amendment from immediately after its ratification through the end of the 19th century can provide clarity on whether a court’s interpretations of earlier history are consistent with how the right was understood; “where a governmental practice has been open, widespread, and unchallenged since the early days of the Republic, the practice should guide our interpretation of an ambiguous constitutional provision”, but “to the extent later history contradicts what the text says, the text controls.” *Id.* at 2136-37.⁴⁶ “Post-Civil War

46. However, the Supreme Court noted that it had “generally assumed” that the scope of the protection applicable to both the Federal Government and States was “pegged to the public understanding of the right when the Bill of Rights was adopted in 1791,” but that there “is an ongoing scholarly debate on whether courts should primarily rely on the prevailing understanding of an individual right when the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified in 1868 when defining its scope.” *Id.* at 2138. It declined to resolve that debate because for the purposes of the law at issue, the public understanding of the right in 1791 and 1868 was “for all relevant purposes, the same[.]” As discussed *infra*, p. 59-64, the same applies here; the conclusion remains unchanged regardless of which period the Court views as more determinative.

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discussions of the right to keep and bear arms” can be relevant to a limited extent, but do “not provide as much insight into its original meaning as earlier sources,” and are “secondary” to the text of the Second Amendment and state constitutions. *Id.* at 2137.

Bruen also cautioned against giving disproportionate weight to isolated examples or historical outliers; for example, statutes applying only to territories, as opposed to states, deserve “little weight” because they were “consistent with the transitory nature of territorial government” and “short lived”; and a “single state statute”, “pair of state-court decisions”, or statute that “governed less than 1% of the American population” could not be used to uphold a challenged statute if the “overwhelming weight” of the other evidence suggested that the statutes were outliers. *Id.* at 2153-55.

With these principles of interpretation in mind, the Court turns to the historical evidence submitted by Plaintiffs and Defendants.

c) Whether the Burden imposed by the Statutes is a Comparable Burden to that of Historically Analogous Regulations and is Comparably Justified

Defendants submit that there are three relevant categories of restrictions analogous to the challenged statutes: regulations on new and dangerous weapon technology, concealed weapon regulations, and gunpowder regulations.

*Appendix B***(1) New and Dangerous Weapon Technology**

Regardless of whether the guns are “dangerous and unusual” as that term was used in *Heller*, Defendants maintain that there is a longstanding tradition of governments “using their police powers to regulate new weapons that posed an unprecedented risk to public safety,” such as folding knives, dirk knives, Bowie knives, and percussion-cap pistols (which could be carried loaded for longer periods of time due to advancements in firearm manufacturing) being banned or taxed prohibitively after being used in an “alarming proportion of the [post-Revolutionary War] era’s murders and serious assaults.” (Defs.’ Mem. at 33.) Roth explains that the first prohibitions against many of these “certain concealable weapons” were passed in Kentucky, Louisiana, Indiana, Arkansas, Georgia, and Virginia between 1813 and 1838, meaning that several were enacted “during the lifetimes of Jefferson, Adams, Marshall, and Madison.”⁴⁷ (Roth Decl. ¶¶ 26-27.) For example, Georgia’s 1837 law⁴⁸ passed banned Bowie knives as well as pistols “as arms of offense or defence” in response to a rise in those weapons “being

47. Thomas Jefferson and John Adams died on July 4, 1826, John Marshall on July 6, 1835, and James Madison on July 28, 1836. (*Id.* n. 54.)

48. The law was overturned in part by *Nunn v. State*, 1 Ga. 243 (1846), which allowed for the ban of concealed carry of certain weapons but held that it could not simultaneously ban open carry.

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used in crime by people who carried them concealed on their persons.” (Roth Decl. ¶¶ 26-27).⁴⁹

The need for further regulation once more became apparent from surging homicide rates and the invention of firearms like the Colt revolver and the Smith and Wesson rimfire revolver in the 1840s and 1850s, as well as the Colt double-action commercial revolver in 1889. (*Id.* ¶¶ 28-33.) Colt’s cap-and-ball revolver, invented in 1836, quickly gained popularity; it still had to be loaded one chamber at a time, and could not be loaded quickly or indefinitely, but the two rotating cylinders allowed a person to fire five or six shots in rapid succession and reload quickly with the second cylinder. (*Id.* ¶ 31.) States responded by passing various restrictions, like the time-place-manner restriction in Texas passed in 1870, and the pocket pistol and revolver bans by Tennessee and Arkansas in 1871 and 1881. (*Id.* ¶ 36.)⁵⁰ When dynamite was invented in 1866, and the Thompson submachine gun in 1918, legislatures responded with ammunition magazine restrictions in 1927 and 1934, the National Firearms Act of 1934 and 1938

49. *See also* Defs.’ Mem. at 33, citing similar statutes from Alabama, Tennessee, Florida, Virginia, Alabama, North Carolina, and Massachusetts in effect from the 1830s to the 1870s.

50. *See also Andrews v. State*, 50 Tenn. 165, 171, 186, 188-89 (1871) (upholding the constitutionality of a statute making it unlawful for any person to publicly or privately carry a dirk, swordcane, Spanish stiletto, belt or pocket pistol or revolver” because “[a]dmitting the right of self-defense in its broadest sense, still on sound principle every good citizen is bound to yield his preference as to the means to be used, to the demands of the public good.”)

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restricting ownership of machine guns and submachine guns, and the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970s restricting ownership of explosives by building on the Federal Explosives Act passed in 1917. (*Id.* ¶¶ 44-47.)⁵¹

Defendants maintain that this pattern demonstrates a tradition of governmental regulation of weapons “that posed a new danger or concern” as behaviors and technologies changed beginning shortly after the founding and continuing through the Reconstruction era and then modern eras. (Defs.’ Mem. at 34.) Thus, in Defendants’ view, regulations on assault weapons are consistent with the kind of laws that states have passed “to address new and evolving societal concerns presented by technologically advanced weapons throughout history.” (*Id.*) Plaintiffs challenge this conclusion, referencing some firearms that could fire more than 10 rounds without reloading that have been available for centuries without

51. Plaintiffs argue that any laws from the late 19th century after the Civil War have only minimal relevance, and that laws from the 20th century are irrelevant under *Bruen*. However, Defendants do not submit 19th and 20th century regulations in a vacuum, but as part of their broader purported explanation of why this regulation is part of a “governmental practice” that has been “open, widespread, and unchallenged since the early days of the Republic,” which *Bruen* explicitly permitted; it chose not to address the 20th century evidence submitted because it “contradicts earlier evidence,” not because 20th century evidence is per se irrelevant. See *Bruen*, 142 S. Ct. at 2137, 2154 n. 28. Nowhere does *Bruen* forbid consideration of any regulations or history after the end of the 19th century, and the Court will consider evidence from this period as it relates to, either confirming or contradicting, earlier Founding, antebellum, and Reconstruction-era evidence.

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being regulated. (Pls. Mot. at 23, 25). However, amici Brady and March for Our Lives point out that many of those weapons were often malfunctioning, were relatively uncommon, and were not widely used by civilians; for example, the Girandoni air rifle, which Plaintiffs refer to as an example of a multi-shot gun in existence at the time of the Second Amendment, required a “wagon-mounted pump filled with water to sustain the pressure needed to operate” or “1500 manual hand pumps.”⁵² There was no need to regulate many of these firearms because they were neither commonly used nor widely accessible; however, the firearms that *did* pose new dangers to the public based on their use of advanced technology *were* regulated.

Plaintiffs also insist that Defendant’s “handful of isolated examples and outliers” are not relevantly similar historical regulations that impose a comparable burden but are instead “localized restrictions” that do not show a tradition of regulation like the statutes at issue. (Pls.’ Reply at 9; *see also* Pls.’ Reply Ex. 1.) However, beyond objecting to the relevance of each analogue based on their same strained readings of *Heller* and *Bruen*’s holdings and methodology the Court has previously rejected, Plaintiffs produce no evidence or data to undermine Defendants’ core premise, which is that governments have been passing regulations targeting specific types or characteristics of weapons that have proved problematic or dangerous since

52. *See* Brady Amicus at 13-14, also discussing the rarity, unreliability, and lack of popularity of the 16-round wheel lock shooter, the Jennings Flintlock, the Pepperbox-style pistol, and the Winchester repeating rifles, all of which were invented between 1580 and 1873.

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the time of the Founding, demonstrating that there is a longstanding tradition of the government exercising its power to regulate new and dangerous weapon technology. *See Bevis v. City of Naperville Ill.*, 657 F. Supp. 3d 1052, 2023 WL 2077392, at *14 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 17, 2023) (holding that “governments enjoy the ability to regulate highly dangerous arms (and related dangerous accessories)” and that “assault weapons and large-capacity magazines fall under this category.”)

(2) Concealed Weapon Regulations

Defendants also contend that restrictions on concealed carry, which have been enacted by American legislatures for over two centuries, are evidence of a nationwide tradition of regulating the dangers posed by specific weapons and firearms. (Defs.’ Mem. at 35.) After the Revolution, Roth submits that there was “little interest in public officials in the North” for restricting the use of firearms during the period after ratification of the Second Amendment because “[p]olitical stability returned, as did faith in government and a strong sense of patriotic [comraderie].” (Roth Decl. ¶¶ 21-22.) However, in the South, discord remained as poor and middle-class whites were frustrated by their inability to rise in society, and tensions grew between enslaved African-Americans and whites. (*Id.* ¶ 23.) Homicide rose, and public officials in the South recognized that concealable weapons like pistols and certain knives were being used disproportionately in murders and serious assaults. (*Id.* ¶ 24.) As a result, laws banning or restricting the carrying of concealed weapons were enacted in Kentucky, Louisiana, Indiana, Arkansas, and Virginia between 1813 and 1838. (*Id.* ¶ 26.)

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After homicide rates continued to rise during the period from the Mexican War through Reconstruction, and weapons like the Smith and Wesson rimfire revolver “superseded knives and black powder handguns as the primary weapons used in interpersonal assaults” because they were increasingly lethal and “[e]asily concealed,” states responded with increasing degrees of firearm regulation, including time-place-manner restrictions, prohibitions of open or concealed carry of particular firearms, and the sale of particular firearms such as easily concealable pistols. (*Id.* ¶¶ 32-36.) By the early twentieth century, “every state either banned concealed firearms or placed severe restrictions on their possession” in response to the surge in homicide rates and the invention of new firearms. (*Id.* ¶ 21.) Several courts upheld these concealed carry restrictions as constitutional because they restricted only a “particular mode” of bearing arms, rather than infringing on a person’s Second Amendment right. *State v. Jumel*, 13 La. Ann. 399, 399-400 (1858).⁵³

Plaintiffs contend that concealed weapon regulations are not analogous because they prohibit a method of

53. See also *State v. Mitchell*, 3 Blackf. 229, 229 (Ind. 1833) (rejecting a Second Amendment challenge to a state concealed carry law); *State v. Reid*, 1 Ala. 612, 614, 621 (1840) (upholding a concealed carry conviction under a state right to bear arms because “[t]here was no evidence . . . that the defendant could not have defended himself as successfully, by carrying the pistol openly, as by secreting it about his person.”) *Bruen* itself recognized that “States could lawfully eliminate one kind of public carry—concealed carry—so long as they left open the option to carry openly.” *Bruen*, 142 S. Ct. at 2150.

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carry, not a type of weapon, and that *Heller* found them non-analogous to D.C.'s ban on "commonly held arms." (Pls.' Reply at 13.) However, *Heller* and *Bruen* were not considering a modern and unprecedented societal problem, which warrants a more nuanced analysis; both cases also found only that a prohibition on concealed weapons did not impose the same level of burden as a complete ban or proper-cause requirement for the "quintessential self-defense weapon," not that concealed weapon prohibitions may never be an analogue for other types of restrictions imposing only comparable burdens. *See Heller*, 554 U.S. at 629; *Bruen*, 142 S. Ct. at 2143-44, 2150. Defendants have produced sufficient evidence demonstrating that concealed carry statutes were part of a broader tradition of targeting specific dangers posed by the characteristics and unlawful use of particular weapons, and that those regulations were considered constitutional because they left available sufficient avenues of carrying firearms for self-defense. The Challenged Statutes do the same; they are tailored to address problems of mass shootings and mass casualties that employ the firearms at issue with increasing frequency, and still leave open alternative avenues for exercise the Second Amendment right to self-defense, including through possession of the "quintessential" self-defense weapon: a handgun or revolver.

*Appendix B***(3) Overall Conclusion on Whether Defendant's Historical Analogues are Relevantly Similar to the Challenged Statutes**

Plaintiffs insist that the Founders would never have tolerated a ban of a particular kind of gun because free, white male citizens were required to have firearms and ammunition, indicating that early Founding-era regulations were meant to require gun ownership rather than restrict it. (Pls.' Reply at 15.) Mass killings, Plaintiffs maintain, were a problem that existed at the time of the Founding, and the Founding generation's solution was for law-abiding citizens to engage in self-help by defending themselves and their neighbors, rather than broadly disarming the populace of particular weapons to prevent the unlawful from utilizing them. (*Id.* at 16).

Defendants respond that the Founders saw the right to self-defense as existing in harmony with and being further enabled by reasonable regulation of the right to keep and bear arms in order to maintain peace. (Cornell Decl. ¶¶ 7-9, 52-53.) In Defendants' view, the Challenged Statutes "do not prohibit or impact an entire class of firearms," or even "all semiautomatic firearms, long guns, rifles, or fully automatic firearms," but instead "a small subset of unusually dangerous military-style weapons, features, and magazines" that "are not actually useful or used for any such lawful self-defense purposes in practice." (Defs.' Mem. at 20-21.) The rationale behind the Defendants' submitted historical regulations is the same one that drove the enactment of the Challenged Statutes:

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to respond to growing rates of violence and lethality caused by modern innovations in technology and changing patterns of human behavior by regulating the particular kinds of weapons or modes of carry that were being most often employed by those causing the violence, while leaving open alternative avenues for lawful possession of firearms for purposes of self-defense.

As for the level of burden imposed, *Heller* did not foreclose any kind of restriction on the types of firearms that can be possessed and carried, or even restrictions on firearms that are commonly owned by lawful citizens—only a ban on firearms that are so pervasively used for self-defense that to ban them would “infringe,” or destroy, the right to self-defense.⁵⁴ Unlike the broader category of handguns at issue in *Heller* and *Bruen*, the record developed here demonstrates that assault weapons and LCMs are suboptimal for self-defense. A set of statutes that bans only a subset of each category of firearms that possess new and dangerous characteristics that make them susceptible to abuse by non-law abiding citizens wielding them for unlawful purposes imposes a comparable burden to the regulations on Bowie knives, percussion cap pistols, and other dangerous or concealed weapons, particularly when “there remain more than one thousand firearms that Connecticut residents can purchase for responsible and lawful uses like self-defense,

54. (See Cornell Decl. ¶ 14) (explaining that “infringe” during the time of the Founding era meant to “violate” or “destroy”, as opposed to phrases like “abridge” as used in the First Amendment, which mean to “reduce.”)

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home defense, and other lawful purposes such as hunting and sport shooting.” (Warenda Decl. ¶ 33.)⁵⁵

V. Conclusion

Plaintiffs have failed to show their likelihood of success on the merits, and so the Court need not reach the remaining preliminary injunction factors. The motion for preliminary injunction is DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

/s/ Janet Bond Arterton, U.S.D.J.

Dated at New Haven, Connecticut this 3rd day of
August, 2023

55. Because Defendants have already identified two historical analogues and given the *Bruen* and *Heller* courts’ skepticism of the applicability of gunpowder regulations to firearm regulation, the Court declines to address the parties’ arguments regarding whether gunpowder regulations are relevantly similar analogues.

**APPENDIX C — CONSTITUTIONAL AND
STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED**

U.S. Const. amend. II

A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed.

Provisions of General Statutes of Connecticut

§ 53-202a. Assault weapons: Definitions

As used in this section and sections 53-202b to 53-202k, inclusive:

(1) “Assault weapon” means:

(A) (i) Any selective-fire firearm capable of fully automatic, semiautomatic or burst fire at the option of the user or any of the following specified semiautomatic firearms: Algimec Agmi; Armalite AR-180; Australian Automatic Arms SAP Pistol; Auto-Ordnance Thompson type; Avtomat Kalashnikov AK-47 type; Barrett Light-Fifty model 82A1; Beretta AR-70; Bushmaster Auto Rifle and Auto Pistol; Calico models M-900, M-950 and 100-P; Chartered Industries of Singapore SR-88; Colt AR-15 and Sporter; Daewoo K-1, K-2, Max-1 and Max-2; Encom MK-IV, MP-9 and MP-45; Fabrique Nationale FN/FAL, FN/LAR, or FN/FNC; FAMAS MAS 223; Feather AT-9 and Mini-AT; Federal XC-900 and XC-450; Franchi SPAS-12 and LAW-12; Galil AR and ARM; Goncz High-Tech Carbine and High-Tech Long Pistol; Heckler & Koch

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HK-91, HK-93, HK-94 and SP-89; Holmes MP-83; MAC-10, MAC-11 and MAC-11 Carbine type; Intratec TEC-9 and Scorpion; Iver Johnson Enforcer model 3000; Ruger Mini-14/5F folding stock model only; Scarab Skorpion; SIG 57 AMT and 500 series; Spectre Auto Carbine and Auto Pistol; Springfield Armory BM59, SAR-48 and G-3; Sterling MK-6 and MK-7; Steyr AUG; Street Sweeper and Striker 12 revolving cylinder shotguns; USAS-12; UZI Carbine, Mini-Carbine and Pistol; Weaver Arms Nighthawk; Wilkinson “Linda” Pistol;

(ii) A part or combination of parts designed or intended to convert a firearm into an assault weapon, as defined in subparagraph (A)(i) of this subdivision, or any combination of parts from which an assault weapon, as defined in subparagraph (A)(i) of this subdivision, may be rapidly assembled if those parts are in the possession or under the control of the same person;

(B) Any of the following specified semiautomatic centerfire rifles, or copies or duplicates thereof with the capability of any such rifles, that were in production prior to or on April 4, 2013: (i) AK-47; (ii) AK-74; (iii) AKM; (iv) AKS-74U; (v) ARM; (vi) MAADI AK47; (vii) MAK90; (viii) MISR; (ix) NHM90 and NHM91; (x) Norinco 56, 56S, 84S and 86S; (xi) Poly Technologies AKS and AK47; (xii) SA 85; (xiii) SA 93; (xiv) VEPR; (xv) WASR-10; (xvi) WUM; (xvii) Rock River Arms LAR-47; (xviii) Vector Arms AK-47; (xix) AR-10; (xx) AR-15; (xxi) Bushmaster Carbon 15, Bushmaster XM15, Bushmaster ACR Rifles, Bushmaster MOE Rifles; (xxii) Colt Match Target Rifles; (xxiii) Armalite M15; (xxiv) Olympic Arms AR-15, A1,

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CAR, PCR, K3B, K30R, K16, K48, K8 and K9 Rifles; (xxv) DPMS Tactical Rifles; (xxvi) Smith and Wesson M&P15 Rifles; (xxvii) Rock River Arms LAR-15; (xxviii) Doublestar AR Rifles; (xxix) Barrett REC7; (xxx) Beretta Storm; (xxxi) Calico Liberty 50, 50 Tactical, 100, 100 Tactical, I, I Tactical, II and II Tactical Rifles; (xxxii) Hi-Point Carbine Rifles; (xxxiii) HK-PSG-1; (xxxiv) Kel-Tec Sub-2000, SU Rifles, and RFB; (xxxv) Remington Tactical Rifle Model 7615; (xxxvi) SAR-8, SAR-4800 and SR9; (xxxvii) SLG 95; (xxxviii) SLR 95 or 96; (xxxix) TNW M230 and M2HB; (xl) Vector Arms UZI; (xli) Galil and Galil Sporter; (xlii) Daewoo AR 100 and AR 110C; (xliii) Fabrique Nationale/FN 308 Match and L1A1 Sporter; (xliv) HK USC; (xlv) IZHMASH Saiga AK; (xlvi) SIG Sauer 551-A1, 556, 516, 716 and M400 Rifles; (xlvii) Valmet M62S, M71S and M78S; (xlviii) Wilkinson Arms Linda Carbine; and (xlix) Barrett M107A1;

(C) Any of the following specified semiautomatic pistols, or copies or duplicates thereof with the capability of any such pistols, that were in production prior to or on April 4, 2013: (i) Centurion 39 AK; (ii) Draco AK-47; (iii) HCR AK-47; (iv) IO Inc. Hellpup AK-47; (v) Mini-Draco AK-47; (vi) Yugo Krebs Krink; (vii) American Spirit AR-15; (viii) Bushmaster Carbon 15; (ix) Doublestar Corporation AR; (x) DPMS AR-15; (xi) Olympic Arms AR-15; (xii) Rock River Arms LAR 15; (xiii) Calico Liberty III and III Tactical Pistols; (xiv) Masterpiece Arms MPA Pistols and Velocity Arms VMA Pistols; (xv) Intratec TEC-DC9 and AB-10; (xvi) Colefire Magnum; (xvii) German Sport 522 PK and Chiappa Firearms Mfour-22; (xviii) DSA SA58 PKP FAL; (xix) I.O. Inc. PPS-43C; (xx) Kel-Tec PLR-16

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Pistol; (xxi) Sig Sauer P516 and P556 Pistols; and (xxii) Thompson TA5 Pistols;

(D) Any of the following semiautomatic shotguns, or copies or duplicates thereof with the capability of any such shotguns, that were in production prior to or on April 4, 2013: All IZHMASH Saiga 12 Shotguns;

(E) Any semiautomatic firearm regardless of whether such firearm is listed in subparagraphs (A) to (D), inclusive, of this subdivision, and regardless of the date such firearm was produced, that meets the following criteria:

(i) A semiautomatic, centerfire rifle that has an ability to accept a detachable magazine and has at least one of the following:

(I) A folding or telescoping stock;

(II) Any grip of the weapon, including a pistol grip, a thumbhole stock, or any other stock, the use of which would allow an individual to grip the weapon, resulting in any finger on the trigger hand in addition to the trigger finger being directly below any portion of the action of the weapon when firing;

(III) A forward pistol grip;

(IV) A flash suppressor; or

(V) A grenade launcher or flare launcher; or

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(ii) A semiautomatic, centerfire rifle that has a fixed magazine with the ability to accept more than ten rounds; or

(iii) A semiautomatic, centerfire rifle that has an overall length of less than thirty inches; or

(iv) A semiautomatic pistol that has an ability to accept a detachable magazine and has at least one of the following:

(I) An ability to accept a detachable ammunition magazine that attaches at some location outside of the pistol grip;

(II) A threaded barrel capable of accepting a flash suppressor, forward pistol grip or silencer;

(III) A shroud that is attached to, or partially or completely encircles, the barrel and that permits the shooter to fire the firearm without being burned, except a slide that encloses the barrel; or

(IV) A second hand grip; or

(v) A semiautomatic pistol with a fixed magazine that has the ability to accept more than ten rounds; or

(vi) A semiautomatic shotgun that has both of the following:

(I) A folding or telescoping stock; and

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(II) Any grip of the weapon, including a pistol grip, a thumbhole stock, or any other stock, the use of which would allow an individual to grip the weapon, resulting in any finger on the trigger hand in addition to the trigger finger being directly below any portion of the action of the weapon when firing; or

(vii) A semiautomatic shotgun that has the ability to accept a detachable magazine; or

(viii) A shotgun with a revolving cylinder; or

(ix) Any semiautomatic firearm that meets the criteria set forth in subdivision (3) or (4) of subsection (a) of section 53-202a of the general statutes, revision of 1958, revised to January 1, 2013; or

(F) A part or combination of parts designed or intended to convert a firearm into an assault weapon, as defined in any provision of subparagraphs (B) to (E), inclusive, of this subdivision, or any combination of parts from which an assault weapon, as defined in any provision of subparagraphs (B) to (E), inclusive, of this subdivision, may be assembled if those parts are in the possession or under the control of the same person;

(G) Any semiautomatic firearm other than a pistol, revolver, rifle or shotgun, regardless of whether such firearm is listed in subparagraphs (A) to (D), inclusive, of this subdivision, and regardless of the date such firearm was produced, that has at least one of the following:

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- (i) Any grip of the weapon, including a pistol grip, a thumbhole stock or any other stock, the use of which would allow an individual to grip the weapon, resulting in any finger on the trigger hand in addition to the trigger finger being directly below any portion of the action of the weapon when firing;
- (ii) An ability to accept a detachable ammunition magazine that attaches at some location outside of the pistol grip;
- (iii) A fixed magazine with the ability to accept more than ten rounds;
- (iv) A flash suppressor or silencer, or a threaded barrel capable of accepting a flash suppressor or silencer;
- (v) A shroud that is attached to, or partially or completely encircles, the barrel and that permits the shooter to fire the firearm without being burned, except a slide that encloses the barrel;
- (vi) A second hand grip; or
- (vii) An arm brace or other stabilizing brace that could allow such firearm to be fired from the shoulder, with or without a strap designed to attach to an individual's arm;
- (H) Any semiautomatic firearm that meets the criteria set forth in subdivision (3) or (4) of subsection (a) of section 53-202a of the general statutes, revision of 1958, revised to January 1, 2013, that was legally manufactured prior to September 13, 1994; or

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(I) A combination of parts designed or intended to convert a firearm into an assault weapon, as defined in any provision of subparagraph (G) or (H) of this subdivision, or any combination of parts from which an assault weapon, as defined in any provision of subparagraph (G) or (H) of this subdivision, may be assembled if those parts are in the possession or under the control of the same person;

(2) “Assault weapon” does not include (A) any firearm modified to render it permanently inoperable, or (B) a part or any combination of parts of an assault weapon, that are not assembled as an assault weapon, when in the possession of a licensed gun dealer, as defined in subsection (f) of section 53-202f, or a gunsmith who is in the licensed gun dealer’s employ, for the purposes of servicing or repairing lawfully possessed assault weapons under sections 53-202a to 53-202k, inclusive;

(3) “Action of the weapon” means the part of the firearm that loads, fires and ejects a cartridge, which part includes, but is not limited to, the upper and lower receiver, charging handle, forward assist, magazine release and shell deflector;

(4) “Detachable magazine” means an ammunition feeding device that can be removed without disassembling the firearm action;

(5) “Firearm” means a firearm, as defined in section 53a-3;

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(6) “Forward pistol grip” means any feature capable of functioning as a grip that can be held by the nontrigger hand;

(7) “Lawfully possesses” means:

(A) With respect to an assault weapon described in any provision of subparagraphs (B) to (F), inclusive, of subdivision (1) of this section, (i) actual possession that is lawful under sections 53-202b to 53-202k, (ii) constructive possession pursuant to a lawful purchase transacted prior to or on April 4, 2013, regardless of whether the assault weapon was delivered to the purchaser prior to or on April 4, 2013, which lawful purchase is evidenced by a writing sufficient to indicate that (I) a contract for sale was made between the parties prior to or on April 4, 2013, for the purchase of the assault weapon, or (II) full or partial payment for the assault weapon was made by the purchaser to the seller of the assault weapon prior to or on April 4, 2013, or (iii) actual possession under subparagraph (A)(i) of this subdivision, or constructive possession under subparagraph (A)(ii) of this subdivision, as evidenced by a written statement made under penalty of false statement on such form as the Commissioner of Emergency Services and Public Protection prescribes; or

(B) With respect to a 2023 assault weapon, (i) actual possession that is lawful under sections 53-202b to 53-202k, inclusive, (ii) constructive possession pursuant to a lawful purchase transacted prior to June 6, 2023, regardless of whether such assault weapon was delivered to the purchaser prior to June 6, 2023, which lawful

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purchase is evidenced by a writing sufficient to indicate that (I) a contract for sale was made between the parties prior to June 6, 2023, for the purchase of such assault weapon, or (II) full or partial payment for such assault weapon was made by the purchaser to the seller of such assault weapon prior to June 6, 2023, or (iii) actual possession under subparagraph (B)(i) of this subdivision, or constructive possession under subparagraph (B)(ii) of this subdivision, as evidenced by a written statement made under penalty of false statement on such form as the Commissioner of Emergency Services and Public Protection prescribes;

(8) “Pistol grip” means a grip or similar feature that can function as a grip for the trigger hand;

(9) “Second hand grip” means a grip or similar feature that can function as a grip that is additional to the trigger hand grip; and

(10) “2023 assault weapon” means an assault weapon described in any provision of subparagraphs (G) to (I), inclusive, of subdivision (1) of this section.

§ 53-202b. Sale or transfer of assault weapon prohibited. Exemptions. Olympic pistols. Regulations. Class C felony

(a) (1) Any person who, within this state, distributes, transports or imports into the state, keeps for sale, or offers or exposes for sale, or who gives any assault weapon, except as provided by sections 53-202a to 53-202k,

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inclusive, shall be guilty of a class C felony and shall be sentenced to a term of imprisonment of which two years may not be suspended or reduced by the court.

(2) Any person who transfers, sells or gives any assault weapon to a person under eighteen years of age in violation of subdivision (1) of this subsection shall be sentenced to a term of imprisonment of six years, which shall not be suspended or reduced by the court and shall be in addition and consecutive to the term of imprisonment imposed under subdivision (1) of this subsection.

(b) The provisions of subsection (a) of this section shall not apply to:

(1) The sale of assault weapons to: (A) The Department of Emergency Services and Public Protection, police departments, the Department of Correction, the Division of Criminal Justice, the Department of Motor Vehicles, the Department of Energy and Environmental Protection or the military or naval forces of this state or of the United States; (B) a sworn and duly certified member of an organized police department, the Division of State Police within the Department of Emergency Services and Public Protection or the Department of Correction, a chief inspector or inspector in the Division of Criminal Justice, a salaried inspector of motor vehicles designated by the Commissioner of Motor Vehicles, a conservation officer or special conservation officer appointed by the Commissioner of Energy and Environmental Protection pursuant to section 26-5, or a constable who is certified by the Police Officer Standards and Training Council and

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appointed by the chief executive authority of a town, city or borough to perform criminal law enforcement duties, pursuant to a letter on the letterhead of such department, division, commissioner or authority authorizing the purchase and stating that the sworn member, inspector, officer or constable will use the assault weapon in the discharge of official duties, and that a records check indicates that the sworn member, inspector, officer or constable has not been convicted of a crime of family violence, for use by such sworn member, inspector, officer or constable in the discharge of such sworn member's, inspector's, officer's or constable's official duties or when off duty, (C) a member of the military or naval forces of this state or of the United States, or (D) a nuclear facility licensed by the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission for the purpose of providing security services at such facility, or any contractor or subcontractor of such facility for the purpose of providing security services at such facility;

(2) A person who is the executor or administrator of an estate that includes an assault weapon for which a certificate of possession has been issued under section 53-202d which is disposed of as authorized by the Probate Court, if the disposition is otherwise permitted by sections 53-202a to 53-202k, inclusive;

(3) The transfer of an assault weapon for which a certificate of possession has been issued under section 53-202d, by bequest or intestate succession, or, upon the death of a testator or settlor: (A) To a trust, or (B) from a trust to a beneficiary who is eligible to possess the assault weapon;

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(4) The sale of a semiautomatic pistol that is defined as an assault weapon in any provision of subparagraphs (B) to (F), inclusive, of subdivision (1) of section 53-202a that the Commissioner of Emergency Services and Public Protection designates as being designed expressly for use in target shooting events at the Olympic games sponsored by the International Olympic Committee pursuant to regulations adopted under this subdivision, and for which the purchaser signs a form prescribed by the commissioner and provided by the seller that indicates that the pistol will be used by the purchaser primarily for target shooting practice and events. The Commissioner of Emergency Services and Public Protection shall adopt regulations, in accordance with chapter 54,¹ to designate semiautomatic pistols that are defined as assault weapons in any provision of subparagraphs (B) to (F), inclusive, of subdivision (1) of section 53-202a that may be sold pursuant to this subdivision, provided the use of such pistols is sanctioned by the International Olympic Committee and USA Shooting, or any subsequent corresponding governing board for international shooting competition in the United States.

§ 53-202c. Possession of assault weapon prohibited. Exemptions. Class D felony

(a) Except as provided in section 53-202e, any person who, within this state, possesses an assault weapon, except as provided in sections 53-202a to 53-202k, inclusive, and 53-202o, shall be guilty of a class D felony and shall be sentenced to a term of imprisonment of which one year may not be suspended or reduced by the court, except

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that a first-time violation of this subsection shall be a class A misdemeanor if (1) the person presents proof that such person lawfully possessed the assault weapon (A) prior to October 1, 1993, with respect to an assault weapon described in subparagraph (A) of subdivision (1) of section 53-202a, (B) on April 4, 2013, under the provisions of sections 53-202a to 53-202k, inclusive, in effect on January 1, 2013, with respect to an assault weapon described in any provision of subparagraphs (B) to (F), inclusive, of subdivision (1) of section 53-202a, or (C) on June 5, 2023, under the provisions of sections 53-202a to 53-202k, inclusive, revision of 1958, revised to January 1, 2023, with respect to an assault weapon defined as a 2023 assault weapon in section 53-202a, and (2) the person has otherwise possessed the assault weapon in compliance with subsection (f) of section 53-202d.

(b) The provisions of subsection (a) of this section shall not apply to the possession of assault weapons by: (1) The Department of Emergency Services and Public Protection, police departments, the Department of Correction, the Division of Criminal Justice, the Department of Motor Vehicles, the Department of Energy and Environmental Protection or the military or naval forces of this state or of the United States, (2) a sworn and duly certified member of an organized police department, the Division of State Police within the Department of Emergency Services and Public Protection or the Department of Correction, a chief inspector or inspector in the Division of Criminal Justice, a salaried inspector of motor vehicles designated by the Commissioner of Motor Vehicles, a conservation officer or special conservation officer appointed by the

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Commissioner of Energy and Environmental Protection pursuant to section 26-5, or a constable who is certified by the Police Officer Standards and Training Council and appointed by the chief executive authority of a town, city or borough to perform criminal law enforcement duties, for use by such sworn member, inspector, officer or constable in the discharge of such sworn member's, inspector's, officer's or constable's official duties or when off duty, (3) a member of the military or naval forces of this state or of the United States, or (4) a nuclear facility licensed by the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission for the purpose of providing security services at such facility, or any contractor or subcontractor of such facility for the purpose of providing security services at such facility.

(c) The provisions of subsection (a) of this section shall not apply to the possession of an assault weapon described in subparagraph (A) of subdivision (1) of section 53-202a by any person prior to July 1, 1994, if all of the following are applicable:

(1) The person is eligible under sections 53-202a to 53-202k, inclusive, to apply for a certificate of possession for the assault weapon by July 1, 1994;

(2) The person lawfully possessed the assault weapon prior to October 1, 1993; and

(3) The person is otherwise in compliance with sections 53-202a to 53-202k, inclusive.

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(d) The provisions of subsection (a) of this section shall not apply to the possession of an assault weapon described in any provision of subparagraphs (B) to (F), inclusive, of subdivision (1) of section 53-202a by any person prior to April 5, 2013, if all of the following are applicable:

(1) The person is eligible under sections 53-202a to 53-202k, inclusive, to apply for a certificate of possession for the assault weapon by January 1, 2014;

(2) The person lawfully possessed the assault weapon on April 4, 2013, under the provisions of sections 53-202a to 53-202k, inclusive, in effect on January 1, 2013; and

(3) The person is otherwise in compliance with sections 53-202a to 53-202k, inclusive.

(e) The provisions of subsection (a) of this section shall not apply to the possession of a 2023 assault weapon by any person prior to May 1, 2024, if all of the following are applicable:

(1) The person is eligible under sections 53-202a to 53-202k, inclusive, to apply for a certificate of possession for such assault weapon by May 1, 2024;

(2) The person lawfully possessed such assault weapon on June 5, 2023, under the provisions of sections 53-202a to 53-202k, inclusive, and section 53-202m of the general statutes, revision of 1958, revised to January 1, 2023; and

(3) The person is otherwise in compliance with sections 53-202a to 53-202k, inclusive.

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(f) The provisions of subsection (a) of this section shall not apply to the possession of a 2023 assault weapon by any person if all of the following are applicable:

(1) Such assault weapon was reclassified for federal purposes as a rifle pursuant to the amendments to 27 CFR Parts 478 and 479 published at 88 Federal Register 6478 (January 31, 2023).

(2) The person applied to register such assault weapon under the National Firearms Act, P. L. 73-474, as amended from time to time, using the form known as Form 1 published by the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives, and submitted a copy of such form to the Department of Emergency Services and Public Protection not later than August 1, 2023, and the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives has approved such application, has denied such application within the past thirty days, or has not yet processed such application.

(3) The person lawfully possessed such assault weapon on June 5, 2023, under the provisions of sections 53-202a to 53-202k, inclusive, and section 53-202m of the general statutes, revision of 1958, revised to January 1, 2023; and

(4) The person is otherwise in compliance with sections 53-202a to 53-202k, inclusive.

(g) The provisions of subsection (a) of this section shall not apply to a person who is the executor or administrator of an estate that includes an assault weapon, or the trustee of a trust that includes an assault weapon, for which a

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certificate of possession has been issued under section 53-202d if the assault weapon is possessed at a place set forth in subdivision (1) of subsection (f) of section 53-202d or as authorized by the Probate Court.

(h) The provisions of subsection (a) of this section shall not apply to the possession of a semiautomatic pistol that is defined as an assault weapon in any provision of subparagraphs (B) to (F), inclusive, of subdivision (1) of section 53-202a that the Commissioner of Emergency Services and Public Protection designates as being designed expressly for use in target shooting events at the Olympic games sponsored by the International Olympic Committee pursuant to regulations adopted under subdivision (4) of subsection (b) of section 53-202b that is (1) possessed and transported in accordance with subsection (f) of section 53-202d, or (2) possessed at or transported to or from a collegiate, Olympic or target pistol shooting competition in this state which is sponsored by, conducted under the auspices of, or approved by a law enforcement agency or a nationally or state recognized entity that fosters proficiency in, or promotes education about, firearms, provided such pistol is transported in the manner prescribed in subsection (a) of section 53-202f.

**§ 53-202d. Certificate of possession of assault weapon.
Certificate of transfer of assault weapon to gun dealer.
Circumstances where possession of assault weapon
authorized**

(a) (1) (A) Except as provided in subparagraph (B) of this subdivision, any person who lawfully possesses an assault

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weapon, as defined in subparagraph (A) of subdivision (1) of section 53-202a, prior to October 1, 1993, shall apply by October 1, 1994, or, if such person is a member of the military or naval forces of this state or of the United States and is unable to apply by October 1, 1994, because such member is or was on official duty outside of this state, shall apply within ninety days of returning to the state to the Department of Emergency Services and Public Protection, for a certificate of possession with respect to such assault weapon.

(B) No person who lawfully possesses an assault weapon pursuant to subdivision (1), (2) or (4) of subsection (b) of section 53-202c shall be required to obtain a certificate of possession pursuant to this subdivision with respect to an assault weapon used for official duties, except that any person described in subdivision (2) of subsection (b) of section 53-202c who purchases an assault weapon, as defined in subparagraph (A) of subdivision (1) of section 53-202a, for use in the discharge of official duties who retires or is otherwise separated from service shall apply within ninety days of such retirement or separation from service to the Department of Emergency Services and Public Protection for a certificate of possession with respect to such assault weapon.

(2) (A) Except as provided in subparagraph (B) of this subdivision, any person who lawfully possesses an assault weapon, as defined in any provision of subparagraphs (B) to (F), inclusive, of subdivision (1) of section 53-202a, on April 4, 2013, under the provisions of sections 53-202a to 53-202k, inclusive, in effect on January 1, 2013, or any

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person who regains possession of an assault weapon as defined in any provision of said subparagraphs pursuant to subsection (e) of section 53-202f, or any person who lawfully purchases a firearm on or after April 4, 2013, but prior to June 18, 2013, that meets the criteria set forth in subdivision (3) or (4) of subsection (a) of section 53-202a of the general statutes, revision of 1958, revised to January 1, 2013, shall apply by January 1, 2014, or, if such person is a member of the military or naval forces of this state or of the United States and is unable to apply by January 1, 2014, because such member is or was on official duty outside of this state, shall apply within ninety days of returning to the state to the Department of Emergency Services and Public Protection for a certificate of possession with respect to such assault weapon. Any person who lawfully purchases a semiautomatic pistol that is defined as an assault weapon in any provision of subparagraphs (B) to (F), inclusive, of subdivision (1) of section 53-202a that the Commissioner of Emergency Services and Public Protection designates as being designed expressly for use in target shooting events at the Olympic games sponsored by the International Olympic Committee pursuant to regulations adopted under subdivision (4) of subsection (b) of section 53-202b shall apply within ninety days of such purchase to the Department of Emergency Services and Public Protection for a certificate of possession with respect to such assault weapon.

(B) No person who lawfully possesses an assault weapon pursuant to subdivision (1), (2) or (4) of subsection (b) of section 53-202c shall be required to obtain a certificate of possession pursuant to this subdivision with respect

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to an assault weapon used for official duties, except that any person described in subdivision (2) of subsection (b) of section 53-202c who purchases an assault weapon, as defined in any provision of subparagraphs (B) to (F), inclusive, of subdivision (1) of section 53-202a for use in the discharge of official duties who retires or is otherwise separated from service shall apply within ninety days of such retirement or separation from service to the Department of Emergency Services and Public Protection for a certificate of possession with respect to such assault weapon.

(3) Any person who obtained a certificate of possession for an assault weapon, as defined in subparagraph (A) of subdivision (1) of section 53-202a, prior to April 5, 2013, that is defined as an assault weapon pursuant to any provision of subparagraphs (B) to (F), inclusive, of subdivision (1) of section 53-202a shall be deemed to have obtained a certificate of possession for such assault weapon for the purposes of sections 53-202a to 53-202k, inclusive, and shall not be required to obtain a subsequent certificate of possession for such assault weapon.

(4) (A) Except as provided in subparagraphs (B) and (C) of this subdivision, any person who lawfully possesses a 2023 assault weapon on June 5, 2023, under the provisions of sections 53-202a to 53-202k, inclusive, in effect on January 1, 2023, or any person who regains possession of a 2023 assault weapon pursuant to subdivision (2) of subsection (e) of section 53-202f, shall apply by May 1, 2024, or, if such person is a member of the military or naval forces of this state or of the United States and is

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unable to apply by May 1, 2024, because such member is or was on official duty outside of this state, shall apply within ninety days of returning to the state to the Department of Emergency Services and Public Protection for a certificate of possession with respect to such assault weapon. The Department of Emergency Services and Public Protection shall accept applications both in paper and electronic form, to the extent practicable, and shall not require such applications be notarized.

(B) No person who lawfully possesses an assault weapon pursuant to subdivision (1), (2) or (4) of subsection (b) of section 53-202c shall be required to obtain a certificate of possession pursuant to this subdivision with respect to an assault weapon used for official duties, except that any person described in subdivision (2) of subsection (b) of section 53-202c who purchases a 2023 assault weapon for use in the discharge of official duties who retires or is otherwise separated from service shall apply within ninety days of such retirement or separation from service to the Department of Emergency Services and Public Protection for a certificate of possession with respect to such assault weapon.

(C) Any person who lawfully possesses a 2023 assault weapon pursuant to the provisions of subsection (f) of section 53-202c and whose Form 1 application to the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives has not yet been processed may, instead of following the procedure specified in subparagraph (A) of this subdivision, apply by May 1, 2024, to the Department of Emergency Services and Public Protection for a

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temporary certificate of possession with respect to such assault weapon. Such temporary certificate of possession shall expire on the earlier of January 1, 2027, and the date seven days succeeding a denial of the Form 1 application. When the Form 1 application is approved with respect to such assault weapon, such person may apply to the Department of Emergency Services and Public Protection to convert such temporary certificate of possession into a certificate of possession with respect to such assault weapon. If a complete application to convert is received, the Commissioner of Emergency Services and Public Protection shall approve the application. For the purposes of this subparagraph, a full and complete Form 1 application submitted to the Department of Emergency Services and Public Protection in a form and manner determined by the department shall be sufficient to constitute a complete application for a temporary certificate of possession, and a copy of the notice that a Form 1 application has been approved shall constitute a complete application to convert a temporary certificate of possession into a certificate of possession. The Department of Emergency Services and Public Protection shall accept applications under this subparagraph both in paper and electronic form, to the extent practicable, and shall not require such applications to be notarized.

(5) Any person who obtained a certificate of possession for an assault weapon, as defined in any provision of subparagraphs (A) to (F), inclusive, of subdivision (1) of section 53-202a prior to June 6, 2023, that is also a 2023 assault weapon shall be deemed to have obtained a certificate of possession for such assault weapon for the

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purposes of sections 53-202a to 53-202k, inclusive, and shall not be required to obtain a subsequent certificate of possession for such assault weapon.

(6) The certificate of possession shall contain a description of the firearm that identifies it uniquely, including all identification marks, the full name, address, date of birth and thumbprint of the owner, and any other information as the department may deem appropriate.

(7) The department shall adopt regulations, in accordance with the provisions of chapter 54,¹ to establish procedures with respect to the application for and issuance of certificates of possession pursuant to this section. Notwithstanding the provisions of sections 1-210 and 1-211, the name and address of a person issued a certificate of possession shall be confidential and shall not be disclosed, except such records may be disclosed to (A) law enforcement agencies and employees of the United States Probation Office acting in the performance of their duties and parole officers within the Department of Correction acting in the performance of their duties, and (B) the Commissioner of Mental Health and Addiction Services to carry out the provisions of subsection (c) of section 17a-500.

(b) (1) No assault weapon, as defined in subparagraph (A) of subdivision (1) of section 53-202a, possessed pursuant to a certificate of possession issued under this section may be sold or transferred on or after January 1, 1994, to any person within this state other than to a licensed gun dealer, as defined in subsection (f) of section 53-202f, or

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as provided in section 53-202e, or by bequest or intestate succession, or, upon the death of a testator or settlor: (A) To a trust, or (B) from a trust to a beneficiary who is eligible to possess the assault weapon.

(2) No assault weapon, as defined in any provision of subparagraphs (B) to (F), inclusive, of subdivision (1) of section 53-202a, possessed pursuant to a certificate of possession issued under this section may be sold or transferred on or after April 5, 2013, to any person within this state other than to a licensed gun dealer, as defined in subsection (f) of section 53-202f, or as provided in section 53-202e, or by bequest or intestate succession, or, upon the death of a testator or settlor: (A) To a trust, or (B) from a trust to a beneficiary who is eligible to possess the assault weapon.

(3) No 2023 assault weapon possessed pursuant to a certificate of possession issued under this section may be sold or transferred on or after June 6, 2023, to any person within this state other than to a licensed gun dealer, or as provided in section 53-202e, or by bequest or intestate succession, or, upon the death of a testator or settlor: (A) To a trust, or (B) from a trust to a beneficiary who is eligible to possess the assault weapon.

(c) Any person who obtains title to an assault weapon for which a certificate of possession has been issued under this section by bequest or intestate succession shall, within ninety days of obtaining title, apply to the Department of Emergency Services and Public Protection for a certificate of possession as provided in subsection

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(a) of this section, render the assault weapon permanently inoperable, sell the assault weapon to a licensed gun dealer or remove the assault weapon from the state.

(d) Any person who moves into the state in lawful possession of an assault weapon, shall, within ninety days, either render the assault weapon permanently inoperable, sell the assault weapon to a licensed gun dealer or remove the assault weapon from this state, except that any person who is a member of the military or naval forces of this state or of the United States, is in lawful possession of an assault weapon and has been transferred into the state after October 1, 1994, may, within ninety days of arriving in the state, apply to the Department of Emergency Services and Public Protection for a certificate of possession with respect to such assault weapon.

(e) If an owner of an assault weapon sells or transfers the assault weapon to a licensed gun dealer, such dealer shall, at the time of delivery of the assault weapon, execute a certificate of transfer and cause the certificate of transfer to be mailed or delivered to the Commissioner of Emergency Services and Public Protection. The certificate of transfer shall contain: (1) The date of sale or transfer; (2) the name and address of the seller or transferor and the licensed gun dealer, their Social Security numbers or motor vehicle operator license numbers, if applicable; (3) the licensed gun dealer's federal firearms license number and seller's permit number; (4) a description of the assault weapon, including the caliber of the assault weapon and its make, model and serial number; and (5) any other information the commissioner prescribes. The licensed gun dealer shall

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present such dealer's motor vehicle operator's license or Social Security card, federal firearms license and seller's permit to the seller or transferor for inspection at the time of purchase or transfer. The Commissioner of Emergency Services and Public Protection shall maintain a file of all certificates of transfer at the commissioner's central office.

(f) Any person who has been issued a certificate of possession for an assault weapon under this section may possess the assault weapon only under the following conditions:

- (1) At that person's residence, place of business or other property owned by that person, or on property owned by another person with the owner's express permission;
- (2) While on the premises of a target range of a public or private club or organization organized for the purpose of practicing shooting at targets;
- (3) While on a target range which holds a regulatory or business license for the purpose of practicing shooting at that target range;
- (4) While on the premises of a licensed shooting club;
- (5) While attending any exhibition, display or educational project which is about firearms and which is sponsored by, conducted under the auspices of, or approved by a law enforcement agency or a nationally or state recognized entity that fosters proficiency in, or promotes education about, firearms;

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(6) While transporting the assault weapon between any of the places set forth in this subsection, or to any licensed gun dealer, as defined in subsection (f) of section 53-202f, for servicing or repair pursuant to subsection (c) of section 53-202f, provided the assault weapon is transported as required by section 53-202f;

(7) With respect to a nonresident of this state, while transporting a semiautomatic pistol that is defined as an assault weapon in any provision of subparagraphs (B) to (F), inclusive, of subdivision (1) of section 53-202a that the Commissioner of Emergency Services and Public Protection designates as being designed expressly for use in target shooting events at the Olympic games sponsored by the International Olympic Committee pursuant to regulations adopted under subdivision (4) of subsection (b) of section 53-202b, into or through this state in order to attend any exhibition, display or educational project described in subdivision (5) of this subsection, or to participate in a collegiate, Olympic or target pistol shooting competition in this state which is sponsored by, conducted under the auspices of, or approved by a law enforcement agency or a nationally or state recognized entity that fosters proficiency in, or promotes education about, firearms, provided (A) such pistol is transported into or through this state not more than forty-eight hours prior to or after such exhibition, display, project or competition, (B) such pistol is unloaded and carried in a locked carrying case and the ammunition for such pistol is carried in a separate locked container, (C) such nonresident has not been convicted of a felony in this state or of an offense in another state that would constitute a

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felony if committed in this state, and (D) such nonresident has in his or her possession a pistol permit or firearms registration card if such permit or card is required for possession of such pistol under the laws of his or her state of residence.

§ 53-202w. Large capacity magazines. Definitions. Sale, transfer or possession prohibited. Exceptions

(a) As used in this section and section 53-202x:

(1) “Large capacity magazine” means any firearm magazine, belt, drum, feed strip or similar device that has the capacity of, or can be readily restored or converted to accept, more than ten rounds of ammunition, but does not include: (A) A feeding device that has been permanently altered so that it cannot accommodate more than ten rounds of ammunition, (B) a .22 caliber tube ammunition feeding device, (C) a tubular magazine that is contained in a lever-action firearm, or (D) a magazine that is permanently inoperable;

(2) “Lawfully possesses”, with respect to a large capacity magazine, means that a person has (A) actual and lawful possession of the large capacity magazine, (B) constructive possession of the large capacity magazine pursuant to a lawful purchase of a firearm that contains a large capacity magazine that was transacted prior to or on April 4, 2013, regardless of whether the firearm was delivered to the purchaser prior to or on April 4, 2013, which lawful purchase is evidenced by a writing sufficient to indicate that (i) a contract for sale was made between the parties

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prior to or on April 4, 2013, for the purchase of the firearm, or (ii) full or partial payment for the firearm was made by the purchaser to the seller of the firearm prior to or on April 4, 2013, or (C) actual possession under subparagraph (A) of this subdivision, or constructive possession under subparagraph (B) of this subdivision, as evidenced by a written statement made under penalty of false statement on such form as the Commissioner of Emergency Services and Public Protection prescribes; and

(3) “Licensed gun dealer” means a person who has a federal firearms license and a permit to sell firearms pursuant to section 29-28.

(b) Except as provided in this section, on and after April 5, 2013, any person who, within this state, distributes, imports into this state, keeps for sale, offers or exposes for sale, or purchases a large capacity magazine shall be guilty of a class D felony. On and after April 5, 2013, any person who, within this state, transfers a large capacity magazine, except as provided in subsection (f) of this section, shall be guilty of a class D felony.

(c) Except as provided in this section and section 53-202x, any person who possesses a large capacity magazine shall be guilty of a (1) class D felony if such person is ineligible to possess a firearm under state or federal law, or (2) class A misdemeanor if such person is not ineligible to possess a firearm under state or federal law.

(d) A large capacity magazine may be possessed, purchased or imported by:

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(1) The Department of Emergency Services and Public Protection, police departments, the Department of Correction, the Division of Criminal Justice, the Department of Motor Vehicles, the Department of Energy and Environmental Protection or the military or naval forces of this state or of the United States;

(2) A sworn and duly certified member of an organized police department, the Division of State Police within the Department of Emergency Services and Public Protection or the Department of Correction, a chief inspector or inspector in the Division of Criminal Justice, a salaried inspector of motor vehicles designated by the Commissioner of Motor Vehicles, a conservation officer or special conservation officer appointed by the Commissioner of Energy and Environmental Protection pursuant to section 26-5, or a constable who is certified by the Police Officer Standards and Training Council and appointed by the chief executive authority of a town, city or borough to perform criminal law enforcement duties, for use by such sworn member, inspector, officer or constable in the discharge of such sworn member's, inspector's, officer's or constable's official duties or when off duty;

(3) A member of the military or naval forces of this state or of the United States;

(4) A nuclear facility licensed by the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission for the purpose of providing security services at such facility, or any contractor or subcontractor of such facility for the purpose of providing security services at such facility;

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(5) Any person who is sworn and acts as a policeman on behalf of an armored car service pursuant to section 29-20 in the discharge of such person's official duties; or

(6) Any person, firm or corporation engaged in the business of manufacturing large capacity magazines in this state that manufactures, purchases, tests or transports large capacity magazines in this state for sale within this state to persons specified in subdivisions (1) to (5), inclusive, of this subsection or for sale outside this state, or a federally-licensed firearm manufacturer engaged in the business of manufacturing firearms or large capacity magazines in this state that manufactures, purchases, tests or transports firearms or large capacity magazines in this state for sale within this state to persons specified in subdivisions (1) to (5), inclusive, of this subsection or for sale outside this state.

(e) A large capacity magazine may be possessed by:

(1) A licensed gun dealer;

(2) A gunsmith who is in a licensed gun dealer's employ, who possesses such large capacity magazine for the purpose of servicing or repairing a lawfully possessed large capacity magazine;

(3) A person, firm, corporation or federally-licensed firearm manufacturer described in subdivision (6) of subsection (d) of this section that possesses a large capacity magazine that is lawfully possessed by another person for the purpose of servicing or repairing the large capacity magazine;

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(4) Any person who has declared possession of the magazine pursuant to section 53-202x; or

(5) Any person who is the executor or administrator of an estate that includes a large capacity magazine, or the trustee of a trust that includes a large capacity magazine, the possession of which has been declared to the Department of Emergency Services and Public Protection pursuant to section 53-202x, which is disposed of as authorized by the Probate Court, if the disposition is otherwise permitted by this section and section 53-202x.

(f) Subsection (b) of this section shall not prohibit:

(1) The transfer of a large capacity magazine, the possession of which has been declared to the Department of Emergency Services and Public Protection pursuant to section 53-202x, by bequest or intestate succession, or, upon the death of a testator or settlor: (A) To a trust, or (B) from a trust to a beneficiary;

(2) The transfer of a large capacity magazine to a police department or the Department of Emergency Services and Public Protection;

(3) The transfer of a large capacity magazine to a licensed gun dealer in accordance with section 53-202x; or

(4) The transfer of a large capacity magazine prior to October 1, 2013, from a licensed gun dealer, pawnbroker licensed under section 21-40, or consignment shop operator, as defined in section 21-39a, to any person who

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(A) possessed the large capacity magazine prior to or on April 4, 2013, (B) placed a firearm that such person legally possessed, with the large capacity magazine included or attached, in the possession of such dealer, pawnbroker or operator prior to or on April 4, 2013, pursuant to an agreement between such person and such dealer, pawnbroker or operator for the sale of the firearm to a third person, and (C) is eligible to possess the firearm on the date of such transfer.

(g) The court may order suspension of prosecution in addition to any other diversionary programs available to the defendant, if the court finds that a violation of this section is not of a serious nature and that the person charged with such violation (1) will probably not offend in the future, (2) has not previously been convicted of a violation of this section, and (3) has not previously had a prosecution under this section suspended pursuant to this subsection, it may order suspension of prosecution in accordance with the provisions of subsection (i) of section 29-33.